

**AEROSPACE  
RECOMMENDED  
PRACTICE**

**ARP5413**

**REV.  
A**

Issued 1999-11  
Cancelled 2007-03

Superseding ARP5413

Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic  
Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning

**RATIONALE**

This document was developed due to the need to update the requirements that were contained in AC 20-136; the agreement within the committee and with the FAA was that when the AC was updated, this document would be cancelled to prevent any type of conflict; the FAA has announced the release of AC 20-136A so this document is no longer needed.

**CANCELLATION NOTICE**

This document has been declared "CANCELLED" as of March 2007. By this action, this document will remain listed in the Numerical Section of the Aerospace Standards Index.

SAENORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of arp5413a

SAE Technical Standards Board Rules provide that: "This report is published by SAE to advance the state of technical and engineering sciences. The use of this report is entirely voluntary, and its applicability and suitability for any particular use, including any patent infringement arising therefrom, is the sole responsibility of the user."

SAE reviews each technical report at least every five years at which time it may be reaffirmed, revised, or cancelled. SAE invites your written comments and suggestions.

Copyright © 2007 SAE International

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of SAE.

**TO PLACE A DOCUMENT ORDER:** Tel: 877-606-7323 (inside USA and Canada)  
Tel: 724-776-4970 (outside USA)  
Fax: 724-776-0790  
Email: CustomerService@sae.org

**SAE WEB ADDRESS:**

<http://www.sae.org>

SAENORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of arp5413a

**Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic  
Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning**

**FOREWORD**

Whenever a reference document appears in this Standard, it carries the minimum revision level of the reference document acceptable to meet the intended requirements. Later versions of the reference document are also acceptable but earlier versions are not acceptable. In all cases, other documents shown to be equivalent to the referenced document are also acceptable.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. SCOPE .....	3
1.1 Purpose .....	3
2. REFERENCES .....	3
2.1 SAE Publications .....	3
2.2 Related FAR and JAR Information .....	4
2.2.1 Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) .....	4
2.2.2 FAA Advisory Circulars .....	4
2.2.3 Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR) .....	4
2.2.4 JAA Advisory and Interpretive Material .....	4
2.3 Related Reading Material .....	5
2.3.1 SAE Publications .....	5
2.3.2 EUROCAE Documents .....	5
2.3.3 RTCA Publications .....	5
2.4 Definitions .....	5
3. BACKGROUND .....	5
4. APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE .....	6

SAE Technical Standards Board Rules provide that: "This report is published by SAE to advance the state of technical and engineering sciences. The use of this report is entirely voluntary, and its applicability and suitability for any particular use, including any patent infringement arising therefrom, is the sole responsibility of the user."

SAE reviews each technical report at least every five years at which time it may be reaffirmed, revised, or cancelled. SAE invites your written comments and suggestions.

Copyright © 2007 SAE International

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of SAE.

**TO PLACE A DOCUMENT ORDER:** Tel: 877-606-7323 (inside USA and Canada)  
Tel: 724-776-4970 (outside USA)  
Fax: 724-776-0790  
Email: CustomerService@sae.org  
**SAE WEB ADDRESS:** http://www.sae.org

**SAE ARP5413 Revision A**

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

5. EFFECTS OF INDUCED TRANSIENTS .....	11
6. MARGINS AND VERIFICATION METHODS .....	11
7. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCE .....	12
8. MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE.....	26
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS .....	27

SAENORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of arp5413a

## SAE ARP5413 Revision A

### 1. SCOPE:

This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) provides guidance for a means of showing compliance with the regulations for hazards caused by the lightning environment to electrical/electronic systems installed either on or within aircraft. Equipment hazards addressed include those due to indirect effects on equipment and its associated wiring that is mounted on the aircraft exterior as well as indirect effects on equipment and its associated wiring located within the aircraft interior. This document applies to new aircraft and equipment designs, modifications of existing aircraft or equipment, and applications of existing (off the shelf) equipment on new aircraft.

NOTE: This ARP does not address direct effects such as burning, eroding, blasting, of aircraft structure nor does it address fuel ignition hazards (see related reading material in 2.3 of this document). This ARP does not address lightning zoning methods or lightning test requirements, methods, and techniques. Coverings (fairing, skin, cowl, etc.) should normally prevent direct attachment of the lightning channel to underlying system components. However, if a direct lightning strike attachment to a system component can occur, a complete evaluation of both direct and indirect effects will be necessary.

It should be noted that electrical/electronic systems or components are sometimes exposed to lightning currents directly conducted from the aircraft exterior, as may happen when an antenna is struck and a portion of lightning current flows in its cable. Care should be taken to identify any such possibilities and either eliminate these situations by design modifications, or address them in the certification plan. No further discussion of these situations is included in this ARP.

#### 1.1 Purpose:

This ARP provides information and guidance concerning a means, but not the only means, of compliance with Parts 23, 25, 27, and 29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR), as applicable for preventing hazards, due to lightning indirect effects, from occurring to electrical/electronic systems.

### 2. REFERENCES:

#### 2.1 SAE Publications:

Available from SAE, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001.

ARP5412, Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms

ARP5414, Aircraft Lightning Zoning

ARP5415 (DRAFT), User's Manual for Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems Against the Indirect Effects of Lightning

ARP5416 (DRAFT), Aircraft Lightning Test Methods

## SAE ARP5413 Revision A

### 2.2 Related FAR and JAR Information:

#### 2.2.1 Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR):

Federal Aviation Regulations 14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29 and 33; Sections .901, .903, .1301, .1309, .1316, .1431, and .1529 (as applicable). 14 CFR Part 33, Sections .28 and .91 (as applicable)

#### 2.2.2 FAA Advisory Circulars: The following Advisory Circulars (AC) may provide additional information:

AC 23.1309-1C, System and Equipment Installations in Part 23 Airplanes, dated March 12, 1999

AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis, dated June 21, 1988

AC 27-1A, Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft, dated August 8, 1985, including to Change 4 dated September 30, 1997

AC 29-2B, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft, dated September 16, 1987, including to Change 3 dated July 31, 1997

AC 21-16D, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics Document DO-160D, dated March, 1998

AC 20-136, Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect Effects of Lightning

#### 2.2.3 Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR):

Joint Airworthiness Requirements Parts 23.1309, 25X899, 25.1309, 25.1431, 27.610, 27.1309, 29.610, 29.1431, JAR E AMJ 20X-1

#### 2.2.4 JAA Advisory and Interpretive Material:

ACJ 25X899, Electrical Bonding and Protection Against Lightning and Static Electricity (Interpretive Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)

ACJ 29.610, Lightning and Static Electricity Protection (Interpretive Material and Acceptable Means of Compliance)

AMJ 20X-1, Certification of Aircraft Propulsion Systems Equipped with Electronic Controls

AMJ 25.1309, System Design and Analysis

AMJ 29.1309, Equipment, System and Installation

## SAE ARP5413 Revision A

### 2.3 Related Reading Material:

A comprehensive discussion on the material in this Standard, with additional guidance information, is available in the following documents:

#### 2.3.1 SAE Publications: Available from SAE, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001:

ARP4754, Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems

#### 2.3.2 EUROCAE Documents:

EUROCAE ED-14D, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, dated July 1997

#### 2.3.3 RTCA Publications: Available from RTCA, Inc., 1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1020, Washington, DC 20036-4001:

RTCA, Inc., DO-160D, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, dated July, 1997

### 2.4 Definitions:

See Appendix A for list of definitions.

## 3. BACKGROUND:

- a. Aircraft electrical/electronic systems may be vulnerable to lightning hazards. Aircraft which utilize an increasing number of electrical/electronic systems are currently being and will continue to be certified.
- b. Lightning indirect effects may result when the electromagnetic fields produced by a direct strike to the aircraft induce voltage and current transients into the electrical/electronic equipment or components. These transients can be produced by electromagnetic field penetration into the aircraft interior or by structural IR (current times resistance) voltage rises due to current flow on the aircraft.
- c. The trend toward increased reliance on electrical/electronic systems for flight and engine control functions, navigation, and instrumentation requires that effective protection against lightning induced transients be designed and incorporated into these systems. Reliance upon redundancy as a sole means of protection against lightning indirect effects is generally not adequate because the electromagnetic fields and structural IR voltages can interact concurrently with all electrical wiring aboard an aircraft.

#### 4. APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE:

The following seven (7) activities are elements of an iterative process for certification of aircraft electrical/electronic systems with respect to the indirect effects of lightning. The particular order of activities addressed, and the iterative application of the elements appropriate for a particular situation, are left to the applicant and strict adherence to the particular ordering of the elements in the list is not intended.

- a. Review the safety analysis with respect to the indirect effects of lightning on the aircraft.
- b. Determine the lightning strike zones for the aircraft.
- c. Establish the airframe lightning current paths for the zones.
- d. Establish the effects of the internal environment.
- e. Establish Transient Control Levels (TCL) and Equipment Transient Design Levels (ETDL).
- f. Verify compliance.
- g. Corrective measures.

The elements are described in more detail in paragraphs (a) through (g).

- a. Review the safety analysis with respect to the indirect effects of lightning. A Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is conducted to identify all failures and classify them in functional and operational terms. The results of the FHA should be reviewed to ensure that any unique indirect effects of lightning have been identified, such as common mode failures. Airworthiness requirements for classifying these functions are based on Section .1309 of FAR/JAR Parts 23, 25, 27, and 29. FAA/JAA advisory circulars which provide guidance in classifying these failure conditions according to their severity are as follows: AC 23.1309-1C, 25.1309-1A, 27-1A, 29-2B, AMJ 25.1309 and ACJ 29.1309.

The failure condition classifications listed below are derived from this guidance material and are included to assist in the use of this document. The classifications are:

1. Catastrophic: Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.
2. Hazardous/Severe-Major: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
  - (a) A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities.
  - (b) Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew could not be relied on to perform their tasks accurately or completely, or
  - (c) Serious (or fatal<sup>1</sup>) injury to a relatively small number of the occupants.

---

1. JAA only.

## SAE ARP5413 Revision A

### 4. (Continued):

3. Major: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a significant increase in crew work load or in conditions impairing crew efficiency, or discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries.
4. Minor: Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety, and which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine flight plan changes, or some inconvenience to occupants.
5. No Effects: Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the aircraft or increase crew workload.

The system development assurance level would also be assessed when performing the FHA and would be approved by the cognizant aviation certification authority. Guidance for selecting the system development assurance level is provided in ARP4754.

The following development assurance levels are related to the failure condition classifications.

Level A: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure of function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft.

Level B: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure of function resulting in a hazardous/severe-major failure condition for the aircraft.

Level C: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure of function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft.

Level D: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure of function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft. Once a system has been confirmed, by the cognizant aviation certification authority, as being Level D, no further application of this regulation is required.

Level E: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure of function resulting in no effect on aircraft operational capability or crew workload. Once a system has been confirmed, by the cognizant aviation certification authority, as being Level E, no further application of this regulation is required.

- b. Determine the lightning strike zones for the aircraft. The characteristics of currents entering the aircraft vary according to attachment point locations on the aircraft. To establish the lightning characteristics appropriate for different portions of the aircraft, lightning strike zones have been defined in ARP5414.

4. (Continued):

Zones are the means by which the external environment is applied to the aircraft. The locations of these zones on any aircraft are dependent on the aircraft's geometry, materials, and operational factors, and often vary from one aircraft type to another; therefore, a determination must be made for each aircraft configuration. Guidance for location of the strike zones on particular aircraft is given in ARP5414.

- c. Establish the airframe lightning current paths for the zones. The external lightning environment is a consequence of the interaction of the lightning flash with the exterior of the aircraft. The external environment is represented by synthesized waveforms of the lightning current components at the aircraft surface. These waveforms and their applications are provided in ARP5412.

Zones 1 and 2 define where lightning is likely to attach, and, as a result, the entrance and exit points for current flow through the vehicle. By definition, Zone 3 areas carry lightning current flow between pairs of direct or swept stroke lightning attachment points. Therefore, design and analysis using Zone 3 current levels as the external environment is generally acceptable.

- d. Establish the effects of the internal environment. The internal lightning environment consists of the electromagnetic fields and structural IR voltages, which are produced by the external environment, as a result of current flow through the airframe and the penetration of electromagnetic fields. The fields and structural IR voltages cause voltages and currents on interconnecting wiring which in turn appear at equipment interfaces. In some cases, electromagnetic fields within the aircraft may penetrate equipment enclosures and compromise system operation.

For each system to be qualified, determine the lightning induced voltage and current waveforms and actual transient levels (ATL) that can appear at the electrical/electronic equipment interfaces. In many cases, the induced transients will be defined in terms of the open circuit voltage ( $v_{oc}$ ) and the short circuit current ( $i_{sc}$ ) appearing at wiring/equipment interfaces. The "v" and "i" will be related by the source impedances (i.e., loop impedance) of interconnecting wiring, and there may be different levels determined for different circuit functions or operating voltages.

- e. Establish transient control levels (TCL) and equipment transient design levels (ETDL). The ETDLs represent the amplitude of voltage and/or current that the equipment is required to withstand or tolerate and remain operational (e.g., no damage or system functional upset). The TCLs, in turn, are set equal to or higher than the maximum ATL. The difference between ETDL and TCL is the margin. The equipment transient susceptibility level (ETSL) is the amplitude of voltage or current which, when applied to the equipment, will result in damage to components, or upset such that the equipment can no longer perform its intended function. The relationship between ATLs, TCLs, ETDLs, and ETSLs is illustrated in Figure 1. The ETDL is usually stated in the specifications for electrical/electronic equipment and constitutes a qualification test level for this equipment. Since ETDLs are typically represented by these standardized requirements, their use greatly simplifies compliance evaluation. Normally, the TCLs and ETDLs will be established by the airframe manufacturer or system integrator, who will compare the penalties of vehicle or interconnecting wiring protection or equipment hardening to establish the most logical combination of TCLs and ETDLs.




FIGURE 1 - Relationships Between Transient Levels

**SAE ARP5413 Revision A**

4. (Continued):

- f. Verify compliance. Verify compliance by demonstrating that the ATLS appearing at wiring/equipment interfaces do not exceed the established TCLs, and that the equipment can tolerate the ETDLS.
1. Verification may be accomplished by demonstrating similarity with previously installed systems and/or equipment, by tests, or by analysis. Appropriate margins to account for uncertainties in the verification techniques may be required as discussed in Section 6. Developmental test data may be used for certification when properly documented and coordinated with the cognizant aviation certification authority.
  2. Experience has shown, particularly on aircraft with new technology and/or complex systems, that discussion of and concurrence with the certification plan by the cognizant aviation certification authority early in the program is desirable. This plan is beneficial to both the applicant and the cognizant aviation certification authority because it identifies and defines an acceptable resolution of the critical issues early in the certification process. It should be understood that, as the process proceeds, analysis or test results may warrant modifications in design and/or verification methods. As necessary, when significant changes occur, the plan should be updated. The plan may include the following items:
    - (a) A description of the system(s), its installation configuration including any unusual or unique features, the operational aspects being addressed, zone locations, lightning environment, and preliminary estimate of ETDL/TCLs.
    - (b) A description of the method to be used to verify compliance. Typically, the verification method includes a combination of similarity, analytical procedures, and/or tests. If analytical procedures are used, the methodology for verification of these procedures should be described. For further discussion see Section 7.
    - (c) Acceptance Criteria for each system under consideration should be determined by a safety analysis. This safety analysis is to evaluate the aircraft in its various operational situations, taking into account the failure and disruption modes caused by lightning indirect effects.
    - (d) Test Plans for each test should be prepared when tests are to be a part of the certification process. Test plans can be separate documents or a part of the compliance plan at the applicant's option and should address an appropriate test sequence.
- g. Corrective Measures. When test and/or analysis show that acceptance criteria are not achieved, a review of the installation and/or component design should be conducted to determine where lightning protection methodology can be improved. The approach is to optimize the use of installation design techniques and equipment design.

5. EFFECTS OF INDUCED TRANSIENTS:

Induced transients may be characterized by voltages impressed across or currents flowing into equipment interfaces. Equipment interface circuit impedance(s) and configuration(s) will determine whether the induced transient(s) are predominantly voltage or current. These transient voltages and currents can degrade system performance permanently or temporarily. Component damage and system functional upset are the primary types of degradation. Component damage is a permanent condition while functional upset refers to an impairment of system operation, either permanent or momentary (e.g., a change of digital or analog state which may or may not require manual reset), which may adversely affect flight safety.

- a. Component Damage. Devices which may be susceptible to damage due to electrical transients are (1) active electronic devices, especially high frequency transistors, integrated circuits, microwave diodes and power supply components, (2) passive electrical and electronic components, especially those of very low power or voltage rating; (3) electro-explosive devices such as squibs and detonators, (4) electromechanical devices such as indicators, actuators, relays, and motors, and (5) insulating materials (e.g., insulating materials used in printed circuit boards and connectors) and electrical connections which can be burned or melted.
- b. System Functional Upset. Functional upset is primarily a system problem. Permanent or momentary upset of a signal, circuit, or a system component can adversely affect system performance to a degree which compromises flight safety. In general, functional upset depends on circuit design and operating voltages, signal characteristics and timing, and system and software configuration. Systems or devices which may be susceptible to functional upset due to electrical transients include (1) computers and data or signal processing systems, (2) electronic engine and flight controls, and (3) power generating and distribution systems.

6. MARGINS AND VERIFICATION METHODS:

Margins are incorporated to account for the uncertainties involved in the verification process. The magnitude of the margin required is inversely proportional to the confidence which is placed in the verification methods being used. The magnitude of the margin is also directly proportional to the degree that each system contributes to continued safe flight and landing as determined by the aircraft safety analysis. An acceptable margin is an essential element in the compliance process.

7. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF COMPLIANCE:

Various methods for the establishment of TCLs and ETDs (4e), verification of compliance (4f), and corrective measures (4g) are available. These methods, testing, analysis, and similarity, are outlined in the following sections. The methods outlined represent those which have evidence of practical application. The routes to compliance for Level A Control, Level A Display, and Levels B and C systems are provided in the flow diagrams of Figures 2, 3, and 4. It should be noted that there is a corresponding increase in the rigor of compliance with an increase in the failure condition classification of the function performed by the system/equipment.

NOTE: Control System failures and malfunctions can more directly and abruptly contribute to a catastrophic event than display system failures and malfunctions. Based upon this, it is appropriate to require a more rigorous verification method for Level A Control Systems than for Level A Display Systems.

a. Level A Requirements

The translation of the external environment into the internal environment involves application of elements b., c., and d., delineated in Section 4. These activities, as well as those associated with the translation of the internal environment into the equipment interface currents and voltages, comprise the system level assessment of the aircraft electromagnetic (EM) response to a lightning strike and are associated with showing compliance of Level A systems.

Functions performed by electrical and electronic systems whose failure to provide that function correctly could lead to a catastrophic failure condition, would require protection to the extent that the function must not be adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to lightning. These functions must continue to be provided during and after exposure to lightning.

If the function is provided by multiple systems, then loss of a system or systems, during exposure of the aircraft to lightning shall not result in the loss of the function. After the aircraft is exposed to lightning, each affected system that performs these functions shall automatically recover normal operation, unless this conflicts with other operational or functional requirements of that system.




FIGURE 2 - Typical Iterative Process for Level A Requirements (Control Functions)




FIGURE 3 - Typical Iterative Process for Level A Requirements (Display Functions)

SAE ARP5413 Revision A




FIGURE 4 - Typical Iterative Process for Level B and C Requirements

7. (Continued):

Any Failure or Malfunction which occurs during the qualification process must be considered in the overall safety assessment.

1. Systems Performing Level A Control Functions

The applicant must demonstrate that systems performing Level A Control functions are not adversely affected by a lightning strike to the aircraft in which the systems are installed. The Level A Control function must be maintained during and after exposure to lightning.

Figure 2 is a flow diagram showing possible routes to compliance. In all cases, data from aircraft level test or analysis of the specific aircraft under consideration or one of sufficiently similar construction is necessary to obtain certification.

(a) Similarity

Similarity may be used as the basis for certification without the need for additional tests provided:

- only minimal differences exist between the previously certified system and installation and the system and installation to be certified, and
- there have been no unresolved in-service history of problems related to lightning strikes to the aircraft.

If there is uncertainty about the effects of the differences, additional tests and/or analysis should be conducted as necessary and appropriate to resolve the open issues.

Similarity may be used to verify compatibility of systems and equipment with ETDs, or compatibility of interconnecting wiring with TCLs. The former situation might occur when a previously tested system is to be certified in a new aircraft, and the latter situation may occur when a new system is to be installed in an existing aircraft using interconnecting wiring for which ATLs and TCLs are known.

Similarity requires an evaluation of both the system and installation differences which may adversely affect the system susceptibility. An assessment of a new installation should consider differences affecting the internal lightning environment of the aircraft and its effects on the system. The assessment may cover:

- (1) the aircraft type, equipment locations, airframe construction, and apertures which could affect attenuation of the external lightning environment;
- (2) the system interfaces, wiring size and routing, connectors, whether parallel or twisted wires, and cable shielding;
- (3) grounding and bonding;
- (4) system modification status including software, firmware, and hardware.

7. (Continued):

Systems previously certified by test or analysis may be transferable to other applications. Every system needs to be assessed even though it may utilize equipment and installation techniques which have been the subject of a previous certification.

The use of similarity for Level A Control systems requires that the applicant show that any differences of either the system or its installation cause NO ADVERSE CHANGES on the TCL and ETDL values.

Similarity is NOT APPLICABLE for a combination of a new aircraft design and a new system design.

(b) Establish TCLs and ETDLs Using Existing Aircraft Data (Similarity)

Existing aircraft data generated by test and/or analysis may be used to establish TCLs provided the aircraft and system installation under consideration are similar to the aircraft and system installation used to generate the data. Guidance in determining aircraft similarity is given in 7.a.1.(a).

(c) Determine ATLS, TCLs, and ETDLs Using Aircraft Test/Analysis

The ATLS, TCLs, and ETDLs may be determined by aircraft test and/or analysis. Guidance for performing tests is contained in ARP5416 (DRAFT) and guidance for performing analysis is contained in ARP5415 (DRAFT).

Analysis is a valid method for obtaining ATLS. Methods are available for full 3D simulations of entire aircraft including the internal structure and cables. In order to be accepted by the cognizant aviation certification authority, the methods' accuracy must be demonstrated. Some methods have been validated with experimental data under a wide variety of circumstances.

7. (Continued):

(d) Verify or Determine System ETDLs Using System Test/Analysis

The ETDLs provided by aircraft test and/or analysis are used for single stroke, multiple stroke, and multiple burst testing. For multiple stroke and multiple burst testing, the system should be tested in accordance with procedures described in ARP5416 (DRAFT). For pin and single stroke cable bundle testing, the system should be tested in accordance with procedures described in ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 22. Whenever cable bundle test methods are used, the system should be tested in an operational state.

Multiple stroke and multiple burst testing to the ETDLs or an analysis of the circuit response to these environments is required. When an analysis is performed, a description of the system architecture, including hardware and software data handling procedures may be necessary. Such a description should clearly establish the reasons why the system will not experience functional upset when exposed to these environments. Pin testing or single stroke cable bundle testing per Section 22 of ED-14D/DO-160D, is sufficient to demonstrate the system's ability to withstand the ETDLs without component damage.

(e) Establish ETDLs Using Existing System Data (Similarity)

Existing system data generated by test and/or analysis may be used to establish ETDLs provided the system under consideration is similar to the system used to generate the data. Guidance in determining system similarity is given in 7.a.1.(a).

(f) Compliance Assessment

An assessment is required to determine the system's functional compatibility with the internal lightning environment, and must show the following.

- (1) The function on the aircraft must remain available during and after exposure to the indirect effects of lightning.
- (2) Any system interruption or susceptibility must be evaluated to assure that there are no adverse effects on continued performance of the function and must be approved by the cognizant aviation certification authority.
- (3) The affected systems must automatically recover upon removal of the internal lightning environment unless this conflicts with other requirements of that system.
- (4) The equipment/system must tolerate the ETDLs, and the ATLs in the interconnecting wiring must be less than or equal to the TCLs.

7. (Continued):

(g) Corrective Measures

Should the system fail to satisfy the certification requirements, a decision will be required on the corrective action to be taken. The resultant changes or modifications to the installation and/or the equipment may generate the need for additional testing/analysis. It is necessary to analyze whether equipment qualification testing/analysis and/or aircraft testing/analysis, in whole or in part, is required in order to satisfy the certification requirements. Modification of the equipment and/or installation may be necessary to achieve certification.

2. Systems Performing Level A Display Functions

Figure 3 is a flow diagram showing possible routes to compliance for systems performing Level A Display functions. The objective of this approach is to demonstrate that the Level A function is maintained and the Level A system does not generate hazardous misleading information (HMI) when exposed to the indirect effects of lightning. In Figure 3, a review of any existing aircraft and/or system data is accomplished and a decision must be made on the direction the applicant chooses to achieve certification in each case.

(a) Similarity

Similarity may be used as the basis for certification without the need for additional tests provided:

- only minimal differences exist between the previously certified system and installation and the system and installation to be certified, and
- there have been no unresolved in-service history of problems related to lightning strikes to the aircraft.

If there is uncertainty about the effects of the differences, additional tests and/or analysis should be conducted as necessary and appropriate to resolve the open issues.

Similarity may be used to verify compatibility of systems and equipment with ETDs, or compatibility of interconnecting wiring with TCLs. The former situation might occur when a previously tested system is to be certified in a new aircraft, and the latter situation may occur when a new system is to be installed in an existing aircraft using interconnecting wiring for which ATs and TCLs are known.

**SAE ARP5413 Revision A**

7. (Continued):

Similarity requires an evaluation of both the system and installation differences which may adversely affect the system susceptibility. An assessment of a new installation should consider differences affecting the internal lightning environment of the aircraft and its effects on the system. The assessment may cover:

- (1) the aircraft type, equipment locations, airframe construction, and apertures which could affect attenuation of the external lightning environment;
- (2) the system interfaces, wiring size and routing, connectors, whether parallel or twisted wires, and cable shielding;
- (3) grounding and bonding;
- (4) system modification status including software, firmware, and hardware.

Systems previously certified by test or analysis may be transferable to other applications. Every system needs to be assessed even though it may utilize equipment and installation techniques which have been the subject of a previous certification.

The use of similarity for Level A Display systems requires that the applicant show that any differences of either the system or its installation cause MINIMAL ADVERSE CHANGES on the TCL and ETDL values. If minimal adverse changes are discovered, then those differences should be discussed with the cognizant aviation certification authority.

Similarity is NOT APPLICABLE for a combination of a new aircraft design and a new system design.

(b) Establish TCLs and ETDLs Using Existing Aircraft Data (Similarity)

This option provides a means of using existing aircraft data on a similar type aircraft to establish TCLs for the intended installation. This may be accomplished provided the aircraft and system installation under consideration are similar to the aircraft and system installation used to generate the data. Guidance in determining aircraft similarity is given in 7.a.2.(a).

7. (Continued):

(c) Selection of ETDLs

This section examines two options:

(1) Determine ATLS, TCLs, and ETDLs using whole aircraft test/analysis.

This option is the same method which is used for control systems and is outlined in 7.a.1.(b).

(2) Selection of ETDLs per ED-14D/DO-160D.

This option provides a means of selecting the ETDLs for the equipment without the benefit of specific aircraft test data. Section 22 of ED-14D/DO-160D, Tables 22-2 and 22-3 provide predicted ETDLs. It must be noted, however, that substantiating evidence must show all the factors necessary to enable comparison of the ETDLs selected from ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 22, to the proposed aircraft installation. Each ETDL level selected should reflect all the significant aspects of the aircraft installation.

The following guidelines are included to assist the applicant in the proper selection of ETDLs given in ED-14D/DO-160D. It should be noted that different ETDL levels may be appropriate for different waveforms, reflecting proportionately higher or lower structural resistance voltages as compared with induced voltages due to changing magnetic fields. In such cases, the appropriate levels should be used.

Level 5: This level can be used when the equipment under consideration, or the cable bundle, or interfaces to/from the equipment are located in very severe electromagnetic environments which are defined as areas with composite materials demonstrating poor shielding effectiveness, areas where there is no guarantee of structural bonding, and other open areas where minimal shielding is provided. This level may also be used when a broad range of installations is to be covered. Note that in some cases (essentially high current density regions on mixed conductivity structures such as wing tips, engine nacelle fin, etc.) where the wiring may divert some of the lightning current, higher ETDLs may be appropriate unless design measures are applied to reduce them.

Level 4: This level can be used when the equipment under consideration, or the cable bundle, or interfaces to/from the equipment are located in severe electromagnetic areas which are defined as areas outside the fuselage such as wings, fairings, wheel wells, pylons, control surfaces, etc. This definition is not appropriate for equipment installations more appropriately described by the definition of Level 5.

**SAE ARP5413 Revision A**

7. (Continued):

Level 3: This level can be used when the equipment under consideration, all interfaces to/from the equipment, and the cable bundle are contained entirely within a moderate electromagnetic environment which is defined as the inside of a metallic aircraft structure or composite aircraft structure demonstrating equivalent shielding effectiveness, without particular shielding enhancement measures. Examples of such an environment are avionics bays not enclosed by bulkheads, cockpit areas, and locations with large apertures, i.e., doors without EMI gaskets, windows, access panels, etc. Current carrying conductors in this environment such as hydraulic tubing, control cables, cable bundles, metal cable trays, etc., are not necessarily electrically grounded at bulkheads. When a small number of wires exit the environment, either a higher level (i.e., Level 4 or 5) should be used for these interfaces or additional protection for these wires should be provided. This definition is not appropriate for equipment installations more appropriately described by the definitions of Levels 4 and 5.

Level 2: This level can be used when the equipment under consideration, all interfaces to/from the equipment, and the cable bundle are contained entirely within a partially protected environment which is defined as the inside of a metallic aircraft structure or composite aircraft structure demonstrating equivalent shielding effectiveness, where measures have been taken to reduce the electromagnetic coupling onto cables. Cable bundles in this environment passing through bulkhead(s) have shields terminated at the bulkhead connector. When a small number of wires exit the environment, either a higher level (i.e., Level 3 or 4) should be used or additional protection for these wires should be provided. Cable bundles are installed close to the ground plane and take advantage of other inherent shielding characteristics provided by metallic structures. Current carrying conductors such as hydraulic tubing, cables, metal cable trays, etc., are electrically grounded at all bulkheads. This definition is not appropriate for equipment installations more appropriately described by the definitions of Levels 3, 4, and 5.

Level 1: This level can be used when the equipment under consideration, all interfaces to/from equipment, and the cable bundles are contained entirely within a well protected environment which is defined as an electromagnetically enclosed area which is not subjected to direct attachment of lightning strikes. This definition is not appropriate for equipment installations more appropriately described by the definitions of Levels 2, 3, 4, and 5.