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**Motorcycles — Consideration for  
use cases of ISO 26262-12 MSIL  
classification**

*Motorcycles — Considération des cas d'usages de l'ISO 26262-12  
Classification MSIL*

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CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8  
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva  
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11  
Email: [copyright@iso.org](mailto:copyright@iso.org)  
Website: [www.iso.org](http://www.iso.org)

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## Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see [www.iso.org/directives](http://www.iso.org/directives)).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see [www.iso.org/patents](http://www.iso.org/patents)).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see [www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html](http://www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html).

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 22, *Road vehicles*, Subcommittee SC 38, *Motorcycles and mopeds*.

Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user's national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at [www.iso.org/members.html](http://www.iso.org/members.html).

# Introduction

## 0.1 General

The ISO 26262 series is intended to be applied to safety-related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and that are installed in series production road vehicles, excluding mopeds. The ISO 26262 series does not address unique E/E systems in special vehicles such as E/E systems designed for drivers with disabilities.

ISO 26262-12:2018 is the standard to address the sector-specific needs of E/E systems within series production motorcycles. The motorcycle industry recognizes the need to use appropriate safety-related techniques to avoid unreasonable risk resulting from random or systematic faults of E/E systems.

Motorcycle safety integrity level (MSIL) is the output of hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA). This is then apportioned between the risk-reduction mechanisms and measures assigned to E/E systems using automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) and the risk reduction taken care of by external measures and/or other technologies. Specifically in the motorcycle industry, a greater proportion of the overall risk reduction is generally apportioned to external measures (for example, riding rules, training/qualification of riders, personal protective equipment, e.g. helmets and infrastructure features).

The worldwide established level of technology (“state-of-the-art”) in the motorcycle industry suggests that ASIL requirements are not appropriate for motorcycles. This is addressed through the alignment between MSIL and ASIL. It is acknowledged that product development processes and technical solutions within the motorcycle industry are inhomogeneous with those of the automobile industry; therefore, the difference between MSIL and ASIL has been made to accommodate worldwide capability.

## 0.2 Objectives

Publicly-available research documents and references relating to the functional safety of motorcycles are fewer in number than those for passenger cars. The purpose of this document is to contribute to the functional safety of motorcycles by internationally collecting and providing examples for motorcycle HARA. This document provides an overview of the principles behind HARA using simplified examples to the concepts.

A prerequisite for HARA is the item definition, which is not the subject of this document. It also does not cover the safety goals of the item. This document takes examples of some items on motorcycles, but is also not exhaustive in terms of their function.

This document presents examples of potential accident scenarios and risk assessments, from the behaviour of an item when it fails and the hazard at vehicle level to its potential accident scenarios. Several methods have been published for each of these, and the aim is to provide a side-by-side comparison to assist in the implementation of HARA.

## 0.3 Points to note

In using this document, please note the following.

The hazard analysis results and MSIL described in this document is just a collection and does not specify the MSIL of a specific item. Although some examples are given in this document, they are the result of several approaches and do not specify the MSIL for a particular item. The same applies even if only one example is given for an item. Also, the information presented in this document is neither exhaustive nor complete. However, introducing some cases (i.e. analytical approaches and results) will help shape the image for applying the ISO 26262 series.

This document has taken as faithfully as possible the descriptions from published documents. Although there are formatting differences from the original text for the purpose of side-by-side comparison, severity(S), exposure(E), controllability(C) and MSIL described have not been altered or harmonised in any way. The information contained in this document is only part of the published material, and it is recommended to consult the original when referring to it in implementation. The use of these methods is neither mandatory nor recommended and is to be used at the user's own responsibility.

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# Motorcycles — Consideration for use cases of ISO 26262-12 MSIL classification

## 1 Scope

This document is intended to be applied to safety-related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and that are installed in series production motorcycles. This document does not address unique E/E systems in special vehicles such as E/E systems designed for drivers with disabilities.

NOTE The series production motorcycle is the vehicle that is intended to be used for public roads and is not a prototype.

This document covers HARA for one or more E/E systems installed in motorcycles. The approach of HARA defined in ISO 26262-12:2018, Clause 8 is applied to them in a motorcycle environment.

The intended user of this document is a functional-safety analyst complying with requirements in ISO 26262-12:2018. Therefore, this document does not intend to provide further necessary knowledge or guidelines in related fields including, but not limited to, item-specific knowledge, user and road profiling, medicine, statistics, accident research and human factors. Instead, it is intended to be related to the field of functional safety with the focus on the HARA examples only. It is the responsibility of the functional-safety analyst to achieve detailed knowledge about the item under investigation and the target application environment.

In this document, the values shown are for reference only. Any new HARA can use the latest relevant data and analyses. The values shown in this document were derived based on some, but not all segments of information expected within an item description, and thus are not considered as an item definition. The ISO 26262 series requires that a HARA be based on a specific item definition. This document is not to be constructed to suggest that conducting a HARA without a specific item definition is acceptable. The scope of the ISO 26262 series is limited to functional safety which is one aspect of the overall system safety assessment in safety risk management.

As for any risk assessment method, the methods mentioned in this document have inherent limitations. The HARA describes a simplified model of the real world, which is neither complete nor fully accurate. Although each assessment is based on available or applicable data as well as on expert judgment, the interpretation of such data can vary among analyses. For these reasons, the user of this document can bear in mind these limitations and judge the applicability of this document in any particular case.

## 2 Normative reference

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO 26262-1, *Road vehicles — Functional safety — Part 1: Vocabulary*

## 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO 26262-1 apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

— ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp>

— IEC Electropedia: available at <https://www.electropedia.org/>

## 4 General topics for MSIL classification

Hazard analysis, risk assessment and MSIL determination are used to determine the safety goals for the item. For this, the item is evaluated with regard to its potential hazardous events. Safety goals and their assigned MSIL are determined by a systematic evaluation of hazardous events. The MSIL is determined by considering severity, probability of exposure and controllability. It is based on the item's functional behaviour; therefore, the detailed design of the item does not need to be known.

The dynamic behaviour of motorcycles differs greatly from that of other vehicles within the scope of the ISO 26262 series, and that controllability of motorcycle specific hazardous events could place more emphasis on the rider. It is recognised that the method of performing risk assessment requires to best suit motorcycle specific hazardous events.

ISO 26262-12:2018, Annex B gives a general explanation of the hazard analysis and risk assessment.

## 5 Use case of hazard analysis and risk assessment

### 5.1 Overview

This clause presents examples of HARA in motorcycles.

HARA is a method to identify and categorize hazardous events of items and to specify safety goals and MSILs related to the prevention or mitigation of the associated hazards in order to avoid unreasonable risk.

The method of performing a HARA is the same as that of a passenger car, but different hazardous events (such as falls down) can be identified depending on the situation peculiar to a motorcycle and the difference in controllability. Evaluation of severity and exposure to driver and others differs significantly from the case of passenger cars.

The case presented below is an example of analysing a scenario in a situation peculiar to motorcycles. These are just a few of the situations that motorcycles encounter, and each item can have other serious hazards. Also, the MSIL shown in the case is just the result of the case study and does not specify the MSIL of the item in general.

Safety goals are top-level safety requirements for the item. Safety goals are not expressed in terms of technological solutions, but in terms of functional objectives. This document does not mention the items of functional objectives and safety goals.

#### 5.1.1 Item definition

HARA is based on the item definition. The item without internal safety mechanisms is evaluated during the hazard analysis and risk assessment, i.e. safety mechanisms intended to be implemented or that have already been implemented in predecessor items are not considered in HARA.

#### 5.1.2 Hazard identification

The purpose of hazard identification is to identify the potential source of harm caused by the malfunctioning behaviour of the item.

Hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item are defined at the vehicle level.

The hazards are determined systematically based on the possible malfunctioning behaviour of the item. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) approaches and hazard and operability (HAZOP) are suitable to support hazard identification at the item level. These can be supported by brainstorming,

checklists, quality history, and field studies. One example to identify a possible malfunction behaviour with the HAZOP method can be to ask what can happen to the rider or other person if:

- the function is active when it is expected to be deactivated;
- the function is not active when it is expected to be activated;
- the output of the function is unintendedly too high;
- the output of the function is unintendedly too low;
- the output of the function came too late;
- the output of the function is changing too fast;
- the output of the function is in the wrong direction;
- the output of the function is alternating.

The identified malfunction behaviour that can cause harm to the rider or other person can be documented as relevant malfunction with their consequences.

The relevant situations can be identified by analysing the expected usage and the expected misuse of the motorcycle. The relevant situations can differ due to the design (e.g. superbike, enduro) or performance (e.g. 125 cm<sup>3</sup>/10 kW, 1 000 cm<sup>3</sup>/150 kW) of the analysed motorcycle. Be aware of the specific behaviour of a motorcycle (e.g. lean angle, separated front and rear brake), special manoeuvres (e.g. wheelie, stoppie) and misuses (e.g. towing other vehicle, overloaded luggage in the top case).

One approach to identify all relevant situation is to build-up a list with possible parameters raised from, for example:

Driving operation:

- driving speed;
- lean angle; and
- braking.

Road type:

- location (e.g. motorway, urban, crossing road); and
- road surface condition (e.g. dry, wet, ice).

Situations:

- overtaking;
- parking;
- wheelie;
- crash.

Be aware that a combination of parameters can change the consequences, because it can lead to an inappropriate lowering of the MSIL.

The relevant situations where the identified malfunction can cause harm the rider or other person are the hazardous events for the risk assessment. The consequences of hazardous events are identified.

**EXAMPLE** An unintended too-high torque output of the engine on a dry country road in a curve with large lean angle can lead to leaving the road lane and to a collision with obstacles.

For a detailed description of the approach, refer to the ISO 26262-3:2018, 6.4.2 and ISO 26262-12:2018, 8.4.2.

### 5.1.3 Risk assessment

Risk assessment is a series of classifications of potential harms caused by hazards in terms of severity, probability of exposure, or controllability.

The severity of the potential harm is estimated based on a defined rationale for each hazardous event. The severity is assigned to one of the severity classes: S0, S1, S2 or S3.

The probability of exposure of each operational situation is estimated based on a defined rationale for each hazardous event. The probability of exposure is assigned to one of the probability classes: E0, E1, E2, E3 or E4.

The controllability of each hazardous event, by the rider or other persons involved in the operational situation is estimated based on a defined rationale for each hazardous event. The controllability is assigned to one of the controllability classes: C0, C1, C2 or C3.

An MSIL is determined for each hazardous event based on the classification of severity, probability of exposure and controllability. Four MSILs are defined: MSIL A, MSIL B, MSIL C and MSIL D, where MSIL A is representing the least stringent and MSIL D the most stringent level. QM is not an MSIL, but can be specified in the hazard analysis and risk assessment.

Each assessment is based on available or applicable data as well as on expert judgment, the interpretation of such data can vary among analyses.

## 5.2 Examples of HARA

### 5.2.1 General

There are different approaches possible for selecting the appropriate values of E, S and C. Possible sources for values can be guidelines, technical papers, ISO 26262-12:2018 Annex B, government statistics, expert judgements or measured data from equivalent motorcycles. The source can be selected according to worldwide use or limited to the expected homologation areas.

For example, the maximum allowed motorway speed can differ in different countries and can change over time (e.g. India: 80 km/h, England: 110 km/h, Japan: 120 km/h, Italy: 130 km/h, USA: 137 km/h, Germany: partly >250 km/h allowed).

NOTE See Reference [6], Table A4: Speed Laws and Enforcement by Country / Area.

Different teams can use different approaches and can come to different results of what can be correct. The use of the data sources must be conservative and correspond to the vehicle, item and target market.

Each selected value of E, S and C can be argued. So, it is possible to follow the selection and the value can be adapted if there is a change.

### 5.2.2 Example for HARA procedure

a) Hazard identification

Unintended acceleration of TBW function

b) Operational situation

Driving on a German motorway with >130 km/h in close distance to vehicle in front (heavy traffic), 0°-5° lean angle

## c) Affected persons

Rider and passenger

## d) Classification of exposure

Duration E3; E4 for driving on motorway due to commuting use of the analysed motorcycle but -1 due to "close distance to vehicle in front (heavy traffic)" = E3; driving data records from an equivalent motorcycle have shown a driving duration of much less than 10 % at a speed >130 km/h = E3

## e) Classification of severity

S3; serious injuries due to falling down with >130 km/h; no traffic in opposite direction expected on motorways = no increase

## f) Classification of controllability

C3; rider can handle the brakes or engine stop switch to reduce the acceleration and can steer to avoid collision but not more than 90 % of all riders can react fast enough in this situation (heavy traffic)

### 5.2.3 Safety goal determination

To determine the safety goal, the MSIL for each hazard event is identified in accordance with ISO 26262-12:2018, 8.4.3.10 and the corresponding malfunction that must be prevented with a safety concept.

The safety goal can have the following information:

- it can be named what can be avoided by the safety function;
- the maximum ASIL can be named;
- the safe state can be defined (e.g. switch off function output for fail safe systems);
- the error threshold for the controllability estimation (e.g. acceleration more than 2,6 m/s<sup>2</sup>) can be defined; and
- the fault tolerant time interval (e.g. 300 ms) can be defined.

The safety goal, its information and the safe state can be validated according to ISO 26262-12:2018, Clause 10. The transition to safe state and the safe state itself can provide sufficient controllability. If a test is used to validate the information or the safe state, the safety of the test rider has the highest priority.

### 5.2.4 Examples of HARA method

In this document, examples of HARA for some items are shown. These items are widely used in motorcycles, and there are also published examples of HARA research reports. By quoting and organizing them, it will help to understand in implementing HARA in practice.

This document cites ANCM guidelines<sup>[4]</sup> and SAE technical paper<sup>[5]</sup>.

In some tables, there are expressions of "Method (1)" and "Method (2)". This means that:

- a) Method (1): is the approach shown in Reference [4];
- b) Method (2): is the approach shown in Reference [5].

Each reference has its own features. For example, in HARA of TBW (throttle by wire), method (1) defines an item as a device that generates driving force regardless of whether it is an internal combustion engine or an electric motor, while method (2) defines an item that focuses on throttle body control.

It also covers scenarios that are not considered as significant risks for motor vehicles, because those scenarios could be the serious hazards for motorcycles.

In the method (2), driving data for some real-world traffic environments for motorcycle has been studied to provide an estimate for the exposure. In some cases, the controllability was estimated by the subjective evaluation of the expert rider which is accepted in the standard as one of the methods. The severity was estimated based on official real-world traffic accident statistics.

The reason for clarifying the two approaches is that the abstraction and quantitative differences in the information they deal with affect MSIL.

EXAMPLE The difference in acceleration in the scenario.

More detailed techniques and information can be found in References [4] and [5].

To prevent these examples from being misunderstood as a requirement of each item, safety goals are not described in this document.

Example 1 describes the hazard analysis and risk assessment of the TBW in 5.2.5.

Example 2 describes the hazard analysis and risk assessment of the ABS (anti-lock braking system) single channel in 5.2.6.

Example 3 describes the hazard analysis and risk assessment of the ABS double channel in 5.2.7.

### 5.2.5 HARA example 1

Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment approach in TBW.

#### 5.2.5.1 Item definition

The item definition of TBW shows as is shown in Table 1.

Both methods are based basically on same item definition. The degree of refinement (e.g. type of sensors) is not of major relevance for HARA.

**Table 1 — Item definition of TBW**

Item		Function overview
TBW	Method (1)	<p>To detect rider request and to torque up to the actuator</p> <p>Example 1</p> <p>Example 2</p>
	Method (2)	<p>To detect rider operation and to control throttle valve to adjust engine output corresponding to rider's intention</p>

**5.2.5.2 Hazard identification**

The hazard identification of TBW shows as is shown in [Table 2](#).

**Table 2 — Hazard identification of TBW**

Item		Malfunction (behaviour) and hazard
TBW	Method (1)	Unwanted sudden acceleration without driver request or far above driver request
	Method (2)	Unintended acceleration without driver request or far above driver request

**5.2.5.3 Risk assessment**

[Table 3](#) show examples of risk assessment for TBW.

NOTE 1 Comparable situations can be evaluated in different approach.

Table 3 — Results of TBW risk assessment

Vehicle level hazard		Potential accident scenario	E	C	S	MSIL
Unintended acceleration without driver request or far above driver request	Method (1)	In motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic Possible collision with preceding vehicle	E4	C2	S3	C
		Urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic Unwanted crossing of intersection, lateral collision other vehicles	E4	C3	S2	C
		Extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip Loss of trajectory, invasion of the opposite lane, accident with other vehicles in opposite direction	E2	C3	S3	B
		Urban road, good grip in zig-zag manoeuvre Collision and invasion of opposite direction	E4	C2	S2	B
		In motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes Possible collision with oncoming vehicle	E3	C3	S2	B
	Method (2)	Unintended acceleration during urban travelling and colliding to preceding vehicle Vehicle speed: 40 km/h generated acceleration: 3,92 m/s <sup>2</sup>	E3	C3	S2	B
		Unintended acceleration during turning corner with urban travelling and colliding to oncoming vehicle Vehicle speed: 30 km/h generated acceleration: 4,12 m/s <sup>2</sup>	E3	C3	S3	C
		Unintended acceleration during highway travelling and colliding to preceding vehicle Vehicle speed: 140 km/h generated acceleration: 2,5 m/s <sup>2</sup>	E4	C3	S3	D

NOTE 2 The rationales for E and C classification of Method (2) described in Reference [4] are as follows;

a) Unintended acceleration

E: In the field survey result conducted it shows that the probability of frequency of follow-up running is 6,4 % and 95 % tile value of inter-vehicle time is 0,52 s. Based on the literature survey, the probability of frequency of using public road other than highway is 77 % in average, therefore exposure with above situation is estimated to E3.

C: Expected generated acceleration is 3,92 m/s<sup>2</sup> and this is the possible acceleration value at the moment of malfunction, calculated by engine performance curve and transmission ratio of one litter sport type motorcycle. Subjective evaluation result by four expert riders shows it is difficult to control motorcycle in case 3,0 m/s<sup>2</sup> or more acceleration is generated. Controllability is estimated to C3.

b) Unintended deceleration

E: Exposure is estimated E4 because of the probability of travelling on the road other than highway.

C: Expected possible generated deceleration caused by throttle off is 0,98 m/s<sup>2</sup> and it is expected following vehicle could easily avoid the collision. Controllability is estimated to C0 by expert judgment.

## 5.2.6 HARA example 2


Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment approach in ABS single channel.

**5.2.6.1 Item definition**

The item definition of ABS shows as is shown in [Table 4](#).

The item definition of ABS single channel is only for Method (1).

**Table 4 — Item definition of ABS single channel**

Item	Function overview
ABS (Anti-lock braking system) single channel	To detect front wheel speed, and to control necessary devices to adjust front brake force  

**5.2.6.2 Hazard identification**

The hazard identification of ABS shows as is shown in [Table 5](#).

**Table 5 — Hazard identification of ABS single channel**

Item	Malfunction (behaviour) and hazard	
ABS single channel	Method (1)	Unwanted front wheel lock
		Unwanted reduction of brake pressure for front wheel

**5.2.6.3 Risk assessment**

The risk assessment of ABS is shown in [Table 6](#). Comparable scenarios are considered by Method (2) for the ABS double channel. Considering such scenarios, one will come to a different conclusion regarding MSIL level.

**Table 6 — Results of ABS single channel risk assessment**

Vehicle level hazard		Potential accident scenario	E	C	S	MSIL		
Front wheel lock	Method (1)	Braking in motorway/highway, high speed down-hill curve Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B		
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed light traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B		
		Braking in urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E4	C3	S1	B		
		Braking in extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S2	A		
		Braking in output from a tunnel, lateral wind during an overtaking Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B		
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B		
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, low adherence with rain Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B		
		Reduction of brake pressure for front wheel	Method (1)	Braking in motorway/highway, high speed down-hill curve No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed light traffic No brake, possible collision with other vehicles		E4	C1	S3	B	
		Braking in urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic No brake, possible collision with other vehicles		E4	C1	S1	QM	
Braking in extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E2	C1		S2	QM			
Braking in output from a tunnel, lateral wind during an overtaking No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E2	C1		S3	QM			
Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E4	C1		S3	B			
Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, low adherence with rain No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E3	C1		S3	A			


**5.2.7 HARA example 3**

Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment approach in ABS double channel.

**5.2.7.1 Item definition**

The item definition of ABS double channel is shown in [Table 7](#). The item definition of ABS double channel is the same for Method (1) and Method (2).

**Table 7 — Item definition of ABS double channel**

Item	Function overview
ABS double channel	<p>To detect front and rear wheel speed, and to control necessary devices to adjust front/rear brake force</p>  <pre> graph LR     subgraph Item_Boundaries [Item boundaries]         S1[Sensors - Front wheel speed sensor] --&gt; CU[Control unit]         S2[Sensors - Rear wheel speed sensor] --&gt; CU         CU --&gt; A[Actuator - Solenoid valve - Pump motor]     end     A --&gt; FB[Front brake]     A --&gt; RB[Rear brake]     </pre>

**5.2.7.2 Hazard identification**

The item definition of ABS double channel is shown in [Table 8](#).

**Table 8 — Hazard identification of ABS double channel**

Item	Malfunction (behaviour) and hazard	
ABS double channel	Method (1)	Unwanted front wheel lock
		Unwanted rear wheel lock
		Unwanted front and rear wheel lock
		Unwanted reduction of brake pressure for front wheel
		Unwanted reduction of brake pressure for rear wheel
		Unwanted reduction of brake pressure for front and rear wheel
	Method (2)	Unintended loss of front wheel braking force
		Unintended loss of rear wheel braking force
		Unintended loss of braking force of both wheels
		Unintended loss of front wheel ABS function
		Unintended loss of rear wheel ABS function
Unintended loss of ABS function of both wheels		

**5.2.7.3 Risk assessment**

The risk assessment of ABS double channel is shown in [Table 9](#). Comparable situations can be evaluated differently.

**Table 9 — Results of ABS double channel risk assessment**

Vehicle level hazard		Potential accident scenario	E	C	S	MSIL
Front wheel lock	Method (1)	Braking in motorway/highway, high speed down-hill curve Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed light traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E4	C3	S1	B
		Braking in extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S2	A
		Braking in output from a tunnel, lateral wind during an overtaking Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, low adherence with rain Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
Rear wheel lock	Method (1)	Braking in motorway/highway, high speed down-hill curve Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed light traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C1	S3	QM
		Braking in urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E4	C1	S1	QM
		Braking in extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C1	S2	QM
		Braking in output from a tunnel, lateral wind during an overtaking Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C1	S3	A
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C1	S3	QM
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, low adherence with rain Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C1	S3	QM
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed down-hill curve Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B

Table 9 (continued)

Vehicle level hazard		Potential accident scenario	E	C	S	MSIL
Front and rear wheel lock	Method (1)	Braking in motorway/highway, high speed light traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic Fall down and low-side crash	E4	C3	S1	B
		Braking in extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S2	A
		Braking in output from a tunnel, lateral wind during an overtaking Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, low adherence with rain Fall down and low-side crash	E2	C3	S3	B
Reduction of brake pressure for front wheel	Method (1)	Braking in motorway/highway, high speed down-hill curve No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E2	C3	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed light traffic No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E4	C1	S3	B
		Braking in urban intersection on middle lane, low speed in heavy traffic No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E4	C1	S1	QM
		Braking in extra urban road with uphill curve in the night, no good grip No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E2	C1	S2	QM
		Braking in output from a tunnel, lateral wind during an overtaking No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E2	C1	S3	QM
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, moving in parallel lanes No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E4	C1	S3	B
		Braking in motorway/highway, high speed in light traffic, low adherence with rain No brake, possible collision with other vehicles	E3	C1	S3	A