
**Guidance on the application of
ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 in the design
of safety-related control systems for
machinery**

*Lignes directrices relatives à l'application de l'ISO 13849-1 et de la
CEI 62061 dans la conception des systèmes de commande des
machines relatifs à la sécurité*

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

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The main task of technical committees is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.

In exceptional circumstances, when a technical committee has collected data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard ("state of the art", for example), it may decide by a simple majority vote of its participating members to publish a Technical Report. A Technical Report is entirely informative in nature and does not have to be reviewed until the data it provides are considered to be no longer valid or useful.

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ISO/TR 23849 was prepared jointly by Technical Committee ISO/TC 199, *Safety of machinery*, and Technical Committee IEC/TC 44, *Safety of machinery — Electrotechnical aspects*. The draft was circulated for voting to the national bodies of both ISO and IEC. These technical committees have agreed that no modification will be made to this Technical Report except by mutual agreement.

Introduction

This Technical Report has been prepared by experts from both IEC/TC 44/WG 7 and ISO/TC 199/WG 8 in response to requests from their Technical Committees to explain the relationship between IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1. In particular, it is intended to assist users of these International Standards in terms of the interaction(s) that can exist between the standards to ensure that confidence can be given to the design of safety-related systems made in accordance with either standard.

It is intended that this Technical Report be incorporated into both IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 by means of corrigenda that reference the published version of this document. These corrigenda will also remove the information given in Table 1, *Recommended application of IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1*, provided in the common introduction to both standards, which is now recognized as being out of date. Subsequently, it is intended to merge ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 by means of a JWG of ISO/TC 199 and IEC/TC 44.

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Guidance on the application of ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery

1 Scope

This Technical Report is intended to explain the application of IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1¹⁾ in the design of safety-related control systems for machinery.

2 General

2.1 Both IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1 specify requirements for the design and implementation of safety-related control systems of machinery²⁾. The methods developed in both of these standards are different but, when correctly applied, can achieve a comparable level of risk reduction.

2.2 These standards classify safety-related control systems that implement safety functions into levels that are defined in terms of their probability of dangerous failure per hour. ISO 13849-1 has five Performance Levels (PLs), a, b, c, d and e, while IEC 62061 has three safety integrity levels (SILs), 1, 2 and 3.

2.3 Product standards (type-C) committees specify the safety requirements for safety-related control systems and it is recommended that these committees classify the levels of confidence required for them in terms of PLs and SILs.

2.4 Machinery designers may choose to use either IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1 depending on the specific features of the application.

2.5 The selection and use of either standard is likely to be determined by, for example:

- previous knowledge and experience in the design of machinery safety-related control systems based upon the concept of categories described in ISO 13849-1:1999 can mean that the use of ISO 13849-1:2006 is more appropriate;
- safety-related control systems based upon media other than electrical can mean that the use of ISO 13849-1 is more appropriate;
- customer requirements to demonstrate the safety integrity of a machine safety-related control system in terms of a SIL can mean that the use of IEC 62061 is more appropriate;
- safety-related control systems of machinery used in, for example, the process industries, where other safety-related systems (such as safety instrumented systems in accordance with IEC 61511) are characterized in terms of SILs, can mean that the use of IEC 62061 is more appropriate.

1) This Technical Report considers ISO 13849-1:2006 rather than ISO 13849-1:1999, which has been withdrawn.

2) These standards have been adopted by the European standardization bodies CEN and CENELEC as ISO 13849-1 and EN 62061, respectively, where they are published with the status of transposed harmonized standards under the Machinery Directive (98/37/EC and 2006/42/EC). Under the conditions of their publication, the correct use of either of these standards is presumed to conform to the relevant essential safety requirements of the Machinery Directive (98/37/EC and 2006/42/EC).

3 Comparison of standards

3.1 A comparison of the technical requirements in ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 has been carried out in respect of the following aspects:

- terminology;
- risk estimation and performance allocation;
- safety requirements specification;
- systematic integrity requirements;
- diagnostic functions;
- software safety requirements.

3.2 Additionally, an evaluation of the use of the simplified mathematical formulae to determine the probability of dangerous failures (PFH_D) and $MTTF_d$ according to both standards has been carried out.

3.3 The conclusions from this work are the following.

- Safety-related control systems can be designed to achieve acceptable levels of functional safety using either of the two standards by integrating non-complex³⁾ SRECS (safety-related electrical control system) subsystems or SRP/CS (safety-related parts of a control system) designed in accordance with IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1, respectively.
- Both standards can also be used to provide design solutions for complex SRECS and SRP/CS by integrating electrical/electronic/programmable electronic subsystems designed in accordance with IEC 61508.
- Both standards currently have value to users in the machinery sector and benefits will be gained from experience in their use. Feedback over a reasonable period on their practical application is essential to support any future initiatives to move towards a standard that merges the contents of both IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1.
- Differences exist in detail and it is recognized that some concepts (e.g. functional safety management) will need further work to establish equivalence between respective design methodologies and some technical requirements.

4 Risk estimation and assignment of required performance

4.1 A comparison has been carried out on the use of the methods to assign a SIL and/or PL_r to a specific safety function. This has established that there is a good level of correspondence between the respective methods provided in Annex A of each standard.

4.2 It is important, regardless of which method is used, that attention be given to ensure that appropriate judgements are made on the risk parameters to determine the SIL and/or PL_r that is likely to apply to a specific safety function. These judgements can often best be made by bringing together a range of personnel (e.g. design, maintenance, operators) to ensure that the hazards that may be present at machinery are properly understood.

4.3 Further information on the process of risk estimation and the assignment of performance targets can be found in ISO 14121-1 and IEC 61508-5.

3) Although there is no definition for the term “non-complex” SRECS or SRP/CS this should be considered equivalent to low complexity in the context of IEC 62061:2005, 3.2.7.

5 Safety requirements specification

5.1 A first stage in the respective methodologies of both ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 requires that the safety function(s) to be implemented by the safety-related control system are specified.

5.2 An assessment should have been performed relevant to each safety function that is to be implemented by a control circuit by, for example, using ISO 13849-1, Annex A, or IEC 62061, Annex A. This should have determined what risk reduction needs to be provided by each particular safety function at a machine and, in turn, what level of confidence is required for the control circuit that performs this safety function.

5.3 The level of confidence specified as a PL and/or a SIL is relevant to a specific safety function.

5.4 The following shows the information that should be provided in relation to safety functions by a product (type-C) standard.

Safety function(s) to be implemented by a control circuit:

Name of safety function

Description of the function

Required level of performance according to ISO 13849-1: PL_r a to e

and/or

Required safety integrity according to IEC 62061: SIL 1 to 3

6 Assignment of performance targets: PL versus SIL

Table 1 gives the relationship between PL and SIL based on the average probability of a dangerous failure per hour. However, both standards have requirements (e.g. systematic safety integrity) additional to these probabilistic targets that are also to be applied to a safety-related control system. The rigour of these requirements is related to the respective PL and SIL.

Table 1 — Relationship between PLs and SILs based on the average probability of dangerous failure per hour

Performance level (PL)	Average probability of a dangerous failure per hour (1/h)	Safety integrity level (SIL)
a	$\geq 10^{-5}$ to $< 10^{-4}$	No special safety requirements
b	$\geq 3 \times 10^{-6}$ to $< 10^{-5}$	1
c	$\geq 10^{-6}$ to $< 3 \times 10^{-6}$	1
d	$\geq 10^{-7}$ to $< 10^{-6}$	2
e	$\geq 10^{-8}$ to $< 10^{-7}$	3

7 System design

7.1 General requirements for system design using IEC 62061 and ISO 13849-1

The following aspects should be taken into account when designing a SRECS/SRP/CS.

- When applied within the limitations of their respective scopes either of the two standards can be used to design safety-related control systems with acceptable functional safety, as indicated by the achieved SIL or PL.
- Non-complex safety-related parts that are designed to the relevant PL in accordance with ISO 13849-1 can be integrated as subsystems into a safety-related electrical control system (SRECS) designed in accordance with IEC 62061. Any complex safety-related parts that are designed to the relevant PL in accordance with ISO 13849-1 can be integrated into safety-related parts of a control system (SRP/CS) designed in accordance with ISO 13849-1.
- Any non-complex subsystem that is designed in accordance with IEC 62061 to the relevant SIL can be integrated as a safety-related part into a combination of SRP/CS designed in accordance with ISO 13849-1.
- Any complex subsystem that is designed in accordance with IEC 61508 to the relevant SIL can be integrated as a safety-related part into a combination of SRP/CS designed in accordance with ISO 13849-1 or as subsystems into a SRECS designed in accordance with IEC 62061.

7.2 Estimation of PFH_D and $MTTF_d$ and the use of fault exclusions

7.2.1 PFH_D and $MTTF_d$

7.2.1.1 The value of $MTTF_d$ in the context of ISO 13849-1 relates to a single channel SRP/CS without diagnostics and, only in this case, is the reciprocal of PFH_D in IEC 62061.

7.2.1.2 $MTTF_d$ is a parameter of a component(s) and/or single channel without any consideration being given to factors such as diagnostics and architecture, while PFH_D is a parameter of a subsystem that takes into account the contribution of factors such as diagnostics and architecture depending on the design structure.

7.2.1.3 Annex K of ISO 13849-1 describes the relationship between $MTTF_d$ and the PFH_D of an SRP/CS for different architectures classified in terms of category and diagnostic coverage (DC).

7.2.1.4 The estimation of PFH_D for a series connected combination of SRP/CS in accordance with ISO 13849-1 can also be performed by adding PFH_D values (e.g. derived from Annex K of ISO 13849-1) of each SRP/CS in a similar manner to that used with subsystems in IEC 62061.

7.2.2 Use of fault exclusions

7.2.2.1 Both standards permit the use of fault exclusions, see 6.7.7 of IEC 62061 and 7.3 of ISO 13849-1. IEC 62061 does not permit the use of fault exclusions for a SRECS without hardware fault tolerance required to achieve SIL 3 without hardware fault tolerance.

7.2.2.2 It is important that where fault exclusions are used that they be properly justified and valid for the intended lifetime of an SRP/CS or SRECS.

7.2.2.3 In general, where PL e or SIL 3 is specified for a safety function to be implemented by an SRP/CS or SRECS, it is not normal to rely upon fault exclusions alone to achieve this level of performance. This is dependent upon the technology used and the intended operating environment. Therefore it is essential that the designer takes additional care in the use of fault exclusions as PL or SIL increases.

7.2.2.4 In general the use of fault exclusions is not applicable to the mechanical aspects of electromechanical position switches and manually operated switches (e.g. an emergency stop device) in order

to achieve PL e or SIL 3 in the design of an SRP/CS or SRECS. Those fault exclusions that can be applied to specific mechanical fault conditions (e.g. wear/corrosion, fracture) are described in ISO 13849-2.

7.2.2.5 For example, a door interlocking system that has to achieve PL e or SIL 3 will need to incorporate a minimum fault tolerance of 1 (e.g. two conventional mechanical position switches) in order to achieve this level of performance since it is not normally justifiable to exclude faults such as broken switch actuators. However, it may be acceptable to exclude faults such as short circuit of wiring within a control panel designed in accordance with relevant standards.

7.2.2.6 Further information on the use of fault exclusions is to be provided in the forthcoming revision of ISO 13849-2 currently being developed by ISO/TC 199/WG 8.

7.3 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS that conform to either IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1

7.3.1 In all cases where subsystems or safety-related parts of control systems are designed to either ISO 13849-1 or IEC 62061, conformance to the system level standard can only be claimed if all the requirements of the system level standard (as relevant) are satisfied.

7.3.2 For the design of a subsystem or a part of safety-related parts of control systems either IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1, respectively, shall be satisfied. It is permissible to satisfy more than one of these standards provided that those standards used are fully complied with.

7.3.3 It is not permissible to mix requirements of the standards when designing a subsystem or part of safety-related parts of control systems.

7.4 System design using subsystems or SRP/CS that have been designed using other IEC or ISO standards

7.4.1 It may be possible to select subsystems, for example, electrosensitive protective equipment, that comply with relevant IEC or ISO product standards and either IEC 61508, IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1 in their design. The vendor(s) of these types of subsystems should provide the necessary information to facilitate their integration into a safety-related control system in accordance with either IEC 62061 or ISO 13849-1.

7.4.2 Subsystems, for example, adjustable speed electrical power drive systems, that have been designed using product standards, such as IEC 61800-5-2, that implement the requirements of IEC 61508 can be used in safety-related control systems in accordance with IEC 62061 (see also 6.7.3 of IEC 62061) and ISO 13849-1.

7.4.3 In accordance with IEC 62061 other subsystems that have been designed using IEC, ISO or other standard(s) are subject to 6.7.3 of IEC 62061.


8 Example

8.1 General

The following example assumes that all the requirements of the standards have been satisfied. The example is only intended to demonstrate specific aspects of the application of the standards.

8.2 Simplified example of the design and validation of a safety-related control system implementing a specified safety-related control function

8.2.1 This simplified example is intended to demonstrate the use of subsystems or SRP/CS that comply with IEC 62061 and/or ISO 13849-1 in a SRECS/SRP/CS. The example is based on the implementation of a safety function described as a safety-related stop function associated with position monitoring of a moveable guard, with a specified safety integrity level of SIL 3/required performance level PL_r e as described in Figure 1.



↑↑ shown in actuated position

- a Open.
- b Closed.
- c START.
- d Feedback circuit.

Figure 1 — Example implementation of the safety function

8.2.2 The following information is relevant to the safety requirements specification for this example.

Safety function

- Safety-related stop function, initiated by a protective device: opening of the moveable guard initiates the safety function STO (safe torque off).

Functional description

- Trapping hazards are safeguarded by means of a moveable guard (protective grating). Opening of the interlocked guard is detected by two position switches, B1/B2, employing a break contact/make contact

combination, and evaluation by a central safety module, K1. K1 actuates two contactors, Q1 and Q2, dropping out of which interrupts or prevents hazardous movements or states.

- The position switches are monitored for plausibility in K1 for the purpose of fault detection. Faults in Q1 and Q2 are detected by a start-up test in K1. A start command is successful only if Q1 and Q2 had previously dropped out. Start-up testing by opening and closing of the interlocked guard is not required.
- The safety function remains intact in the event of a component failure. Faults are detected during operation or at actuation (opening and closing) of the interlocked guard resulting in the dropping out of Q1 and Q2 and operational disabling.
- An accumulation of more than two faults in the period between two successive actuations can lead to loss of the safety function.

8.2.3 The following features should also be provided.

- Basic and well-tried safety principles are observed (e.g. the load current for the contactors Q1 and Q2 is de-rated by a factor of 50 %) and the requirements of Category B are met. Protective circuits (e.g. contact protection) are implemented.
- A stable arrangement of the protective devices is assured for actuation of the position switches.
- Switch B1 is a position switch with direct opening action in accordance with IEC 60947-5-1:2003, Annex K.
- The supply conductors to position switches B1 and B2 are laid separately or with protection.

8.2.4 The following information is available from the manufacturers for each part within the design of SRP/CS.

- The safety module K1 is declared by the manufacturer ⁴⁾ as satisfying the requirements for Category 4, PL e and SIL CL 3.
- The contactors Q1 and Q2 possess mechanically linked contact elements conforming with IEC 60947-5-1:2003, Annex L.

8.2.5 The following observation can be made on the design of SRP/CS and/or SRECS.

- Category 4 can only be achieved where several mechanical position switches for different protective devices are not connected in a series arrangement (i.e. no cascading). This is necessary, as faults in the switches cannot otherwise be detected.

4) This module is dealt with as a subsystem and, as such, the $MTTF_d$ of its individual channels need not be given (see 7.2.1.1).

8.2.6 Calculation of the probability of failure in accordance with ISO 13849-1

Figure 2 shows a logic subsystem (safety module K1) to which two-channel input and output elements are connected. Since an abstraction of the hardware level is already performed in the safety-related block diagram, the sequence of the subsystems is in principle interchangeable. It is therefore recommended that subsystems sharing the same structure be grouped together, as shown in Figure 3. This makes calculation of the PL simpler by reducing the number of times limitation of the $MTTF_d$ of a channel to 100 years is performed in the estimation.





Figure 2 — Safety-related block diagram



Key

- 1 hardware related representation: three SRP/CS as subsystems
- 2 simplified logical representation: two SRP/CS as subsystems

Figure 3 — Safety-related block diagram for calculation according to ISO 13849-1

The probability of failure of the safety module K1 is declared by the manufacturer and is added at the end of the calculation [$2,31 \times 10^{-9}$ per hour (manufacturer's value), suitable for PL e]. For the remaining subsystem, the probability of failure is calculated as follows:

- $MTTF_d$: the B_{10d} value of 1 000 000 cycles [manufacturer's value] is stated for the mechanical part of B1. For the position switch B2, the B_{10d} value is 500 000 cycles (manufacturer's value). At 365 working days per year, 24 working hours per day and a cycle time of 900 s (15 min), n_{op} is 35 040 cycles per year for these components calculated by using Equations (C.2) and (C.7) of ISO 13849-1:

$$n_{op} = \frac{d_{op} \cdot h_{op} \cdot 3600 \frac{s}{h}}{t_{cycle}} = \frac{365 \frac{d}{y} \cdot 24 \frac{h}{d} \cdot 3600 \frac{s}{h}}{900 \frac{s}{cycle}} = 35040 \frac{cycles}{y}$$

$$\text{MTTF}_{d,B1} = \frac{B_{10d}}{0,1 \cdot n_{op}} = \frac{1\,000\,000 \text{ cycles}}{0,1 \cdot 35\,040 \frac{\text{cycles}}{y}} = 285y$$

$$T_{10d,B1} = \frac{B_{10d}}{n_{op}} = \frac{1\,000\,000 \text{ cycles}}{35\,040 \frac{\text{cycles}}{y}} = 28,5y$$

$$\text{MTTF}_{d,B2} = \frac{B_{10d}}{0,1 \cdot n_{op}} = \frac{500\,000 \text{ cycles}}{0,1 \cdot 35\,040 \frac{\text{cycles}}{y}} = 143y$$

$$T_{10d,B2} = \frac{B_{10d}}{n_{op}} = \frac{500\,000 \text{ cycles}}{35\,040 \frac{\text{cycles}}{y}} = 14,3y$$

The T_{10d} value of B2 is 14,3 years. After this time B2 shall be replaced if a mission time of 20 years is intended for the whole SRP/CS.

- For the contactors Q1 and Q2, the B_{10} value corresponds under inductive load (AC 3) to an electrical lifetime of 1 000 000 cycles (manufacturer's value). If 50 % of failures are assumed to be dangerous, the B_{10d} value is produced by doubling of the B_{10} value:

$$\text{MTTF}_{d,Q1/Q2} = \frac{B_{10d}}{0,1 \cdot n_{op}} = \frac{2\,000\,000 \text{ cycles}}{0,1 \cdot 35\,040 \frac{\text{cycles}}{y}} = 571y$$

$$T_{10d,Q1/Q2} = \frac{B_{10d}}{n_{op}} = \frac{2\,000\,000 \text{ cycles}}{35\,040 \frac{\text{cycles}}{y}} = 57,1y$$

- For both channels the MTTF_d is calculated by using Equation (D.1) of ISO 13849-1:

$$\frac{1}{\text{MTTF}_d} = \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{1}{\text{MTTF}_{d,i}}$$

$$\frac{1}{\text{MTTF}_{d,Ch1}} = \frac{1}{285y} + \frac{1}{571y} = \frac{1}{190y}$$

$$\frac{1}{\text{MTTF}_{d,Ch2}} = \frac{1}{143y} + \frac{1}{571y} = \frac{1}{114y}$$

This gives an $\text{MTTF}_{d,Ch1}$ of 190 years and an $\text{MTTF}_{d,Ch2}$ of 114 years. In accordance with ISO 13849-1 the MTTF_d of both channels is limited to 100 years and, in this case, as the MTTF_d of both channels are equal after limiting it is not necessary to perform symmetrization.

- DC_{avg} : the DC of 99 % for B1 and B2 is based upon plausibility monitoring of the break/make contact combination in K1. The DC of 99 % for contactors Q1 and Q2 is derived from regular monitoring by K1 during start-up. The DC values stated correspond to the DC_{avg} for each subsystem. The DC_{avg} will be calculated according to Equation (E.1) of ISO 13849-1. Because each single DC is 99 %, the DC_{avg} is also 99 %.

- Adequate measures against common-cause failure in the subsystems B1/B2 and Q1/Q2 (70 points): separation (15), well-tried components (5), protection against overvoltage, etc. (15) and environmental conditions (25 + 10).
- Mission time: for the simplified approach of ISO 13849-1 a mission time of 20 years is assumed.
- The subsystem B1/B2/Q1/Q2 corresponds to Category 4 with a high $MTTF_d$ (100 years) and high DC_{avg} (99 %). This results in an average probability of dangerous failure of $2,47 \times 10^{-8}$ per hour (see Table K.1 of ISO 13849-1). Following addition of the subsystem K1, the average probability of dangerous failure is $2,70 \times 10^{-8}$ per hour. This corresponds to PL e.

8.2.7 Calculation of the probability of failure in accordance with IEC 62061

8.2.7.1 In accordance with 6.6.2 of IEC 62061, the circuit arrangement can be divided into three subsystems: B1/B2, K and Q1/Q2 as shown in the safety-related block diagram.

8.2.7.2 For subsystem K, the probability of failure of $2,31 \times 10^{-9}$ per hour and a SIL claim limit of 3 for the safety module K1 is declared by the manufacturer.

8.2.7.3 For the remaining subsystems, the probability of failure can be estimated as follows.


- Subsystem B1/B2: the B_{10d} value of 1 000 000 cycles [manufacturer's value] is stated for the mechanical part of B1. For the position switch B2, the B_{10d} value is 500 000 cycles [manufacturer's value]. At 365 working days per year, 24 working hours per day and a cycle time of 15 min, C is 4 cycles per hour for these components. The failure rate is calculated as $0,1 \times C/B_{10d} = 4,00 \times 10^{-7}/h$. For B2 this gives a failure rate of $8,00 \times 10^{-7}/h$.

NOTE The number of operating cycles, C , of the application according to IEC 62061 corresponds to the mean number of annual operations, n_{op} , according to ISO 13849-1. Since C is stated in cycles per hour and n_{op} in cycles per year, the following relation applies:

$$C = n_{op} \cdot \frac{y}{365 \cdot 24h}$$

Thus the mean operation in hours per day and days per year has influence on the value of C as well as of n_{op} .

- The logical architecture of this subsystem equates to diagram D from 6.7.8.2.5 of IEC 62061 as shown in Figure 4.

**Key**

- 1 subsystem D
- 2 subsystem element λ_{De1}
- 3 diagnostic function(s)
- 4 subsystem element, λ_{De2}
- 5 common cause failure

Figure 4 — Logical representation of subsystem D

- The subsystem elements (switches B1 and B2) are of different design, therefore the following, Equation (D.1) from 6.7.8.2.5 of IEC 62061, is used to determine the PFH_D of the subsystem.

$$\lambda_{DssD} = (1 - \beta)^2 \left\{ \left[\lambda_{De1} \times \lambda_{De2} \times (DC_1 + DC_2) \right] \times T_2 / 2 + \left[\lambda_{De1} \times \lambda_{De2} \times (2 - DC_1 - DC_2) \right] \times T_1 / 2 \right\} + \beta \times (\lambda_{De1} + \lambda_{De2}) / 2$$

$$PFH_{DssD} = \lambda_{DssD} \times 1h$$

where

T_2 is the diagnostic test interval; for subsystem B1/B2, this is 15 min.

T_1 is the proof test interval or lifetime, whichever is the smaller. For subsystem B1/B2, the lifetime interval is 125 000 h (14,3 years) at the given rate of use based on the lowest subsystem element T_{10d} value (see ISO 13849-1, C.4.2). Switch B2 has the lowest T_{10d} value. The proof test interval (see Foreword of IEC 62061) is assumed to be 20 years (175 200 h), which is greater than the lifetime. So T_1 is 125 000 h.

β is the susceptibility to common cause failures. This has a value of 5 % (0,05) resulting from 42 points scored in the simplified method in IEC 62061, Annex F. Separation (5 + 5 + 5), assessment/analysis (9) and environmental conditions (9 + 9).

λ_{De1} is the dangerous failure rate of subsystem element 1. For switch B1 this equates to $4,00 \times 10^{-7}/h$ (see above).

DC_1 is the diagnostic coverage of subsystem element 1. For switch B1, this is estimated to be 99 %, based upon plausibility monitoring of the break/make contacts of B1 and B2 in combination with K1.