TECHNICAL REPORT

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Intelligent transport systems — Cooperative ITS —

Part 6: 'Core system' risk assessment methodology

Systèmes intelligents de transport — Systèmes intelligents de transport coopératifs —

Partie 6: Méthodologie d'évaluation du risque 'd'un système principal'

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Foreword

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The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

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For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information

The committee responsible for this document is ISO/TC 204, *Intelligent transport systems*.

ISO 17427 consists of the following parts under the general title, *Intelligent transport systems — Cooperative ITS:*

— *Part 2: Framework overview* [Technical Report]

— *Part 3: Concept of operations (ConOps) for 'Core' systems* [Technical Report]

— *Part 4: Minimum system requirements and behaviour for core systems* [Technical Report]

— *Part 6: 'Core System' risk assessment methodology* [Technical Report]

— *Part 7: Privacy aspects* [Technical Report]

— *Part 8: Liability aspects* [Technical Report]

— *Part 9: Compliance and enforcement aspects* [Technical Report]

— *Part 10: Driver distraction and information display* [Technical Report]

The following parts are under preparation:

— *Part 1: Roles and responsibilities in the context of co-operative ITS architecture(s)*

— *Part 5: Common approaches to security* [Technical Report]

— *Part 11: Compliance and enforcement aspects* [Technical Report]

— *Part 12: Release processes* [Technical Report]

— *Part 13: Use case test cases* [Technical Report]

— *Part 14: Maintenance requirements and processes* [Technical Report]

This Technical Report provides an informative 'C-ITS Core System Risk Assessment Methodology' for Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS). It should be studied alongside ISO 17427-1, ISO/TR 17465-1, and other parts of the ISO/TR 17465 series and ISO 21217. Detailed specifications for the application context will be provided by other ISO, CEN and SAE deliverables, and communications specifications will be provided by ISO, IEEE and ETSI.

Introduction

Intelligent transport systems (*ITS*) are transport systems in which advanced information, communication, sensor and control technologies, including the Internet, are applied to increase safety, sustainability, efficiency, and comfort.

A distinguishing feature of '*ITS*' is its communication with outside entities.

Some *ITS* systems operate autonomously, for example, 'adaptive cruise control' uses radar/lidar/and/or video to characterize the behaviour of the vehicle in front and adjust its vehicle speed accordingly. Some *ITS* systems are informative, for example, 'Variable Message Signs' at the roadside, or transmitted into the vehicle, provide information and advice to the driver. Some *ITS* systems are semi-autonomous, in that, they are largely autonomous, but rely on 'static' or 'broadcast' data, for example, *GNSS* based 'SatNav' systems operate autonomously within a vehicle but are dependent on receiving data broadcast from satellites in order to calculate the location of the vehicle.

Cooperative *Intelligent transport systems* (*C-ITS*) are a group of *ITS* technologies where service provision is enabled by, or enhanced by, the use of 'live', present situation related, dynamic data/information from other entities of similar functionality [for example, from one vehicle to other vehicle(s)], and/or between different elements of the transport network, including vehicles and infrastructure [for example, from the vehicle to an infrastructure managed system or from an infrastructure managed system to vehicle(s)]. Effectively, these systems allow vehicles to 'talk' to each other and to the infrastructure. These systems have significant potential to improve the transport network.

A distinguishing feature of '*C-ITS*, is that, data is used across *application*/service boundaries.

It is important to understand that *C-ITS* is not an end in itself, but a combination of techniques, protocols, systems and sub-systems to enable 'cooperative'/collaborative service provision.

The purpose of this '*C-ITS* Risk Assessment Methodology' Technical Report is to identify critical technical and cost risks that can impact *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems service provision deployment, and to provide means to evaluate such risks. Risk varies according to the complexity, size, commercial paradigm, and political paradigm prevalent in each jurisdiction where *C-ITS* are supported.

While the principle causes of risks, both technical and cost risks, will be generally similar in each jurisdiction which encourages and supports *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems, the quantifiable or assessable risk will vary to some extent in each case, and each jurisdiction, the *core system* operator, and *application service* provider, will need to make their own risk assessment. This Technical Report, therefore, does not provide a calculated 'global' risk assessment for *C-ITS*, but identifies the principal causes of risk, and provides a consistent way for a jurisdiction, *core system* operator, or *application service* provider, to assess the risks that they face.

Some see the evolution of *C-ITS* as possible on a V2V basis, without the need for 'Core Systems' and such casual encounter *C-ITS* is indeed possible and the technology proven. The subject of risks associated with *In-vehicle systems* is outside of the scope of this Technical Report, which is focused on risk assessment for *core system* deployments.

The principle environment that this 'Risk Assessment Technical Report' is designed to embrace are *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems where there is some institutional involvement and support, by the direct or indirect provision of *core system* support, and it is the risks associated with the deployment of 'Core Systems' that provide the focus of this Technical Report.

This Technical Report is a 'living document', and as our experience with *C-ITS* develops, it is intended that it will be updated from time to time, as and when we see opportunities to improve this Technical Report.

Intelligent transport systems — Cooperative ITS
Part 6:
'Core system' risk assessment methodology

1 Scope

The scope of this Technical Report is to identify critical technical and financial risks that can impact the *core system* deployment supporting *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems service provision and to provide means to evaluate such risks.

This Technical Report is designed to embrace *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems where there is some institutional involvement and support, by the direct or indirect provision of *core system* support, and it is the risks associated with the deployment of 'Core Systems' that provide the focus of this Technical Report.

This Technical Report does not provide a calculated 'global' risk assessment for *C-ITS*, but identifies the principal causes of risk, and provides a consistent methodology for a jurisdiction, *core system* operator, or *application service* provider, to assess the risks that they face. The objective of this Technical Report is to raise awareness of and consideration of such issues and to give pointers, where appropriate, to standards deliverables existing that provide specifications for all or some of these aspects. This Technical Report does not provide specifications for solutions of these issues.

2 Terms and definitions

2.1
application
software application

2.2
application service
service provided by a service provider accessing data from the IVS vehicle in the case of C-ITS, through a wireless communications network, or provided on-board the vehicle as the result of software (and potentially also hardware and firmware) installed by a service provider or to a service provider's instruction

2.3
cooperative ITS
C-ITS
group of *ITS* technologies where service provision is enabled, or enhanced by, the use of 'live', present situation related, data/information from other entities of similar functionality [for example, from one vehicle to other vehicle(s)], and/or between different elements of the transport network, including vehicles and infrastructure (for example, from the vehicle to an infrastructure managed system or from an infrastructure managed system to vehicle(s)]

2.4
'core' system
combination of enabling technologies and services that provides the foundation for the support of a distributed, diverse set of *applications* (2.1)/*application* transactions which works in conjunction with 'external support systems' such as 'Certificate Authorities'

Note 1 to entry: The system boundary for the core system is not defined in terms of devices or agencies or vendors, but by the open, standardized interface specifications that govern the behaviour of all interactions between core system users.

2.5
global navigation satellite system
GNSS
several networks of satellites that transmit radio signals containing time and distance data that can be picked up by a receiver, allowing the user to identify the location of its receiver anywhere around the globe

2.6
in-vehicle system
hardware, firmware and software on board a vehicle that provides a platform to support *C-ITS* service provision, including that of the ITS-station (ISO 21217), the facilities layer, data pantry and on-board 'apps'

2.7
intelligent transport systems
ITS
transport systems in which advanced information, communication, sensor and control technologies, including the Internet, are applied to increase safety, sustainability, efficiency, and comfort

2.8
ITS-station
ITS-S
entity in a communication network [comprised of *application* (2.1), facilities, networking and access layer components] that is capable of executing ITS-S *application* processes, comprised of an ITS-S facilities layer, ITS-S networking & transport layer, ITS-S access layer, ITS-S management entity and ITS-S security entity, which adheres to a minimum set of security principles and procedures so as to establish a level of trust between itself and other similar ITS stations with which it communicates

3 Abbreviated terms

CA	Certificate Authority
CCA	Core Certification Authority
C-ITS	cooperative intelligent transport systems, cooperative ITS
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
ESS	External System Support
ITS	intelligent transport systems (2.7)
IVS	in-vehicle system (2.6)
RA	Registration Authority
V2I	vehicle to/from infrastructure
V2V	vehicle to vehicle

4 How to use this Technical Report

4.1 Acknowledgements

The contribution of the following sources are acknowledged as the prime sources of material for this Technical Report, and thanked for their contribution:

http://www.cvisproject.org/

www.its.dot.gov/research/systems_engineering.htm

Cooperative ITS Regulatory Policy Issues and Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems Policy Paper, National Transport Commission, Australia.

4.2 C-ITS 'Core System' risks

The purpose of this Technical Report is to identify critical technical and cost risks that can impact a 'Core System' for *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems service provision deployment, and to provide means to evaluate such risks.

The risks that are faced by any jurisdiction or deployer of a *C-ITS* vehicle and highway system varies according to a number of factors:

— the predominant political paradigm of the jurisdiction in which the deployment is instantiated;

— the predominant commercial paradigm within the jurisdiction in which the deployment is instantiated;

— the size of the transport network covered by the deployment;

— the complexity of the transport network covered by the deployment;

— the extent of service provision covered by the instantiation.

The political paradigm probably has the greatest impact. Some jurisdictions are very centralized, while others are, in some way or the other decentralized and/or federated. Some countries organize as a single monolithic jurisdiction, others are organized as a federation of jurisdictions (states), others somewhere in-between. Some countries are associated into political groups of countries where the member states are the paramount jurisdictions and the central jurisdiction is controlled by the will of unanimity or majority, sometimes both.

The practical effect of this on the management of the transport network is significant. A monolithic jurisdiction (for example, Great Britain, France, China), while they may have regional Departments of Transport (DoT), have a centralized controlling DoT which determines policy and strategy. In some jurisdictions, this may be one of centralized control with management of all core strategic policies, including transport, managed by the central government [for example, China which has one 'super' 'Ministry of Transportation of the People's Republic of China' including the former 'Ministry of Communications', 'Civil Aviation Administration', 'State Post Bureau', 'China Maritime Safety Administration' and (since 2013) the 'Ministry of Railways']. Federated states (for example, USA, Australia) that have their own DoTs and central policy, in some cases, may be determined centrally and imposed locally [by a combination of regulations for consistency across the country, and by control of the allotment of financial resources to implement central policies/strategies (for example, USA)], or may be determined locally and brought to the central DoT for agreement by consensus where achievable (for example, Australia, Switzerland).

In combination with the constraints and opportunities of the political paradigm is the commercial paradigm that it fosters. In nearly all countries, the transport environment, and especially the road network, is 'state' funded and controlled. Highways may be totally state funded from taxation, or outsourced to commercial or pseudo-commercial organizations to fund the development of autoroutes/highways/and infrastructures such as tunnels and bridges, increasingly a combination of both, but the paradigm is almost globally managed by the 'jurisdiction'. However, whether this is the local jurisdictional 'state' or the National DoT varies considerably, and in cases such as Europe, while there may be a European "Directorate General" MOVE (Mobility and Transport), it is the National Member States whose DoTs are paramount, and whose policies vary from one member state to another. Some jurisdictions are sympathetic to the provision of commercial services (including *C-ITS* service provisions), while others are hostile and consider commercialisation to be potentially a safety risk. Most will live with some compromise that suits the local community, but those compromises will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

The other factors that are most important in shaping the shape of *C-ITS* deployment are the size and complexity of the transport network, and in particular, the road network. In countries such as USA,

the network is so complex, with many different layers of governance, and many different local political and commercial environments, and the size, both in terms of road pavement kilometres/miles and in the number of road users, so vast, that would make a monolithic 'Core System' impracticable. However, other countries, such as Australia, although the size of the territory is 80 % the size of USA, because the road network is only 12 % of the size of that in USA and serves a population of 7 % of that of USA, a single monolithic 'National' *core system* may seem to be the only viable arrangement to support *C-ITS* service provision.

The principle causes of risks, both technical and cost risks, will be generally similar in each jurisdiction which encourages and supports *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems, but the quantifiable or assessable risk will vary to some extent in each case, and each jurisdiction, *core system* operator, and *application service* (2.2) provider, will need to make their own risk assessment. This Technical Report, therefore, does not provide a calculated 'global' risk assessment for *C-ITS*, but identifies the principal causes of risk, and provides a consistent way for a jurisdiction, *core system* operator, or *application service* provider, to assess the risks that they face.

While this Technical Report can provide tools for deployers and enablers of *C-ITS* service provision to assess the general risks that face any implementers of a *core system* to support *C-ITS*, there can also be specific risks specialized to a jurisdiction or implementation that are very location or instantiation specific that are not covered in this Technical Report (for example, the communications and environmental issues in the Australian outback or Siberia), so there is a general section towards the end of this report which reminds the deployer/enabler to consider additional local aspects, (but does not provide specific tools for their assessment). Generally, however, the principal causes of risk inherent in most *C-ITS* instantiations have been included and tools identified to consistently assess them.

Another alternative for consideration is to rely on autonomous safety systems coupled with whatever the commercial sector develops in terms of *C-ITS* vehicle-highway systems (perhaps funded by advertising). In these circumstances, it is the tools available to '*application service* providers' to assess their risk exposure that are relevant, and the principle risk to the jurisdiction/administration in these circumstances are the risks of 'doing nothing'.

The evolution of *C-ITS* on a V2V basis, without the need for 'Core Systems' as casual encounter *C-ITS* presents different issues of risk. While these 'casual' or 'commercial' *C-ITS* options clearly bring additional benefits over a current, non *C-ITS* service environment, their utility will be limited in scope and the client system will be limited. In any event, the roll out will most probably be significantly slower and many of the life-saving, injury mitigation benefits significantly deferred or even lost altogether. However, in some jurisdictions, such routes, can provide the only feasible, or best, option. In these circumstances, it will be important for the jurisdiction, even if not funding or getting involved in deployment, to at least ensure that such solutions are not proprietarily locked to the extent that safety of life and interoperability and transport system efficiency benefits are impaired, and such jurisdictions would be wise to consider how they will achieve this goal. (Requiring adherence to International Standards is recommended as a first step.)

This Technical Report does not address issues of risk that do not involve 'Core Systems'.

The principle environment that this 'Risk Assessment Technical Report' is designed to embrace are *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems where there is some institutional involvement and support, probably often by the direct or indirect provision of *core system* support, and it is the risks associated with the deployment of 'Core Systems' that provide the focus of this Technical Report.

A common definition of a risk is the probability that a decision or action will result in a negative or unwanted consequence, where the probability of each possible outcome is known or can be estimated. In this Technical Report, risks will be identified along with a discussion of their potential impact on deployment. Each risk will have a qualitative discussion of its impact (e.g. high, medium, or low impact) and its likelihood (e.g. high, medium or low likelihood) that the risk will materialize. For each deployment/proposed deployment, actions or mitigation measures will then need to be listed as a part of the assessment.

Table 1 summarizes the high *core system* risks based on the combination of impact and likelihood. More detail on these and all other identified risks are provided in Clause 6.

Table 1 — High *core system* risks

Subclause	Subject
6.1.1	Timely deployment
6.1.2	Relationships between 'Core Systems' and external enterprises
6.2.1	Role and makeup of a 'Core Certification Authority'
6.2.2	External Support System (ESS) for security
6.2.3	Operations and maintenance (O&M) of External Support System (ESS) for security
6.2.4	Security management

The principle body of this Technical Report consists of the following sections:

— The Introduction provided the context of this Technical Report, and Clause 1 determined its purpose and extent.

— Clause 2 and Clause 3 provide explanation of the terms and abbreviations used.

— Clause 4 provides an overview of how to use this Technical Report and what is meant by the *core system.*

— Clause 5 describes how the risks are organized and explains the 'scoring' mechanisms.

— Clause 6 provides the detailed listing of each risk including a 'Risk statement', a root cause, the consequence, likelihood it will happen, a graphical summary of the overall risk, and a list of any actions that can be taken to mitigate or reduce the risk.

— A bibliography is provided at the end of the document.

4.3 'Core System' overview

C-ITS vehicle and highway systems service provision envisions the combination of the *applications* (2.1), services and systems necessary to provide the safety, mobility and environmental benefits through the exchange of data between mobile and fixed transportation users. It consists of the following:

— **applications** that provide functionality to realize safety, mobility and environmental benefits;

— **communications** that facilitate data exchange;

— **'Core Systems'** which provide the functionality needed to enable data exchange between and among mobile and fixed transportation users;

— **support systems,** including security credentials certificate and registration authorities that allow devices and systems to establish trust relationships.

The 'Core Systems' main mission is to enable safety, mobility and environmental communications-based *applications* for both mobile and non-mobile users.

See ISO/TR 17427-2 for a more detailed explanation of the framework and overview of *C-ITS* service provision.

See ISO/TR 17427-3 for a more detailed explanation of the concept of operations for *C-ITS* 'Core Systems', and ISO 17427-1 for explanation of the roles and responsibilities involved in *C-ITS* service provision.

Within the *C-ITS vehicle and highway systems* environment, the *core system* concept distinguishes communications mechanisms from data exchange, and from the services needed, to facilitate the data exchange. The *core system* supports the *C-ITS vehicle and highway systems* environment by being responsible for providing the services needed to facilitate the data exchanges. The contents of the data exchange are determined by *applications* unless the data exchange is used as part of the facilitation process between the user and the *core system*.

The *core system* provides the functionality required to support safety, mobility, and environmental *applications*. This same functionality can also enable commercial *applications* but that is not a driving factor for the development of the *core system*. The primary function of the *core system* is the facilitation of communications between system users and many of the communications must also be very secure. The *core system* can also provide data distribution and network support services depending on the needs of the *core system* deployment.

A critical factor driving the conceptual view of the *core system* and the entire *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment is the level of trustworthiness between communicating parties. A complicating factor is the need to maintain the privacy of participants, though not necessarily exclusively through anonymous communication. ISO/TR 14827-7 will address privacy aspects of *C-ITS* service provision in greater detail. ISO/TR 17428-8 will address Liability issues in greater detail.

4.4 Non 'Core System' risks

This Technical Report is focused on risk assessment in respect of 'Core Systems' deployment. The risks associated with *in-vehicle systems* is not assessed, and such systems, may it be OEM or aftermarket, need to face the same risk assessment processes used to assess risk for any vehicle safety equipment.

Some see the evolution of *C-ITS* as possible on a V2V basis, without the need for 'Core Systems' and such casual encounter *C-ITS* is indeed possible and the technology proven. Another alternative for consideration is to rely on autonomous safety systems coupled with whatever the commercial sector develops in terms of *C-ITS* vehicle-highway systems (perhaps funded by advertising). In these circumstances, it is the tools available to '*application service* providers' to assess their risk exposure that are relevant, and the principle risk to the jurisdiction/administration in these circumstances are the risks of 'doing nothing'.

The subject of risks associated with *In-vehicle systems* is outside of the scope of this Technical Report, which is focused on risk assessment for *core system* deployments.

While these 'casual' or 'commercial' *C-ITS* options clearly bring additional benefits over a current, non *C-ITS* service environment, their utility will be limited in scope and the client system will be limited. In any event, the roll out will most probably be significantly slower and many of the life-saving, injury mitigation benefits that are the target of many *C-ITS* services can be significantly deferred or even lost altogether. However, in some jurisdictions, such routes, may provide the only feasible, or best, option. In these circumstances, it will be important for the jurisdiction, even if not funding or getting involved in deployment, to at least ensure that such solutions are not proprietarily locked to the extent that safety of life and interoperability and transport system efficiency benefits are impaired, and such jurisdictions would be wise to consider how they will achieve this goal. (Requiring adherence to International Standards is recommended as a first step.)

However, in the case of 'casual encounter' *C-ITS* systems (V2V without the involvement of a *core system*), there is another layer of risk that needs to be assessed, and this is associated with the risks of

— reliance on receipt of data from other vehicles in order to make system decisions,

— risks associated with processing such data, and

— and risks associated with providing data to other system users.

A Technical Report providing advice and guidance for risk assessment of IVS (in both 'core system' supported and 'casual encounter' *C-ITS* systems) can be produced in this series at a later date to provide guidance for these issues.

5 Tools to assess risk

5.1 General

5.1.1 Technology risk

Within this Technical Report ,'Technology Risk' is taken to mean exposure to loss arising from risk that the employed technology might not work as expected; the probability of loss incurred through the execution of a technical process in which the outcome is uncertain, i.e. uncertainties caused by the basic technological design.

Untested or unstable design, engineering, technological or manufacturing procedures entail some level technology risk that can result in the loss of time, resources, and possibly harm to individuals and facilities.

5.1.2 Technical risk

Within this Technical Report, 'Technical Risk' is taken to mean exposure to loss arising from technical failure in operation. Technical risk is measured as an expected value derived from prior experience that led to undesirable results, i.e. uncertainties caused by the physical instantiation and operation.

Faulty manufacture, operation or operational procedures entail some technology risk that can result in the loss of time, resources, and possibly harm to individuals and facilities.

5.1.3 Financial risk

Within the context of this Technical Report, 'Financial Risk' is a term used to mean the potential for financial loss.

Financial loss can occur from three basic causes:

a) failure of the business model to support continuance of the operation of the system;

b) technological or technical failure directly causing financially quantifiable losses;

c) liability for consequential loss causing financial cost.

5.1.4 Liability

ISO/TR 17427-8 addresses liability issues in *C-ITS* deployment.

5.2 Operational phases of risk assessment

The process recommended for risk assessment is kept deliberately simple and the result graphically obvious. The steps are as follows.

a) Calculate appropriate 'Mitigation Cost' bands (see 5.3).

b) Calculate appropriate 'Schedule' bands (see 5.3).

c) For each 'Category', extrapolate the calculations and identify the location of the result with a 'spot' or similar marking.

For most instantiations, this can provide adequate information to assist management to assess risks involved in the judgements and decisions that they have to make.

If a summary grid is felt to be useful, this can be constructed by extracting the row featuring the 'spot' row from each category and presenting these as a single chart. Alternatively, the values can be added and divided by the number of categories to provide an average, if that approach is preferred.

If a financial risk assessment is required, these charts can be supplemented by the following simple algorithm:

Risk Loss = Calculated cost in the event of failure × probability of failure.

This provides a simple, though naïve, guide to the 'exposure' caused by various aspects of the project, which may be useful to project managers to assess the 'scale' of risk (for example, to compare between a high risk option with low consequential loss or a low risk option with high consequential loss).

However, it is a very simple guide to indicate the financial significance of risk, and by no means a precise calculation.

Where required, more sophisticated calculations can be made, but this is beyond the scope of this Technical Report.

Recommended links for more complex risk assessment:

http://www.cimaglobal.com/Thought-leadership/Research-topics/Organisational-management/Reporting-and-managing-risk/

http://riskencyclopedia.com/articles/var_measure/

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1008.1108.pdf

http://www.pacca.info/public/files/docs/public/finance/Active%20Risk%20Management/Uryasev%20-%20Algorithms%20Optimization%20VaR.pdf

ISO 31000, '*Risk Management — Principles and Guidelines*' and IEC 31010, *Risk management — Risk assessment techniques are also recommended as providing tools for risk assessments.*

5.3 Risk evaluation explanation

The model proposed for evaluation of risk is based around the development and use of "Risk assessment Grid Charts". These can be explained as follows:

The' Risk Assessment Grid Chart' is made up of an 'x-axis', called 'Consequences' (or impacts) and a 'y-axis', called 'Likelihood' (or probability). Each x-axis and y-axis is made up of five grid cells (1-5), with the lower numbers representing less risk than higher ones as represented in Figure 1. The green section represents lower numbers (e.g. 2, 3; 3, 1), while the red section represents higher numbers (e.g. 5, 3; 4,4).



Figure 1 — Risk assessment grid

The y-axis as likelihood (or probability) is evaluated as a percentage as follows:

Table 2 — Likelihood evaluation table

Likelihood score	Probability range	Overall probability
1	1 % to 19 %	Very low
2	20 % to 39 %	Low
3	40 % to 59 %	Medium
4	60 % to 79 %	High
5	80 % to 100 %	Very high

The 'y-axis' as 'consequences' (or impacts) is typically made up of cost, schedule, and technical factors with a mean score for the overall 'Consequence' score. An example is provided in Table 3.

Table 3 — Example 'Consequence evaluation table'

Consequence score	Mitigation cost	Schedule (months)	Technical evaluation
1	$1K to $25 000[a]	1 to 2[a]	Existing technology meets requirements
2	$25 000 to $100 000[a]	2 to 3[a]	Minor evolution of existing technology needed to meet requirements, all issues addressed and near resolution.
3	$100 000 to $500 000[a]	3 to 5[a]	Moderate evolution of existing technology need to meet requirements, issues addressed but not resolved.
4	$500 000 to $1M[a]	5 to 6[a]	Significant evolution of existing technology, major performance issues remain, critical requirements not met.
5	$1M and over[a]	6 and over[a]	New "State of the Art," Limited technology experience, current system does not meet critical requirements.

[a] These are suggested figures. Actual figures to be calculated as part of the assessment.

Likelihood (probability) scores can be typically supported by rationale, whereas consequence (impact) factors are more difficult to determine especially in the design phase. Consequence factors are better evaluated at the development and implementation phase where costs and schedules are more pronounced. For the purpose of this Technical Report, 'Consequence' factors use schedule and technical evaluation factors to determine impacts, but not cost.

The overall risk score consists of green for low, yellow for medium, and red for high.

A resultant calculated grid might look like the example in Figure 2.



Figure 2 — Overall risk score grid

The development and management team for each instantiation needs to work through the calculation for at least each of the categories below.

5.4 Categorization of risk

Within this Technical Report, the risks for the *core system* will be separated into two categories:

— risks that are associated with an individual *core system*;

— risks that are associated with the collection of multiple 'Core Systems' and their relationships.

The following risks are those that are associated with an individual *core system*:

a) timely deployment (usually high risk);

b) relationships between 'Core Systems' and external enterprises (usually high risk);

c) adequate operations and maintenance personnel (usually medium risk).

The following risks are those that are associated with multiple 'Core Systems' and their relationships:

a) role and makeup of the 'Core Certification Authority' (usually high risk);

b) 'External Support System' (ESS) for security (usually high risk);

c) 'Operations and Maintenance (O&M)' of the security 'External Support System' (ESS) (usually high risk);

d) security management (usually high risk);

e) system performance management (usually medium risk);

f) privacy (usually medium risk);

g) device certification (usually medium risk).

6 Risks for the core system

6.1 Risks associated with an individual 'Core System'

6.1.1 Timely deployment



Risk statement
If the deployment for functioning 'Core Systems' is not complete by the time mobile system, users are beginning to use the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment, THEN the core services including trust management and data distribution will not be available to system users and *applications* that rely on having common trust and standardized data can be affected. Are the next steps for implementing the design of the *core system* documented and scheduled? Are the schedules for the *core system* deployment in alignment with the deployment of other parts of the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems service provision such as the vehicle-based safety systems? Allowing the design and implementation of the *core system* to fall behind the development of *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems related devices and *applications* could jeopardize the successful implementation of the overall *C-ITS vehicle and highway systems* environment.
Root cause driver
Planned deployment issue.
Consequence (Impacts)
If the *core system* is not deployed along with the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems *applications*, then system users may have to resort to devices with non-standard interfaces or stand-alone *applications* resulting in a patchwork of systems that cannot interoperate.
Likelihood (Probability)
This is an institutional issue which may take time to accomplish. Planning involves various interest groups. At this point, with few specific decisions about the deployment of the *core system* being discussed or documented, the likelihood is most probably high that this risk will occur.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events
1) The responsible Jurisdiction/DoT should conduct an analysis to determine when the *core system* should be deployed relative to other devices and *applications* being developed in order to provide the best benefits.
2) The *core system* documentation needs to be made available to research programs, test bed, and other private researchers to support prototyping and to determine how to design and implement *core system*(s).

Risk statement
3) Standards organizations need to begin evaluating how to incorporate *core system* interfaces.

6.1.2 Relationships between 'Core Systems' and external enterprises



Risk statement
IF the enterprise relationships between the *core system* and external entities are not developed, deployed, operational, and maintained, THEN the *core system* will likely not operate correctly and efficiently. A 'System Architecture Document' defines relationships for governance of the 'Core Systems', including a *core system* 'Certification Authority' and 'External Support Systems'. This affects all aspects of the *core system* included trust management and data distribution services. Related risks: 6.2.1
Root cause driver
Stakeholder operational agreements
Consequence (Impacts)
The *core system* has dependencies on external enterprise relationships working correctly as designed, otherwise, the *core system* is impacted operationally and over time through undefined maintenance agreements and operating agreements.
Likelihood (Probability)
External enterprise objects like the 'Core Certification Authority' will involve many different stakeholder organizations, including public and private sector organizations. The likelihood can be high that the diverse group of stakeholders will not be able to coalesce and establish the necessary structure to govern the *core system*(s) and the security external support systems or sustain their operations over the long term.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events
1) Assess the system architecture documentation (SAD) external 'enterprise objects' and their relationships to ensure cooperation and interoperability.
2) Develop the institutional/policy concepts necessary to establish the 'Core Certification Authority' and 'External Support Systems' while continuing to develop the technical aspects of the *core system* to ensure interoperability.

6.1.3 Adequate operations and maintenance personnel



Risk statement
IF new personnel need to be hired and trained or retraining is needed for existing personnel to operate and maintain a *core system,* THEN appropriate annual budgets and training time must be available so that *core system* critical updates will not lag behind which could cause security and incompatibility issues over time.
Root cause driver
That there is budget required for personnel to operate and maintain the 'Core Systems'.
Consequence (Impacts)
There are operations and maintenance personnel to handle the day-to-day operations of the *core system* and there may be a need for these personnel to be trained. There are also training costs that are needed as well. Without a budget for support staff, the *core system* cannot operate.
Likelihood (Probability)
Adequate and complete budgets are needed to operate/maintain the *core system*. The assumption is that if a jurisdiction is installing a *core system* that they have considered personnel for operations and maintenance.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events
1) The jurisdiction will need to conduct an assessment to determine what personnel are needed to operate and maintain *core system* equipment, servers, accounts, etc. This makeup of the workforce will depend on the scale of the services being provided by a *core system*, including, to some degree, the estimated number of system users (particularly centre based system users with which a *core system* will interact in order to set up geo-casts, set up new subscriptions, investigate misbehaviour, etc.), as well as the hours of operation of that *core system*.
2) The jurisdiction, as part of the institutional/policy development for the *core system* governance should also establish policy guidelines (see risk 6.2.1) that address the minimal staffing requirements for any agency or entity contemplating hosting a *core system*. This could be part of the role of a 'Core Certification Authority' - to ensure that the required levels are in place and are maintained over time.

6.2 Risks associated with multiple 'Core Systems'

The following risks are those that are associated with multiple 'Core Systems' and their relationships:

6.2.1 Role and makeup of the 'Core Certification Authority'



Risk statement
IF the Core Certification Authority (CCA) is not established and operational, THEN the *core system* will likely have policy and interdependence issues with other 'Core Systems', as well as with external support systems. System architecture documentation should define roles for the 'Core Certification Authority' and suggest the importance of bringing together a number of diverse stakeholders in order to establish this authority. The success of the *core system* depends on having a trusted authority to establish the governance models, standards for operations, and provide leadership concerning the institutional issues surrounding the operation of the *core system*. The 'Core Certification Authority' will need to monitor upgrades as they come along to determine when there is an interoperability issue with other 'Core Systems' or system users. The make-up of the CCA is probably many different bodies, all of which need to be identified. Related risks: 6.1.2 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.2.7
Root cause driver
Establishment and operation of the 'Core Certification Authority' is needed.
Consequence (Impacts)
If the 'Core Certification Authority' is not available, then *core system* policies, conflicts, jurisdictional issues, interdependencies, *application* standards, etc., may not be resolved in a manner that supports the overall interoperability of the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment.
Likelihood (Probability)
This is an institutional issue which will usually take time to resolve. There will likely be a need for a jurisdictional/national charter for this authority. The task of establishing the CCA will include establishing budgets, defining roles, identifying governance processes, and determining personnel needs. It will also need buy-in from local jurisdictions, device/system developers, and other various interest groups. This effort will require time to establish the CCA. Given the institutional complexity of this activity and the number of stakeholders that must work together, the likelihood is high that it will take longer to establish the institutional issues than to get the technical issues worked out and ready to support deployment of the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events

Risk statement
1) Jurisdiction should continue the policy research already underway for the overall governance needs for the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment and use the enterprise objects and relationships described in system architecture documentation to better inform the investigations into what formal or informal processes are needed, what roles might need to be filled, how the CCA will be chartered, how budgets will be established, etc.
2) Using this assessment, the national oversight and governance authority can be scoped.

6.2.2 External support system (ESS) for security



Risk statement
IF the ESS for providing a security credentials 'Registration Authority' (RA) and 'Certificate Authority' (CA) are not developed, established, and deployed, THEN the system users will not be able to receive valid security certificates nor will the *core system* or system users be able to receive 'Certificate Revocation Lists' (CRLs) in order to quickly identify any misbehaving users and maintain an operational system. Related risks: 6.2.3
Root cause driver
Inadequate planning for security distribution
Consequence (Impacts)
The 'Core Systems' misbehaviour management is impacted if CRLs are not distributed to the *core system*. Connected vehicle services like Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) safety are impacted if there is no defined way to distribute certificates and CRLs to system users.
Likelihood (Probability)
The automobile companies and *core system* have expectations that appropriate certificates are to be distributed by an external authority. This is an institutional issue which may take time to accomplish. The establishment of this external support system involves various interest groups, including system users and the likelihood is high that this may not be in place in time for full-scale deployment of devices and *applications* in the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events
1) Assess which certificate authority functions for the ESS need to be developed, established, and deployed and set up a plan.
2) Determine who will operate the ESS and what is the funding model will be for both the initial roll-out and ongoing support phases.
3) Determine who has oversight and governance to ensure that the *core system* is compatible with the ESS functions.

6.2.3 Operations and maintenance (O&M) of the security 'External Support System' (ESS)



Risk statement
IF the ESS RA and CA roles and responsibilities for operations, maintenance, and funding are not established, THEN the ESS may not be efficiently managed. The *core system* will be impacted if it is relying on an ESS for security credentials management, particularly regular, accurate CRLs to ensure that the 'Core Systems' users are adequately protected. Related risks: 6.2.2
Root cause driver
ESS RA and CA Enterprise roles and responsibilities need to be defined for efficient operation and maintenance.
Consequence (Impacts)
The ESS roles and responsibility for operations and maintenance need to be defined for certificate distribution, and especially for IEEE 1609.2 (5.9 GHz) certificate distribution and CRL distribution, otherwise the *core system* is impacted by poor operations and maintenance of CRL distribution and all *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment users are impacted by poor O&M of the certificate distribution process.
Likelihood (Probability)
This is an institutional issue which must be planned for and may take time to accomplish. The establishment of this ESS involves various interest groups, including system users to define roles and responsibilities. With the great number of stakeholders that must agree on how this is done and continue to ensure that this security system is operational the likelihood may be high that this risk will occur.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events
1) Assess what the roles and responsibilities for the ESS are.
2) Develop a business model for continued solvency of the ESS, including how long term O&M will be funded and sustained.

6.2.4 Security management



Risk statement
IF the security management standards or policies are not established nationally, including agreements on what constitutes misbehaviour and how bad actors are removed, THEN 'Core Systems' and system users could be vulnerable to the actions of unidentified malicious system users, and the data provided to system users may be suspect. Such policies need to include registration, expiration, revocation, and renewal of certificates. Revocation policies need to define what constitutes misbehaviour and identify the appropriate response(s) for incidence of misbehaviour. This should include how to handle devices that do not operate according to their specification but may simply have malfunctioned, as well as devices that operate in such a way as to indicate they may have been tampered with. Related risks: 6.2.1
Root cause driver
Governance, security credentials policy
Consequence (Impacts)
'Core Systems' with different security management standards or policies may be incompatible.
Likelihood (Probability)
This is an institutional issue which will involve planning among diverse interest groups, including system users.
Overall score:
Risk reduction actions/events
1) Assess the need for a jurisdiction or nationwide policy or standard dealing with security management of the *C-ITS* vehicle and highway systems environment.
2) Investigate a potential role for the 'Core Certification Authority' to provide oversight in establishing the security management standards or policies for the 'Core Systems', individually and collectively.
3) Establish criteria or thresholds to govern how misbehaviour in the *core system* is identified and how the information is provided to the ESS 'Certificate Authority' for removal.
4) Establish a policy for the ESS 'Certificate Authority' to accept or reject the 'Core Systems' CRL Change Request recommendation(s).