
**Electronic data interchange for
administration, commerce and transport
(EDIFACT) — Application level syntax rules
(Syntax version number: 4) —**

**Part 9:
Security key and certificate management
message (message type — KEYMAN)**

Échange de données informatisées pour l'administration, le commerce et le transport (EDIFACT) — Règles de syntaxe au niveau de l'application — (Numéro de version de syntaxe: 4) —

Partie 9: Clé de sécurité et message de gestion de certificat (type de message-KEYMAN)



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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.

This part of ISO 9735 was prepared by the UN/ECE Trade Division (as UN/EDIFACT) and was adopted, under a special "fast-track procedure", by Technical Committee ISO/TC 154, *Documents and data elements in administration, commerce and industry*.

Whereas this part supersedes the earlier publications, and shall use a version number of "4" in the mandatory data element 0002 (Syntax version number) in the segment UNB (Interchange header), interchanges continuing to use the syntax defined in the earlier published versions shall use the following Syntax version numbers, in order to differentiate them from each other and from this part:

ISO 9735:1988 — *Syntax version number: 1*

ISO 9735:1988 (amended and reprinted in 1990) — *Syntax version number: 2*

ISO 9735:1988 (amended and reprinted in 1990) plus Amendment 1:1992 — *Syntax version number: 3*

ISO 9735 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport (EDIFACT) — Application level syntax rules (Syntax version number: 4)*:

- *Part 1: Syntax rules common to all parts, together with the syntax service directories for each of the parts*
- *Part 2: Syntax rules specific to batch EDI*
- *Part 3: Syntax rules specific to interactive EDI*
- *Part 4: Syntax and service report message for batch EDI (message type - CONTRL)*
- *Part 5: Security rules for batch EDI (authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of origin)*

- *Part 6: Secure authentication and acknowledgement message (message type - AUTACK)*
- *Part 7: Security rules for batch EDI (confidentiality)*
- *Part 8: Associated data in EDI*
- *Part 9: Security key and certificate management message (message type - KEYMAN)*

Further parts may be added in the future.

Annexes A and B form an integral part of this part of ISO 9735. Annexes C to H are for information only.

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Introduction

This part of ISO 9735 includes the rules at the application level for the structuring of data in the interchange of electronic messages in an open environment, based on the requirements of batch processing. These rules have been agreed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) as syntax rules for Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport (EDIFACT) and are part of the United Nations Trade Data Interchange Directory (UNTDID) which also includes both batch and interactive Message Design Guidelines.

Communications specifications and protocols are outside the scope of this part of ISO 9735.

This is a new part, which has been added to ISO 9735. It provides an optional capability of managing security keys and certificates.

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Electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport (EDIFACT) — Application level syntax rules (Syntax version number: 4)

Part 9: Security key and certificate management message (message type - KEYMAN)

1 Scope

This part of ISO 9735 for batch EDIFACT security defines the security key and certificate management message KEYMAN.

2 Conformance

Conformance to a standard means that all of its requirements, including all options, are supported. If all options are not supported, any claim of conformance shall include a statement which identifies those options to which conformance is claimed.

Data that is interchanged is in conformance if the structure and representation of the data conform to the syntax rules specified in this part of ISO 9735.

Devices supporting this part of ISO 9735 are in conformance when they are capable of creating and/or interpreting the data structured and represented in conformance with this part of ISO 9735.

Conformance to this part of ISO 9735 shall include conformance to Part 1, Part 2 and Part 5 of ISO 9735.

When identified in this part of ISO 9735, provisions defined in related standards shall form part of the conformance criteria.

3 Normative references

The following standards contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this part of ISO 9735. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All standards are subject to revision, and parties to agreements based on this part of ISO 9735 are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the standards indicated below. Members of IEC and ISO maintain registers of currently valid International Standards.

ISO/IEC 9594-8:—¹⁾, *Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — The Directory: Authentication framework. [ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997)]*

ISO 9735-1:1998, *Electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport (EDIFACT) — Application level syntax rules (Syntax version number: 4) — Part 1: Syntax rules common to all parts, together with syntax directories for each of the parts.*

1) To be published. (Revision of ISO/IEC 9594-8:1995)

ISO 9735-2:1998, *Electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport (EDIFACT) — Application level syntax rules (Syntax version number: 4) — Part 2: Syntax rules specific to batch EDI.*

ISO 9735-5:1998, *Electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport (EDIFACT) — Application level syntax rules (Syntax version number: 4) — Part 5: Security rules for batch EDI (authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of origin).*

4 Definitions

For the purposes of this part of ISO 9735, the definitions in ISO 9735-1:1998, annex A apply.

5 Rules for the use of security key and certificate management message

5.1 Functional definition

KEYMAN is a message providing for security key and certificate management. A key may be a secret key used with symmetric algorithms, or a public or private key used with asymmetric algorithms.

5.2 Field of application

The security key and certificate management message (KEYMAN) may be used for both national and international trade. It is based on universal practice related to administration, commerce and transport, and is not dependent on the type of business or industry.

5.3 Principles

The message may be used to request or deliver security keys, certificates, or certification paths (this includes requesting other key and certificate management actions, for example renewing, replacing or revoking certificates, and delivering other information, such as certificate status), and it may be used to deliver lists of certificates (for example to indicate which certificates have been revoked). The KEYMAN message may be secured by the use of security header and trailer segment groups. Security header and trailer segment group structures are defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735.

A security key and certificate management message can be used to:

- a) request actions in relation to keys and certificates
- b) deliver keys, certificates, and related information

5.4 Message definition

5.4.1 Data segment clarification

0010 UNH, Message header

A service segment starting and uniquely identifying a message.

The message type code for the security key and certificate management message is KEYMAN.

Note: messages conforming to this document must contain the following data in segment UNH, composite S009:

Data element	0065	KEYMAN
	0052	4
	0054	1
	0051	UN

0020 Segment group 1: USE-USX- SG2

A group of segments containing all information necessary to carry key, certificate or certification path management requests, deliveries and notices.

0030 USE, Security message relation

A segment identifying a relationship to an earlier message, such as a KEYMAN request.

0040 USX, Security references

A segment identifying a link to an earlier message, such as a request. The composite data element "security date and time" may contain the original generation date and time of the referenced message.

0050 Segment group 2: USF-USA-SG3

A group of segments containing a single key, single certificate, or group of certificates forming a certification path.

0060 USF, Key management function

A segment identifying the function of the group it triggers, either a request or a delivery. When used for indicating elements of the certification paths, the certificate sequence number shall indicate the position of the following certificate within the certification path. It may be used on its own for list retrieval, with no certificate present. There may be several different USF segments within the same message, if more than one key or certificate is handled. However, there shall be no mixture of request functions and delivery functions. The USF segment may also specify the filter function used for binary fields of the USA segment immediately following this segment.

0070 USA, Security algorithm

A segment identifying a security algorithm, the technical usage made of it, and containing the technical parameters required (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This segment shall be used for symmetric key requests, discontinuation or delivery. It may also be used for an asymmetric key pair request.

0080 Segment group 3: USC-USA-USR

A group of segments containing the data necessary to validate the security methods applied to the message/package, when asymmetric algorithms are used (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This group shall be used in the request or delivery of keys and certificates.

Either the full certificate segment group (including the USR segment), or the only data elements necessary to identify unambiguously the asymmetric key pair used, shall be present in the USC segment. The presence of a full certificate may be avoided if the certificate has already been exchanged by the two parties, or if it may be retrieved from a database.

Where it is desired to refer to a non-EDIFACT certificate (such as X.509), the certificate syntax and version shall be identified in data element 0545 of the USC segment. Such certificates may be conveyed in an EDIFACT package

0090 USC, Certificate

A segment containing the credentials of the certificate owner and identifying the certification authority which has generated the certificate (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This segment shall be used for certificate requests such as renewal, or asymmetric key requests such as discontinuation, and for certificate deliveries.

0100 USA, Security algorithm

A segment identifying a security algorithm, the technical usage made of it, and containing the technical parameters required (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This segment shall be used for certificate requests such as credentials registration, and for certificate deliveries.

0110 USR, Security result

A segment containing the result of the security functions applied to the certificate by the certification authority (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This segment shall be used for certificate validation or certificate deliveries.

0120 Segment group 4: USL-SG5

A group of segments containing lists of certificates or public keys. The group shall be used to group together certificates of similar status - i.e. which are still valid, or which may be invalid for some reason.

0130 USL, Security list status

A segment identifying valid, revoked, unknown or discontinued items. These items may be certificates (e.g. valid, revoked) or public keys (e.g. valid or discontinued). There may be several different USL segments within this message, if the delivery implies more than one list of certificates or public keys. The different lists may be identified by the list parameters.

0140 Segment group 5: USC-USA-USR

A group of segments containing the data necessary to validate the security methods applied to the message/package, when asymmetric algorithms are used (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This group shall be used in the delivery of lists of keys or certificates of similar status.

0150 USC, Certificate

A segment containing the credentials of the certificate owner and identifying the certification authority which has generated the certificate (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). This segment shall be used either in the full certificate using in addition the USA and USR segments, or may alternatively indicate the certificate reference number or key name, in which case the message shall be signed using security header and trailer segment groups.

0160 USA, Security algorithm

A segment identifying a security algorithm, the technical usage made of it, and containing the technical parameters required (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). If it is required to indicate the algorithms used with a certificate, this segment shall be used.

0170 USR, Security result

A segment containing the result of the security functions applied to the certificate by the certification authority (as defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735). If it is required to sign a certificate, this segment shall be used.

0180 UNT, Message trailer

A service segment ending a message, giving the total number of segments and the control reference number of the message.

5.4.2 Data segment index

TAG	Name
UNH	Message header
UNT	Message trailer
USA	Security algorithm
USC	Certificate
USE	Security message relation
USF	Key management function
USL	Security list status
USR	Security result
USX	Security references

5.4.3 Message structure

5.4.3.1 Segment table

POS	TAG	Name	S	R
0010	UNH	Message header	M	1
0020	-----	Segment group 1 -----	C	999
0030	USE	Security message relation	M	1
0040	USX	Security references	C	1
0050	-----	Segment group 2 -----	M	9
0060	USF	Key management function	M	1
0070	USA	Security algorithm	C	1
0080	-----	Segment group 3 -----	C	1
0090	USC	Certificate	M	1
0100	USA	Security algorithm	C	3
0110	USR	Security result	C	1
0120	-----	Segment group 4 -----	C	99
0130	USL	Security list status	M	1
0140	-----	Segment group 5 -----	M	9999
0150	USC	Certificate	M	1
0160	USA	Security algorithm	C	3
0170	USR	Security result	C	1
0180	UNT	Message trailer	M	1

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Annex A (normative)

Definitions

Addendum — to be added to Part 1 annex A when approved

- A.1 certification path:** An ordered sequence of certificates of objects in the Directory Information Tree which, together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path. (ISO 9594-8) [1]

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Annex B
(normative)
Addendum — to be added to Part 1 annex C when approved
Syntax service directories
(segments, composite data elements and simple data elements)

B.1 Segment directory**B.1.1 Legend**

Function The function of the segment

POS The sequential position number of the segment or stand-alone data element or composite data element in the segment table

TAG The tags of all service segments contained in the segment directory start with the letter "U". The tags of all service composite data elements start with the letter "S", and the tags of all service simple data elements start with the figure "0"

Name Name of a SEGMENT in capital letters
Name of a COMPOSITE DATA ELEMENT in capital letters
Name of a STAND-ALONE DATA ELEMENT in capital letters
Name of a component data element in small letters

S The status of the segment in the structure or of the stand-alone data element or composite data element in the segment, or of the components in the composite (where M = Mandatory, C = Conditional)

R The maximum number of occurrences of the segment in the structure or of the stand-alone data element or composite data element in the segment

Repr. Data value representation of the stand-alone data element or component data element in the composite.

a alphabetic characters
n numeric characters
an alphanumeric characters
a3 3 alphabetic characters, fixed length
n3 3 numeric characters, fixed length
an3 3 alphanumeric characters, fixed length
a..3 up to 3 alphabetic characters
n..3 up to 3 numeric characters
an..3 up to 3 alphanumeric characters

B.1.2 Dependency note identifiers

Code	Name
D1	One and only one
D2	All or none
D3	One or more
D4	One or none
D5	If first, then all
D6	If first, then at least one more
D7	If first, then none of the others

See clause 11.5 in ISO 9735-1:1998 for the definition of the dependency note identifiers.

B.1.3 Index of segments by tag

TAG	Name
UNH	Message header
UNT	Message trailer
USA	Security algorithm
USC	Certificate
USE	Security message relation
USF	Key management function
USL	Security list status
USR	Security result
USX	Security references

B.1.4 Index of segments by name

TAG	Name
USC	Certificate
USF	Key management function
UNH	Message header
UNT	Message trailer
USA	Security algorithm
USE	Security message relation
USX	Security references
USR	Security result
USL	Security list status

B.1.5 Segment specifications

Notes:

1. Only segments which are not included in other parts of ISO 9735 are defined here.

 USE SECURITY MESSAGE RELATION

Function: To specify the relation to earlier security messages, such as response to a particular request, or request for a particular answer.

Pos	TAG	Name	S	R	Repr.	Notes
010	0565	MESSAGE RELATION, CODED	M	1	an..3	

 USF KEY MANAGEMENT FUNCTION

Function: To specify the type of key management function and the status of a corresponding key or certificate

Pos	TAG	Name	S	R	Repr.	Notes
010	0579	KEY MANAGEMENT FUNCTION QUALIFIER	M	1	an..3	
020	S504	LIST PARAMETER	C	9		
	0575	List parameter qualifier	M		an..3	
	0558	List parameter	M		an..70	
030	0567	SECURITY STATUS, CODED	C	1	an..3	
040	0572	CERTIFICATE SEQUENCE NUMBER	C	1	n..4	

050 0505 FILTER FUNCTION, CODED C 1 an..3

USL SECURITY LIST STATUS

Function: To specify the status of security objects, such as keys or certificates to be delivered in a list, and the corresponding list parameters.

Pos	TAG	Name	S	R	Repr.	Notes
010	0567	SECURITY STATUS, CODED	M	1	an..3	
020	S504	LIST PARAMETER	C	9		
	0575	List parameter qualifier	M		an..3	
	0558	List parameter	M		an..70	

B.2 Composite data element directory

B.2.1 Legend

POS The sequential position number of the component data element in the composite data element

TAG The tags of all service composite data elements contained in the composite data element directory start with the letter "S", and all service simple data elements start with the figure "0"

Name Name of a component data element in small letters

S The status of the component data element in the composite data element (where M = Mandatory and C = Conditional)

Repr. Data value representation of the component data element in the composite.

a alphabetic characters
n numeric characters
an alphanumeric characters
a3 3 alphabetic characters, fixed length
n3 3 numeric characters, fixed length
an3 3 alphanumeric characters, fixed length
a..3 up to 3 alphabetic characters
n..3 up to 3 numeric characters
an..3 up to 3 alphanumeric characters

Desc. Description of the composite data element

B.2.2 Dependency note identifiers

Code	Name
D1	One and only one
D2	All or none
D3	One or more
D4	One or none
D5	If first, then all
D6	If first, then at least one more
D7	If first, then none of the others

See clause 11.5 in Part 1 for the definition of the dependency note identifiers.

B.2.3 Index of composite data elements by tag

Notes:

1. Only composite data elements which are not included in other parts of ISO 9735 are included here.

TAG Name

S504 List parameter

B.2.4 Index of composite data elements by name

TAG Name

S504 List parameter

B.2.5 Composite data element specifications

S504 LIST PARAMETER

Desc : Identification of a parameter for a list request or delivery

POS	TAG	Name	S	Repr.	Notes
010	0575	List parameter qualifier	M	an..3	
020	0558	List parameter	M	an..70	

B.3 Simple data element directory

B.3.1 Legend

The tags of all service simple data elements contained in the simple data element directory start with the figure "0".

- Name Name of a simple data element
- Desc. Description of the simple data element
- Repr. Data value representation of the simple data element :
 - a alphabetic characters
 - n numeric characters
 - an alphanumeric characters
 - a3 3 alphabetic characters, fixed length
 - n3 3 numeric characters, fixed length
 - an3 3 alphanumeric characters, fixed length
 - a..3 up to 3 alphabetic characters
 - n..3 up to 3 numeric characters
 - an..3 up to 3 alphanumeric characters

Notes Simple data element note number(s)

B.3.2 Index of simple data elements by tag

Notes:

1. Only data elements which are not included in other parts of ISO 9735 are defined here.

TAG Name

0558 List parameter
 0565 Message relation, coded
 0572 Certificate sequence number
 0575 List parameter qualifier
 0579 Key management function qualifier

B.3.3 Index of simple data elements by name**TAG Name**

0572 Certificate sequence number
 0579 Key management function qualifier
 0558 List parameter
 0575 List parameter qualifier
 0565 Message relation, coded

B.3.4 Simple data element specifications

0558 LIST PARAMETER

Desc : Specification of the list requested or delivered.

Repr : an..70

0565 MESSAGE RELATION, CODED

Desc : Relationship with another message, past or future

Repr : an..3

0572 CERTIFICATE SEQUENCE NUMBER

Desc : Specification of a certificate's position within a certification path

Repr : n..4

Note 1: Allows certification paths to be ordered by specifying the ordinal number of the certificate within a certification path.

0575 LIST PARAMETER QUALIFIER

Desc : Specification of the type of list parameter.

Repr : an..3

0579 KEY MANAGEMENT FUNCTION QUALIFIER

Desc : Specification of the type of key management function

Repr : an..3

Annex C (informative)

KEYMAN functions

This annex describes the different functions provided by KEYMAN. In the following, credentials will just mean information relating to one particular party, but not the public key, nor timestamps. So a certificate will consist of

- Credentials
- A public key
- Timestamps
- A digital signature

Certain functions are considered to be handled out of band, i.e. using a communication channel different from that normally used. This is the case with communication of the secret key of the user, if he is not responsible for his own key generation.

C.1 Registration-related key management functions

C.1.1 Registration submission

The purpose is to submit (part of) certificate content for registration.

Although this function typically will be backed up by some secure out of band technique (such as a personal visit, or a human signature), it may be more efficient for the registration authority (RA, an authority trusted by one or more users to register users) not to have to re-key the information, but merely to check it. For this reason, this message itself need not be secured, though integrity checking using the normal header/trailer approach defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735 may be useful, if further secured out of band.

C.1.2 Asymmetric key pair request

The purpose is to request a trusted party to generate an asymmetric key pair. The subsequent transport of the secret key must be handled out of band.

C.2 Certification-related key management functions

C.2.1 Certification request

The purpose is to request certification of credentials and public key.

It may be presumed to be merely a request following prior out of band transfer of information, in which case the request itself results in no transfer of information. No registered keys may yet available, so it is assumed to be an unsecured message. However, if this information is transmitted in the message, it will require separate authentication. If a registered key already exists, then this may be used to provide non-repudiation of origin for the information for the new key and certificate.

Nevertheless, if the message is used by a user to forward his public key, it should be possible for him to sign it with the corresponding secret key, even though no label exists yet for the public key. This is called self-certification, and requires the use of security header and trailer segment groups. To indicate that the key is self-certified, the security header segment group defined in Part 5 of ISO 9735 must contain a certificate issued by the user on his own key. Although a self-certified public key does not prove its user's authenticity to another party, it does prove to the certification authority that the user is in possession of the corresponding private key.

C.2.2 Certificate renewal request

The purpose is to request the renewal (or update) of a certificate.

The purpose of this is to extend the validity period of the current valid key, whose certificate is about to expire. The request must be signed, using EDIFACT security header and trailer segment groups described in Part 5 of ISO 9735, by the private key certified by the certificate to be renewed.

C.2.3 Certificate replacement request

The purpose is to request the replacement of a current certificate by a new one with a different public key, as well as giving additional information if required. The request must be signed according to an agreed policy using EDIFACT header and trailer segment groups described in Part 5 of ISO 9735.

It differs from a renewal request in that the old certificate typically is revoked, rather than expiring. A new certificate always has a new certificate reference number, while a revocation certificate always carries the same reference number as the certificate being revoked.

C.2.4 Certificate (path) retrieval request

The purpose is to request the delivery of an existing certificate, valid or a revoked, or a revocation certificate. This also includes the situation where the response contains a certification path rather than just a certificate, as usually the inquirer is ignorant to such details.

If the certificate reference number has been specified, there are no requirements for security since the certificates are public.

C.2.5 Certificate delivery

The purpose is to deliver an existing certificate or revocation certificate with or without prior request.

The certification authority (CA) public key transport would normally be handled out of band. However, for convenience of re-keying, a message may be required, possibly secured by header and trailer segment groups for integrity, with separate authentication. If available, it may tempt users to ignore checking the out of band value, in which case it will actually reduce security considerably. This may require security services, such as non-repudiation of origin.

C.2.6 Certificate status request

The purpose is to request the current status of a given certificate.

C.2.7 Certificate status notice

The purpose is to inform the requesting party about the status of the given certificate.

The possible status's are: unknown, valid or revoked. This notice may be delivered without prior request and would typically have to be secured by non-repudiation of origin.

C.2.8 Certificate validation request

The request is to be forwarded to a CA for the validation of an existing certificate.

This pertains to certificates of other security domains (i.e. issued by other CA's), in which case the user may be unable to establish the validity.

C.2.9 Certificate validation notice

This is the response to a certificate validation request. It is recommended to use non-repudiation of origin or other means of authentication for this.

C.3 Revocation-related key management functions

C.3.1 Revocation request

The purpose is to request revocation (the change of status from valid to invalid) of a party's certificate, e.g. because the private key has been compromised, the user has changed to a new CA, the original certificate has been superseded, use has been terminated (for example the user left the company), or some other reason. It is recommended to use authentication if possible. The function may require a separate channel, and may cover the case where the user has lost the private key.

C.3.2 Revocation confirmation

The purpose is to confirm the revocation of the requested certificate.

It is recommended to secured this by means of non-repudiation of origin.

C.3.3 Revocation list request

The purpose is to request full or partial list of revoked certificates.

C.3.4 Revocation list delivery

The purpose is to inform parties about all (or a specified subset of all) currently revoked certificates in the CA's domain.

This is like a multiple status notice, but only for revoked certificates. While it would be possible to have a separate black list type, it is probably better to just have one, and identify the status. The delivery should be secured by non-repudiation of origin.

C.4 Alert request

The purpose is to request a party's certificate to be put on alert.

The certificate is not revoked (no request to the CA) but the other users are warned that there can be something wrong with this certificate. This could be used if no appropriate means of authentication is available to secure a revocation request, for example a second, valid, key and certificate.

C.5 Certificate paths

C.5.1 Certificate path delivery

The purpose is to deliver an existing certification path with or without prior request.

C.6 Symmetric key generation and transport

C.6.1 Symmetric key request

The purpose is to request the delivery of symmetric data keys or key encryption keys.

Since the delivery of the keys implies a prior secure relationship between the two parties, the originator must be authenticated using a key encrypting key (KEK, a key used to provide confidentiality for another key), if public key techniques are not used.

C.6.2 Symmetric key delivery

The purpose is to deliver symmetric keys (with or without prior request).

If symmetric techniques are used only, it must be assumed that an out of band transfer of a KEK would be necessary before the transfer. The algorithm parameter in USA would then carry the encrypted key.

C.7 Key discontinuation

C.7.1 (A)symmetric key discontinuation request

The purpose is to request discontinuation of an existing symmetric or asymmetric key (if certificates are not used), e.g. because the key has been compromised, the original key has been superseded, use has been terminated (for example the user left the company), or some other reason. It is recommended to secure this using existing keys for authentication.

C.7.2 Discontinuation acknowledgement

The purpose is to confirm that some specified key(s) has been discontinued

Remark: Functions that can not be supported by a KEYMAN message:

- Independent time-stamping functions (require a separate message, e.g. AUTACK)
- Acknowledgement and error notification related to received KEYMAN messages will require the use of other messages, e.g. AUTACK or CONTRL

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Annex D (informative)

Security techniques to be applied to KEYMAN messages

This annex suggests the minimum and maximum level of header/trailer (H/T) security, as described in Part 5 of ISO 9735, to be used with each KEYMAN function.

Function	H/T Security		Comments
	MIN	MAX	
Registration submission		INT	Out of band AUT
Asymmetric key pair request			
Certification request		NRO	Out of band AUT
Certificate renewal request	NRO		
Certificate replacement request	NRO		
Certificate (path) retrieval request		NRO	
Certificate delivery			
Certificate status request		NRO	
Certificate status notice		NRO	
Certificate validation request			
Certificate validation notice	NRO		
Revocation request	NRO		
Revocation confirmation	NRO		
Revocation list request			
Revocation list delivery	NRO		
Alert request		NRO	
Certificate path delivery			
Symmetric key request			
Symmetric key delivery	CON		May use KEK
(A)symmetric key discontinuation request	AUT	NRO	
Discontinuation acknowledgement	AUT	NRO	

Key:

AUT	Authentication
CON	Confidentiality
INT	Integrity
KEK	Key encrypting key
NRO	Non-repudiation of origin
Out of band	Using a communication channel different from that normally used

Annex E (informative)

Use of segment groups in KEYMAN messages

This annex describes which segment groups are used to provide particular KEYMAN functions.

Requests:

Function	Segments	Comments
Registration submission	USE-USF-USC-USA	
Asymmetric key pair request	USE-USF-USA	
Certification request	USE-USF-USC-USA	Identify the certificate and public key
Certificate renewal request	USE-USF-USC	Identify the certificate and specify the new validity period
Certificate replacement request	USE-USF-USC-USA	The current certificate to be revoked is referred in a similar group
Certificate (path) retrieval request	USE-USF-USC	Certificate list retrieval is included here, using USF
Certificate status request	USE-USF-USC	
Certificate validation request	USE-USF-USC-USA(3)-USR	
Revocation request	USE-USF-USC	Out of band as well
Revocation list request	USE-USF	
Alert request	USE-USF-USC	
Symmetric key request	USE-USF-USA	Symmetric only. USA defines the key name if required
(A)symmetric key discontinuation request	USE-USF-USA/USC	Sym/Asym. Identify the keys

Key: Out of band Using a communication channel different from that normally used

Deliveries or notices


Function	Segments	Comments
Certificate delivery	USE-USX-USF-USC-USA(3)-USR	
Certificate status notice	USE-USX-USF-USC-USA(3)-USR	May be like certificate/path delivery: revocation reason is added to the normal certificate, and/or the status is obvious from USF
Certificate validation notice	USE-USX-USF-USC-USA(3)-USR	Like certificate status notice, secured by NRO
Revocation confirmation	USE-USX-USF-USC	Like certificate status notice. Must be secured by NRO
Revocation list delivery	USL-USC	Like multiple certificate status notice, but only for revoked certificates
Certificate path delivery	USE-USX-USF-USC-USA(3)-USR	Repeat USF group for paths
Symmetric key delivery	USE-USX-USF-USA	Symmetric only. An out of band transfer of a KEK is necessary before
Discontinuation acknowledgement	USE-USX-USF-USA/USC	Sym/Asym. Like certificate status notice. Must be secured by authentication/NRO

Key: KEK Key encrypting key
 NRO Non-repudiation of origin
 Out of band Using a communication channel different from that normally used

Annex F (informative)

A model for key management

Key management deals with the generation, distribution, certification, verification and revocation of cryptographic keys in an open and secure information system. The model considered here is depicted in the following figure, where five logical parties are defined according to their functionality:



Key Management Model

The basic assumption of this model is that public key techniques for security services are used. Moreover, the architecture is according to the ITU/TS X.509 framework standard.

A security domain is defined as the “jurisdiction” of the pair of public keys used by the certification authority (CA) to issue certificates. Thus there is only one CA within a security domain, and the security domain is characterised by the fact that all users of that domain are certified with the same secret key under the control of the CA.

The CA is connected by means of secured communication to a number of registration authorities (RA), through which any user may register. A registration is acknowledged by a certificate issued by the CA at the request of some RA. Furthermore public information on the users, such as certificates is available in a directory (DIR). Finally, a number of additional trusted third parties (TTP’s) may register as well as users offering special services.

F.1 The end-user (U)

By a user (U) is meant the unique user-Id in the system, as identified by his credentials. A real user may have more than one Id. In fact, a user-Id may represent a legal person, a real, (or moral), person or a system device.

F.2 The registration authority (RA)

For an unregistered user, there is no established electronic security link between the user and the system. RA is used as an entry point for users to set-up such links by using some existing trusted means such as registered letters or personal enrolment. This registration will also form the legal basis for the use of digital signatures by the user, if required, although this aspect in itself is not key management. Once this registration has been established, the user credentials and his public key are passed on the CA with a request for certification.

F.3 The certification authority (CA)

The certification authority is the central party of the system. It provides certificates to the users so that "trust" can be established between different users based on the "trust" between the RA's and users. These certificates are furthermore made available in one or more directories which can be accessed by all users.

It is a common misunderstanding that the fact that a certificate has been issued implies that one can trust the public key to be valid. If a public key is cancelled at a later stage, after the certificate was issued, the certificate is no longer valid. In stead, the CA issues a revocation certificate, which is placed in the directory to replace the original certificate. The users will therefore have to consult the directory at regular intervals for verification even though certificates are used. How often is a question of risk assessment.

F.4 The directory (DIR)

The public directory (DIR), acting like a public telephone book, is responsible for holding the current certificates, as well as revocation certificates, for ready on-line inspection by other users. It is essential, that the communication between users and the DIR is secured in order to guarantee that the information drawn from the DIR is up to date and correct.

In fact, the DIR will typically continuously certify the current status of the CA certificates by means of its own secret key. This in particular requires that the directory is registered as a user with a public key by the CA.

F.5 Trusted third party (TTP) services

A trusted third party is a party which at least two other parties trust. TTP's may provide some additional services such as time-stamping, etc. The TTP services relevant to EDI include:

- Independent time-stamping
- Attribute certificates
- Notary functions
- Document repository
- Non-repudiation of submission/delivery
- Translation/validation of certificates

Annex G
(informative)
Addendum — to be added to Part 1 annex D when approved
Syntax service code directory

The service code directory is maintained by the UN/ECE and is part of the UN Trade Data Interchange Directory (UNTDID) and as such is not reproduced in this part of ISO 9735. The most recent version of the service code directory should be used to reference the code values for the coded data elements in the simple data element directory (see annex B within this part). The UNTDID is updated and published at regular intervals.

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Annex H (informative)

Key and certificate management examples

Four examples are provided herein to illustrate different applications of the KEYMAN message.

H.1 Revocation request

H.1.1 Narrative

A certificate previously issued by certification authority CA2 for an employee E1 of an organisation O1 is revoked by the organisation because the employee left at midday GMT on 31 December 1996. This message from the organisation to the certification authority will be signed for non-repudiation of origin by the organisation in the normal way using security header and trailer segment groups as described in Part 5 of ISO 9735. The message may be responded to by a revocation confirmation from CA2 to O1.

H.1.2 Security Details

SECURITY MESSAGE RELATION	
MESSAGE RELATION	'1' no relation

KEY MANAGEMENT FUNCTION	
KEY MANAGEMENT FUNCTION QUALIFIER	'130' revocation request

CERTIFICATE	
CERTIFICATE REFERENCE	'CA2-O1-E1' (eg) the certificate in question
SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS	
Security party qualifier	'3' certificate owner
Key name	
Security party identification	'O1-E1' (eg) the employee within the organisation
Security party code list qualifier	'ZZZ' mutually agreed
Security party code list responsible agency	'1' UN
SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DETAILS	
Security party qualifier	'4' authenticating party
Key name	
Security party identification	'CA2' the certification authority
Security party code list qualifier	'ZZZ' mutually agreed
Security party code list responsible agency	'1' UN
SECURITY DATE AND TIME	
Date and time qualifier	'6' certificate revocation date and time
Event date	'19961231
Event time	'120000'
Time offset	'0000'
REVOCATION REASON	'3' owner changed affiliation

H.2 Symmetric key discontinuation request

H.2.1 Narrative

Organisation O1 requests organisation O2 to stop using a mutual symmetric key K1 because it has been superseded. This message between the organisations will be protected for message origin authentication by the organisation in the normal way using security header and trailer segment groups as described in Part 5 of ISO 9735 using another previously agreed symmetric key. The message may be responded to by a discontinuation acknowledgement from O2 to O1.