
**Nuclear energy — Fissile materials
— Principles of criticality safety in
storing, handling and processing**

*Énergie nucléaire — Matières fissiles — Principes de sûreté-criticité
lors des opérations d'entreposage, de manutention et de mise en
oeuvre du procédé*

STANDARDSISO.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO 1709:2018



STANDARDSISO.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO 1709:2018



COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT

© ISO 2018

All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO's member body in the country of the requester.

ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Fax: +41 22 749 09 47
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org

Published in Switzerland

Contents

	Page
Foreword	iv
1 Scope	1
2 Normative references	1
3 Terms and definitions	1
4 Procedures	3
4.1 General	3
4.2 Responsibility	3
4.3 Equipment design	3
4.4 Criticality assessment	3
4.5 Written procedures	3
4.6 Review of procedures	4
4.7 Processing violations	4
4.8 Training	4
5 Technical criteria	4
5.1 General	4
5.2 Methods of control	4
5.3 Achievement of control	4
5.4 Factors affecting criticality	5
5.4.1 General	5
5.4.2 Mass	5
5.4.3 Geometry	5
5.4.4 Volume	5
5.4.5 Concentration	5
5.4.6 Moderation	5
5.4.7 Neutron absorbers	5
5.4.8 Physical and chemical form	6
5.4.9 Density	6
5.4.10 Enrichment	6
5.4.11 Reflection	6
5.4.12 Interaction	6
5.4.13 Temperature	6
5.5 Possible abnormalities	7
5.6 Bases of assessment	7
5.7 Margin of criticality safety	7
5.8 Demonstration of safety	7
6 Equipment control	8
7 Material control	8
8 Dispatch and receipt of material	8
9 Monitoring of procedures	8
10 Need for an emergency plan and criticality alarm	8
Bibliography	9

Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation on the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 85, *Nuclear energy, nuclear technologies and radiological protection*, Subcommittee SC 5, *Nuclear installations, processes and technologies*.

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO 1709:1995), which has been technically revised.

A list of all parts in the ISO 1709 series can be found on the ISO website.

Nuclear energy — Fissile materials — Principles of criticality safety in storing, handling and processing

1 Scope

This document specifies the basic principles and limitations which govern operations with fissile materials. It discusses general nuclear criticality safety criteria for equipment design and for the development of operating controls, while providing guidance for the assessment of procedures, equipment, and operations. It does not cover specific quality assurance requirements or details of equipment or operational procedures.

This document does not deal with the issues associated with administrative criteria relating to nuclear criticality safety. These issues are covered by ISO 14943. It does not cover the effects of radiation on man or materials, unless the material properties affect nuclear criticality safety.

These criteria apply to operations with fissile materials outside nuclear reactors but within the boundaries of nuclear establishments. They are concerned with the limitations which are imposed on operations because of the properties of these materials which permit them to support nuclear chain reactions. These principles apply to quantities of fissile nuclides in which nuclear criticality safety is required to be established.

This document can also be applied to the transport of fissile materials outside the boundaries of nuclear establishments.

2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO 7753, *Nuclear energy — Performance and testing requirements for criticality detection and alarm systems*

ISO 11320, *Nuclear criticality safety — Emergency preparedness and response*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <https://www.iso.org/obp>
- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>

3.1

critical

having an effective neutron multiplication factor equal to unity

3.2

double batching

unintended increase in the quantity of a material that is controlled for Nuclear Criticality Safety such that twice the intended quantity is present

Note 1 to entry: This typically applies to processes involving discrete quantities of material.

3.3

fissile material

material, other than natural or depleted uranium, that is capable of sustaining a thermal neutron chain reaction

3.4

fissile nuclide

nuclide capable of undergoing fission by interaction with neutrons of any energy

3.5

credible abnormal conditions

identified faults and/or circumstances outside of the normal envelope of operations that may lead to an unsafe situation

3.6

neutron absorber

material with which neutrons interact significantly by reactions resulting in their disappearance as free particles

3.7

neutron leakage

neutrons leaving a fissile system boundary such that they no longer interact with that system

Note 1 to entry: For an array of fissile units, neutron leakage from one unit may or may not interact with other units.

3.8

nuclear chain reaction

series of nuclear reactions in which one of the agents necessary to the series is itself produced by the same reactions

3.9

nuclear criticality accident

release of energy as a result of inadvertently producing a self-sustaining or divergent nuclear chain reaction

3.10

nuclear criticality safety

protection against the consequences of a nuclear criticality accident, preferably by prevention of the accident and responses to such accidents should they occur

3.11

nuclear criticality risk assessment

technically reviewed analysis that establishes the technical bases, limits, and controls for the nuclear criticality safety of a given operation

3.12

defence-in-depth

hierarchical deployment of different levels of diverse equipment and procedures (known as barriers) to prevent the escalation of faults to a hazardous condition

[SOURCE: IAEA *Safety Glossary* 2007 Edition, modified — The definition has been modified.]

3.13

over batching

unintended increase in the quantity of a material that is controlled for Nuclear Criticality Safety such that one or more extra discrete quantities are present

3.14

criticality safety control

mechanism which provides a high level of assurance that the probability of occurrence of a critical excursion is acceptably low

Note 1 to entry: An engineered feature (active or passive) or administrative requirement that establishes constraints on the range of values that process parameters can assume with a given reliability (i.e. failure frequency), thereby, providing a barrier to a criticality accident.

4 Procedures

4.1 General

The early recognition of the special hazards associated with fissile materials has led to the application of formal control practices based on principles of nuclear criticality safety. Diligent and conscientious application of these principles has produced an accident record which compares favourably with common industrial accidents. Continuation and improvement of this generally favourable record should have the cooperation of all those involved in operations.

4.2 Responsibility

Operational responsibility for nuclear criticality safety shall be clearly defined and shall belong to operations management throughout the normal chain of command.

4.3 Equipment design

Safety shall, to a practicable extent, be taken into account when designing operating equipment, for example, by restrictions on vessel geometry. The early incorporation of nuclear criticality safety considerations into plant and equipment design provides economic benefits. Process and equipment design identified as important for nuclear criticality safety may require approval by the appropriate nuclear criticality safety authority.

4.4 Criticality assessment

4.4.1 A nuclear criticality safety assessment is required for all operations and facilities under the Scope unless it can be shown it is not required through reasons of quantity and/or form of fissile material. Such reasoning shall include consideration of all credible abnormal conditions. The reasoning may be based on comparison with established criteria (for example safely subcritical mass or enrichment of fissile material).

4.4.2 The nuclear criticality safety assessment shall consider all normal and credible abnormal conditions. Process management shall assist in determining such abnormal conditions. The process shall be required to remain subcritical with an appropriate margin under such conditions, but it should be recognized that additional assessment may be required before attempting to recover from the abnormal condition.

4.5 Written procedures

Written procedures shall govern all operations involving fissile material in excess of those threshold quantities requiring nuclear criticality safety assessment. Copies of applicable written procedures should be posted up or available in operating areas.

4.6 Review of procedures

The assessment of criticality safety aspects of written procedures shall be performed by persons skilled and familiar with nuclear criticality safety practices and processing operations. These persons should, to a practicable extent, be administratively independent of operations.

4.7 Processing violations

Processing violations and unusual occurrences shall be reported, analysed, and considered for possible improvements in nuclear criticality safety practices.

4.8 Training

4.8.1 Training of processing operators shall include nuclear criticality safety. The extent of training shall provide confidence that the operator can conduct activities without undue risk to himself, his co-workers or the facility.

4.8.2 Supervisors shall be sufficiently knowledgeable to provide guidance to operators concerning the safety of operations.

5 Technical criteria

5.1 General

5.1.1 The potential for criticality depends upon:

- a) the nuclear properties of the fissile material;
- b) the mass of fissile material present and its distribution within the system being assessed;
- c) the mass and distribution of all other materials associated with the fissile material.

In the preparation of nuclear criticality safety assessments, it is generally assumed that only those substances commonly encountered in nature and in construction materials, or usually associated with operations, will be mixed with or located near fissile materials.

5.2 Methods of control

Criticality safety control(s) in any operation are based upon any one or a combination of the factors affecting criticality discussed in [5.4](#).

5.3 Achievement of control

5.3.1 The control of nuclear criticality safety by such methods as those indicated in [5.4](#) can be achieved by:

- a) equipment design;
- b) use of process control systems with associated instrumentation;
- c) administrative control of operations.

5.3.2 Where practicable, the maintenance of control shall depend on safety provided by the equipment, or instrumentation, rather than on administrative control. It is recognized that some reliance on administrative control is inherent in any operation. Where controls are based on equipment, passive safety design should be considered in preference to active safety systems (for example a favourable

geometry vessel is preferable to a non-favourable geometry vessel that is instead controlled by monitoring and control of fissile concentration).

5.4 Factors affecting criticality

5.4.1 General

All relevant factors shall be considered singly and in appropriate combination for both normal operations and abnormal conditions assessed for a comprehensive assessment of nuclear criticality safety. A combination of those factors could lead to necessary complex optimization of critical values. The factors are given in [5.4.2](#) to [5.4.13](#).

5.4.2 Mass

Criticality safety control can be provided by control of the mass of fissile material present in an operation.

5.4.3 Geometry

Criticality safety control can be provided by the use of processing or storage vessels that have a large neutron leakage (e.g. by limitation of the dimensions or shape of operational equipment). Cylinders or slabs of a suitable shape can be very reliable safety designs. Consideration shall be given to possible changes in geometry by faults such as leaks/ruptures of vessels and pipework, or unintentional transfers of fissile solutions to unfavourable geometry vessels. Consideration shall also be given to potential vessel dimension changes such as (but not limited by) over-pressurization, bulging/distortion or corrosion.

5.4.4 Volume

By limiting the available space for a fissile material to occupy or by limiting the quantity of material present, criticality safety control may be achieved. Examples such as a limited size vessel or tank, or a limit to the volume of a solution present in a process are a means of defining a volume control.

5.4.5 Concentration

The quantity of fissile material per unit volume can be a means of nuclear criticality safety control. Concentration is a factor most commonly associated with fissile solutions. This factor is often closely related to the factor of moderation since in many cases solutions of fissile material are with effective moderators.

5.4.6 Moderation

The presence of neutron-moderating material mixed with fissile material can substantially reduce the mass of fissile material necessary to achieve criticality. Water, oil and similar hydrogenous substances are the most common moderators present in the storage, handling and processing of fissile material, and all credible combinations shall be considered.

5.4.7 Neutron absorbers

5.4.7.1 The presence of appropriate neutron absorbers can be an effective means of criticality safety control, noting the reliance on neutron absorbers requires assurance of their continued presence. Equipment and processes can conform to the requirements of nuclear criticality safety by using neutron absorbing materials, such as cadmium and boron, provided available data confirm that their suitability and their presence can be assured. Where practicable, the incorporation of solid neutron absorbers as permanent, integral parts of equipment is more desirable than the use of neutron absorbers in solution, because of the processing controls required to demonstrate the continued presence of dissolved absorbers.

5.4.7.2 Neutron-absorbing materials are most effective for neutrons of thermal energy. Care shall be exercised to ensure that their effectiveness is not seriously reduced in normal or credible abnormal conditions, which might change the conditions into one characterized by neutrons of intermediate or high energy.

5.4.8 Physical and chemical form

The chemical nature of a fissile material can affect its properties with respect to criticality safety (e.g. metal versus oxide). The physical form can also affect its criticality safety properties (e.g. solid or liquid).

5.4.9 Density

Reduction in density of a single unit, with no other change in material properties, will reduce neutron multiplication due to increased neutron leakage. It is important to distinguish between this factor (more commonly applied to solids) and concentration (more commonly applied to liquid solutions).

5.4.10 Enrichment

The proportion of a fissile nuclide to that of all nuclides in an element (fissile, non-fissile and fissionable) has a direct effect on the criticality safety properties of a fissile material. Greater fissile enrichments usually result in lower critical parameters (a reduced subcritical margin), and hence control of enrichment may be used as a means to maintain nuclear criticality safety.

NOTE The term enrichment is occasionally used to describe the proportion of fissile nuclide(s) in a mixture of elements or compounds (for example mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium). When a material is described in such a way, the property of enrichment may still be used in the same manner above to control nuclear criticality safety, but it is noted that care should be taken in ensuring consistency of definitions of enrichment in any application.

5.4.11 Reflection

5.4.11.1 The most appropriate conditions to represent neutron reflection shall be considered, and this may be simplified by the application of bounding reflection condition. In some cases the most effective neutron reflector encountered in handling and in processing fissile material is water of thickness sufficient to yield maximum neutron multiplication. This is particularly relevant as for most processes water is a liquid and is hence mobile and can envelop vessels, containers of fissile material etc.

5.4.11.2 However, careful consideration shall be given to systems where significant thicknesses of other common structural or shielding materials (for example concrete, steel, lead), which may be more effective neutron reflectors than water, may be present. In systems where thick water is not considered credible, any material surrounding the fissile material may need to be considered as a neutron reflector. For some situations, the reflection provided by personnel may be important.

5.4.12 Interaction

Consideration shall be given to neutron interaction between units when at least two units containing fissile material are present. It is possible to reduce neutron interaction either by spacing units, and/or absorbing materials between units, or by some combination of these methods. Conversely, moderating materials between units can increase neutron interaction and care should be taken in consideration of materials that may exist or intrude by some fault condition between the fissile units.

5.4.13 Temperature

Temperature will affect physical parameters such as density and volume and this is taken into account associated with those factors. It is important to also consider the temperature effect on nuclear cross-sections if it is relevant to the system that is being analysed for nuclear criticality safety.

5.5 Possible abnormalities

The effect of the occurrence of credible abnormal conditions shall be considered in the assessment of safety. These include, but are not limited to such factors as:

- a) loss or introduction of moderating material into or between units of fissile material: for example, evaporation, precipitation, dilution and flooding;
- b) introduction of neutron-reflecting material near units of fissile material;
- c) change in shape of fissile material due to such occurrences as vessel leakage or breakage;
- d) change in operating conditions: for example, loss of flow, precipitation, excessive evaporation, violation of mass or volume limits;
- e) change in conditions of neutron interaction: for example, collapse or overturn of equipment;
- f) loss of neutron absorber, or reduction in absorber effectiveness as a result of moderator loss;
- g) double batching, or over batching to the extent that the equipment does not preclude such an occurrence;
- h) accumulation of material in an undesired location; this could be as a result of mis-routing or leakage of fissile material, or materials that affect nuclear criticality safety (e.g. moderators, reflectors);
- i) materials affecting criticality safety (fissile or non-fissile) found in unexpected locations, for example solvent arising in a vessel normally containing only aqueous solution;
- j) transfer of material to an undesired or unexpected location (for example from a favourable to an unfavourable geometry tank for a fissile solution). Note this may be caused by directly (for example by a pump transferring fissile solution via a distributor that is set incorrectly) or indirectly, say by chemical action (for example an incorrect acidity transfers a fissile solution to a solvent phase in a solvent extraction process, where the solution is intended to remain in the aqueous phase).

5.6 Bases of assessment

Wherever possible, the determination of nuclear criticality safety limits shall be established on bases derived directly from experiments. In the absence of directly applicable experimental measurements, which is a common situation, the results of calculations are acceptable, provided they are shown to be acceptably accurate with nationally or internationally recognized experimental data relating to the validation of nuclear criticality safety computer codes or hand calculation methods.

5.7 Margin of criticality safety

In all determinations of nuclear criticality safety, the margin of safety shall be commensurate with the uncertainty in the nuclear criticality safety assessment, the improbability of its violation, and the seriousness of the consequences of a conceivable nuclear criticality accident. Where calculations are performed to demonstrate nuclear criticality safety, the calculated results shall be subjected to a margin of subcriticality sufficient to demonstrate that the system will be subcritical when taking into account any bias and uncertainty associated with the calculation.

5.8 Demonstration of safety

5.8.1 There are various methodologies used in assessing nuclear criticality safety. Any method shall demonstrate suitable and sufficient defence-in-depth to prevent a nuclear criticality accident.

5.8.2 Operations should, in general, incorporate sufficient safety features so that two unlikely, independent, concurrent changes must occur in the conditions originally specified as essential to nuclear