
**Information technology —
Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems — Local and
metropolitan area networks —**

Part 1AE:

Media access control (MAC) security

**AMENDMENT 1: Galois Counter Model —
Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-
AES-256) Cipher Suite**

*Technologies de l'information — Télécommunications et échange
d'information entre systèmes — Réseaux locaux et métropolitains —*

Partie 1AE: Sécurité du contrôle d'accès aux supports (MAC)

AMENDEMENT 1



Reference number
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)



COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT

© IEEE 2015

All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from ISO, IEC or IEEE at the respective address below.

ISO copyright office
Case postale 56
CH-1211 Geneva 20
Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11
Fax + 41 22 749 09 47
E-mail copyright@iso.org
Web www.iso.org

IEC Central Office
3, rue de Varembé
CH-1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland
E-mail inmail@iec.ch
Web www.iec.ch

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
3 Park Avenue, New York
NY 10016-5997, USA
E-mail stds.ipr@ieee.org
Web www.ieee.org

Published in Switzerland

Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

IEEE Standards documents are developed within the IEEE Societies and the Standards Coordinating Committees of the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA) Standards Board. The IEEE develops its standards through a consensus development process, approved by the American National Standards Institute, which brings together volunteers representing varied viewpoints and interests to achieve the final product. Volunteers are not necessarily members of the Institute and serve without compensation. While the IEEE administers the process and establishes rules to promote fairness in the consensus development process, the IEEE does not independently evaluate, test, or verify the accuracy of any of the information contained in its standards.

The main task of ISO/IEC JTC 1 is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is called to the possibility that implementation of this standard may require the use of subject matter covered by patent rights. By publication of this standard, no position is taken with respect to the existence or validity of any patent rights in connection therewith. ISO/IEEE is not responsible for identifying essential patents or patent claims for which a license may be required, for conducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of patents or patent claims or determining whether any licensing terms or conditions provided in connection with submission of a Letter of Assurance or a Patent Statement and Licensing Declaration Form, if any, or in any licensing agreements are reasonable or non-discriminatory. Users of this standard are expressly advised that determination of the validity of any patent rights, and the risk of infringement of such rights, is entirely their own responsibility. Further information may be obtained from ISO or the IEEE Standards Association.

Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-11 was prepared by the LAN/MAN Standards Committee of the IEEE Computer Society (as IEEE Std 802.11ae-2012). It was adopted by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 6, *Telecommunications and information exchange between systems*, in parallel with its approval by the ISO/IEC national bodies, under the “fast-track procedure” defined in the Partner Standards Development Organization cooperation agreement between ISO and IEEE. IEEE is responsible for the maintenance of this document with participation and input from ISO/IEC national bodies.

(blank page)

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/AMD1:2015

**IEEE Standard for
Local and metropolitan area networks—**

Media Access Control (MAC) Security

**Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—
Advanced Encryption Standard—
256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite**

IEEE Computer Society

Sponsored by the
LAN/MAN Standards Committee

IEEE
3 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016-5997
USA

IEEE Std 802.1AEbn™-2011
(Amendment to
IEEE Std 802.1AE™-2006)

14 October 2011

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/AMD1:2015

IEEE Std 802.1AEbn™-2011

(Amendment to

IEEE Std 802.1AE™-2006)

**IEEE Standard for
Local and metropolitan area networks—**

Media Access Control (MAC) Security

**Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—
Advanced Encryption Standard—
256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite**

Sponsor

**LAN/MAN Standards Committee
of the
IEEE Computer Society**

Approved 10 September 2011

IEEE-SA Standards Board

Abstract: This amendment specifies the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite as an option in addition to the existing mandatory to implement Default Cipher Suite, GCM-AES-128.

Keywords: authenticity, authorized port, confidentiality, data origin integrity, IEEE 802.1AEbn, LANs, local area networks, MAC Bridges, MAC security, MAC Service, MANs, metropolitan area networks, port based network access control, secure association, security, transparent bridging

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USA

Copyright © 2011 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
All rights reserved. Published 14 October 2011. Printed in the United States of America.

IEEE and 802 are registered trademarks in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, owned by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated.

PDF: ISBN 978-0-7381-6735-0 STD97152
Print: ISBN 978-0-7381-6736-7 STDPD97152

IEEE prohibits discrimination, harassment and bullying. For more information, visit <http://www.ieee.org/web/aboutus/whatis/policies/p9-26.html>.

No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

IEEE Standards documents are developed within the IEEE Societies and the Standards Coordinating Committees of the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA) Standards Board. The IEEE develops its standards through a consensus development process, approved by the American National Standards Institute, which brings together volunteers representing varied viewpoints and interests to achieve the final product. Volunteers are not necessarily members of the Institute and serve without compensation. While the IEEE administers the process and establishes rules to promote fairness in the consensus development process, the IEEE does not independently evaluate, test, or verify the accuracy of any of the information or the soundness of any judgments contained in its standards.

Use of an IEEE Standard is wholly voluntary. The IEEE disclaims liability for any personal injury, property or other damage, of any nature whatsoever, whether special, indirect, consequential, or compensatory, directly or indirectly resulting from the publication, use of, or reliance upon this, or any other IEEE Standard document.

The IEEE does not warrant or represent the accuracy or content of the material contained herein, and expressly disclaims any express or implied warranty, including any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a specific purpose, or that the use of the material contained herein is free from patent infringement. IEEE Standards documents are supplied **“AS IS.”**

The existence of an IEEE Standard does not imply that there are no other ways to produce, test, measure, purchase, market, or provide other goods and services related to the scope of the IEEE Standard. Furthermore, the viewpoint expressed at the time a standard is approved and issued is subject to change brought about through developments in the state of the art and comments received from users of the standard. Every IEEE Standard is subjected to review at least every five years for revision or reaffirmation, or every ten years for stabilization. When a document is more than five years old and has not been reaffirmed, or more than ten years old and has not been stabilized, it is reasonable to conclude that its contents, although still of some value, do not wholly reflect the present state of the art. Users are cautioned to check to determine that they have the latest edition of any IEEE Standard.

In publishing and making this document available, the IEEE is not suggesting or rendering professional or other services for, or on behalf of, any person or entity. Nor is the IEEE undertaking to perform any duty owed by any other person or entity to another. Any person utilizing this, and any other IEEE Standards document, should rely upon the advice of a competent professional in determining the exercise of reasonable care in any given circumstances.

Interpretations: Occasionally questions may arise regarding the meaning of portions of standards as they relate to specific applications. When the need for interpretations is brought to the attention of IEEE, the Institute will initiate action to prepare appropriate responses. Since IEEE Standards represent a consensus of concerned interests, it is important to ensure that any interpretation has also received the concurrence of a balance of interests. For this reason, IEEE and the members of its societies and Standards Coordinating Committees are not able to provide an instant response to interpretation requests except in those cases where the matter has previously received formal consideration. A statement, written or oral, that is not processed in accordance with the IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual shall not be considered the official position of IEEE or any of its committees and shall not be considered to be, nor be relied upon as, a formal interpretation of the IEEE. At lectures, symposia, seminars, or educational courses, an individual presenting information on IEEE standards shall make it clear that his or her views should be considered the personal views of that individual rather than the formal position, explanation, or interpretation of the IEEE. Comments for revision of IEEE Standards are welcome from any interested party, regardless of membership affiliation with IEEE. Suggestions for changes in documents should be in the form of a proposed change of text, together with appropriate supporting comments. Recommendations to change the status of a stabilized standard should include a rationale as to why a revision or withdrawal is required.

Comments and recommendations on standards, and requests for interpretations should be addressed to:

Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards Board
445 Hoes Lane
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA

Authorization to photocopy portions of any individual standard for internal or personal use is granted by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., provided that the appropriate fee is paid to Copyright Clearance Center. To arrange for payment of licensing fee, please contact Copyright Clearance Center, Customer Service, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA; +1 978 750 8400. Permission to photocopy portions of any individual standard for educational classroom use can also be obtained through the Copyright Clearance Center.

Introduction

This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011, IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks—Media Access Control (MAC) Security—Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—Advanced Encryption Standard—256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite.

The first edition of IEEE Std 802.1AE was published in 2006. This first amendment to that standard adds the option of using the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite.

Relationship between IEEE Std 802.1AE and other IEEE Std 802 standards

IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 specifies Port-based Network Access Control, and provides a means of authenticating and authorizing devices attached to a LAN, and includes the MACsec Key Agreement protocol (MKA) necessary to make use of IEEE 802.1AE.

This standard is not intended for use with IEEE Std 802.11 Wireless LAN Medium Access Control. An amendment to that standard, IEEE Std 802.11i-2004, also makes use of IEEE Std 802.1X, thus facilitating the use of a common authentication and authorization framework for LAN media to which this standard applies and for Wireless LANs.

Notice to users

Laws and regulations

Users of these documents should consult all applicable laws and regulations. Compliance with the provisions of this standard does not imply compliance to any applicable regulatory requirements. Implementers of the standard are responsible for observing or referring to the applicable regulatory requirements. IEEE does not, by the publication of its standards, intend to urge action that is not in compliance with applicable laws, and these documents may not be construed as doing so.

Copyrights

This document is copyrighted by the IEEE. It is made available for a wide variety of both public and private uses. These include both use, by reference, in laws and regulations, and use in private self-regulation, standardization, and the promotion of engineering practices and methods. By making this document available for use and adoption by public authorities and private users, the IEEE does not waive any rights in copyright to this document.

Updating of IEEE documents

Users of IEEE standards should be aware that these documents may be superseded at any time by the issuance of new editions or may be amended from time to time through the issuance of amendments, corrigenda, or errata. An official IEEE document at any point in time consists of the current edition of the document together with any amendments, corrigenda, or errata then in effect. In order to determine whether a given document is the current edition and whether it has been amended through the issuance of amendments, corrigenda, or errata, visit the IEEE Standards Association website at <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/standards.jsp>, or contact the IEEE at the address listed previously.

For more information about the IEEE Standards Association or the IEEE standards development process, visit the IEEE-SA website at <http://standards.ieee.org>.

Errata

Errata, if any, for this and all other standards can be accessed at the following URL: <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/errata/index.html>. Users are encouraged to check this URL for errata periodically.

Interpretations

Current interpretations can be accessed at the following URL: <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/interps/index.html>.

Patents

Attention is called to the possibility that implementation of this amendment may require use of subject matter covered by patent rights. By publication of this amendment, no position is taken with respect to the existence or validity of any patent rights in connection therewith. The IEEE is not responsible for identifying Essential Patent Claims for which a license may be required, for conducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of Patents Claims or determining whether any licensing terms or conditions provided in connection with submission of a Letter of Assurance, if any, or in any licensing agreements are reasonable or non-discriminatory. Users of this amendment are expressly advised that determination of the validity of any patent rights, and the risk of infringement of such rights, is entirely their own responsibility. Further information may be obtained from the IEEE Standards Association.

Participants

At the time this standard was submitted to the IEEE-SA for approval, the IEEE P802.1 Working Group had the following membership:

Tony Jeffree, Chair
Paul Congdon, Vice Chair
Mick Seaman, Editor and Chair, Security Task Group

Zehavit Alon	Eric Gray	Eric Multanen
Yafan An	Yingjie Gu	David Olsen
Ting Ao	Craig Gunther	Donald Pannell
Peter Ashwood-Smith	Michael Johas Teener	Glenn Parsons
Christian Boiger	Stephen Haddock	Mark Pearson
Paul Bottorff	Hitoshi Hayakawa	Joseph Pelissier
Rudolf Brandner	Hal Keen	Rene Raeber
Craig Carlson	Srikanth Keesara	Karen T. Randall
Rodney Cummings	Yongbum Kim	Josef Roese
Claudio Desanti	Philippe Klein	Dan Romascanu
Zheming Ding	Oliver Kleineberg	Jessy Rouyer
Donald Eastlake, III	Michael Krause	Ali Sajassi
Janos Farkas	Lin Li	Panagiotis Saltsidis
Donald Fedyk	Jeff Lynch	Rakesh Sharma
Norman Finn	Ben Mack-Crane	Kevin Stanton
Ilango Ganga	David Martin	Robert Sultan
Geoffrey Garner	John Messenger	Patricia Thaler
Anoop Ghanwani	John Morris	Chait Tumuluri
Mark Gravel		Maarten Visser

The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may have voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.

Thomas Alexander	Atsushi Ito	Robert Robinson
Butch Anton	Raj Jain	Benjamin Rolfe
Nancy Bravin	Junghoon Jee	Jessy Rouyer
William Byrd	Tony Jeffree	Herbert Ruck
Radhakrishna Canchi	Michael Johas Teener	Randall Safier
Keith Chow	Shinkyō Kaku	Joseph Salowey
Charles Cook	Piotr Karocki	Raymond Savarda
Claudio DeSanti	Stuart J. Kerry	Bartien Sayogo
Wael Diab	Lior Khernosh	Mick Seaman
Patrick Diamond	Yongbum Kim	Shusaku Shimada
Thomas Dineen	Geoff Ladwig	Kapil Sood
Sourav Dutta	Paul Lambert	Thomas Starai
Donald Fedyk	William Lumpkins	Walter Struppler
Yukihiko Fujimoto	Greg Luri	Joseph Tardo
Devon Gayle	Elvis Maculuba	Michael Johas Teener
Gregory Gillooly	Edward McCall	Patricia Thaler
Evan Gilman	Michael McInnis	Mark-Rene Uchida
Ron Greenthaler	Gary Michel	Dmitri Varsanofiev
Randall Groves	Michael S. Newman	Prabodh Varshney
C. Guy	Satoshi Obara	John Vergis
John Hawkins	Glenn Parsons	Hung-Yu Wei
David Hunter	Karen T. Randall	Brian Weis
Paul Isaacs	Maximilian Riegel	Ludwig Winkel
		Oren Yuen

When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 10 September 2011, it had the following membership:

Richard H. Hulett, *Chair*
John Kulick, *Vice Chair*
Robert M. Grow, *Past Chair*
Judith Gorman, *Secretary*

Masayuki Ariyoshi
William Bartley
Ted Burse
Clint Chaplin
Wael Diab
Jean-Philippe Faure
Alexander Gelman
Paul Houzé

Jim Hughes
Joseph L. Koepfinger*
David J. Law
Thomas Lee
Hung Ling
Oleg Logvinov
Ted Olsen

Gary Robinson
Jon Walter Rosdahl
Sam Sciacca
Mike Seavey
Curtis Siller
Phil Winston
Howard L. Wolfman
Don Wright

*Member Emeritus

Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:

Satish Aggarwal, NRC Representative
Richard DeBlasio, DOE Representative
Michael Janezic, NIST Representative

Catherine Berger
IEEE Project Editor

Patricia Gerdon
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program Development

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/AMD1:2015

Contents

1. Overview	2
1.1 Introduction	2
1.2 Scope	2
2. Normative references	3
6. Secure provision of the MAC Service	4
6.1 MACsec connectivity	4
7. Principles of secure network operation	5
8. MAC Security Protocol (MACsec)	6
9. Encoding of MACsec protocol data units	7
9.8 Transmit SA status	7
10. Principle of MAC Security Entity (SecY) operation	8
11. MAC Security in Systems	9
11.7 MACsec in Provider Bridged Networks	9
14. Cipher Suites	10
14.1 Cipher Suite use	10
14.4 Cipher Suite conformance	10
14.5 Default Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128)	11
14.6 GCM-AES-256	11
Annex B (informative) Bibliography	13
Annex C (informative) MACsec Test Vectors	14
C.1 Integrity protection (54-octet frame)	15
C.2 Integrity protection (60-octet frame)	18
C.3 Integrity protection (65-octet frame)	21
C.4 Integrity protection (79-octet frame)	24
C.5 Confidentiality protection (54-octet frame)	27
C.6 Confidentiality protection (60-octet frame)	30
C.7 Confidentiality protection (61-octet frame)	33
C.8 Confidentiality protection (75-octet frame)	36

Figures

Figure 11-14 Provider network with priority selection and aggregation..... 9

Figure 14-1 Cipher Suite Protect and Validate operations 10

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/AMD1:2015

Tables

Table 14-1	MACsec Cipher Suites.....	10
Table C-1	Unprotected frame (example)	15
Table C-2	Integrity protected frame (example)	15
Table C-3	GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)	16
Table C-4	GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)	17
Table C-5	Unprotected frame (example)	18
Table C-6	Integrity protected frame (example)	18
Table C-7	GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)	19
Table C-8	GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)	20
Table C-9	Unprotected frame (example)	21
Table C-10	Integrity protected frame (example)	21
Table C-11	GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)	22
Table C-12	GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)	23
Table C-13	Unprotected frame (example)	24
Table C-14	Integrity protected frame (example)	24
Table C-15	GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)	25
Table C-16	GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)	26
Table C-17	Unprotected frame (example)	27
Table C-18	Confidentiality protected frame (example).....	27
Table C-19	GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	28
Table C-20	GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	29
Table C-21	Unprotected frame (example)	30
Table C-22	Confidentiality protected frame (example).....	30
Table C-23	GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	31
Table C-24	GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	32
Table C-25	Unprotected frame (example)	33
Table C-26	Confidentiality protected frame (example).....	33
Table C-27	GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	34
Table C-28	GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	35
Table C-29	Unprotected frame (example)	36
Table C-30	Confidentiality protected frame (example).....	36
Table C-31	GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	37
Table C-32	GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example).....	38

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/AMD1:2015

IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks— Media Access Control (MAC) Security Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode— Advanced Encryption Standard— 256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This standard is not intended to ensure safety, security, health, or environmental protection. Implementers of the standard are responsible for determining appropriate safety, security, environmental, and health practices or regulatory requirements.

This IEEE document is made available for use subject to important notices and legal disclaimers. These notices and disclaimers appear in all publications containing this document and may be found under the heading “Important Notice” or “Important Notices and Disclaimers Concerning IEEE Documents.” They can also be obtained on request from IEEE or viewed at <http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html>.

NOTE—The editing instructions contained in this amendment define how to merge the material contained therein into the existing base standard and its amendments to form the comprehensive standard.

The editing instructions are shown in **bold italic**. Four editing instructions are used: change, delete, insert, and replace. **Change** is used to make corrections in existing text or tables. The editing instruction specifies the location of the change and describes what is being changed by using ~~strikethrough~~ (to remove old material) and underscore (to add new material). **Delete** removes existing material. **Insert** adds new material without disturbing the existing material. Deletions and insertions may require renumbering. If so, renumbering instructions are given in the editing instruction. **Replace** is used to make changes in figures or equations by removing the existing figure or equation and replacing it with a new one. Editing instructions, change markings, and this NOTE will not be carried over into future editions because the changes will be incorporated into the base standard.

1. Overview

1.1 Introduction

Change the fourth paragraph as follows:

To deliver these benefits, MACsec has to be used in conjunction with appropriate policies for higher-level protocol operation in networked systems, an authentication and authorization framework, and network management. IEEE Std 802.1X ~~P802.1afTM [B2]~~¹ provides authentication and cryptographic key distribution.

1.2 Scope

Change bullet i) as follows:

- i) Specifies the interface/exchanges between a SecY and its associated and collocated MAC Security Key Agreement Entity (KaY, IEEE Std 802.1X ~~P802.1af [B2]~~) that provides and updates cryptographic keys.

Change bullet o) as follows:

- o) Specify how the relationships between MACsec protocol peers are discovered and authenticated, as supported by key management or key distribution protocols, but makes use of IEEE Std 802.1X ~~P802.1af Key Agreement for MAC security~~ to achieve these functions.

2. Normative references

Insert the following references at the appropriate point:

IEEE Std 802.1X™-2010, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-based Network Access Control.

IEEE Std 802.1Q™, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks.

NIST SP 800-38D, Nov 2007, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.¹

Delete the following reference and the accompanying footnote:

~~Galois Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), David A. McGrew, John Viega.⁴~~

Delete the following references:

~~IEEE Std 802.1Q 2005, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks.~~

~~IEEE Std 802.1X 2004, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port Based Network Access Control.~~

~~IEEE Std 802.1ad™ 2005, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks—Amendment 4: Provider Bridges.~~

¹This document is available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf>

6. Secure provision of the MAC Service

6.1 MACsec connectivity

Change the first paragraph as follows:

The connectivity provided (6.2) between the MAC Internal Sublayer Service (ISS) access points of stations connected to a single LAN composes an insecure association between communicating stations. Key agreement protocols as defined in ~~IEEE P802.1af~~ IEEE Std 802.1X establish and maintain a secure Connectivity Association (CA), which is a fully (i.e., symmetric and transitive) connected subset of the ISS service access points. Each instance of MACsec operates within a single CA.

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015

7. Principles of secure network operation

Change bullet d) as follows:

- d) MACsec Key Agreement Entities (~~IEEE P802.1af~~ IEEE Std 802.1X)

7.1.2 Use of the secure MAC Service by bridges

Change NOTE 1 as follows:

NOTE 1—Using an SC identifier that includes a port number component would appear to be unnecessary in the case of a simple system that comprises a single LAN station, with a uniquely allocated 48-bit MAC address, and a single SecY. However, some systems require support for more SecYs than they have uniquely allocated addresses, either because they make use of technologies that support virtual MACs, or because their interface stacks include the possibility of including multiple SecYs at different sublayers. Provider bridges (~~IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005~~ IEEE Std 802.1Q) provide examples of the latter.

7.3.1 Client policies

Change NOTE 1 as follows:

NOTE 1—To facilitate policy selection by clients of the secure MAC Service, ~~IEEE P802.1af~~ IEEE Std 802.1X specifies authorized permissions, including those required by MAC Bridges (IEEE Std 802.1D) and VLAN-aware Bridges (IEEE Std 802.1Q) to support the secure MAC Service in Bridged and Virtually Bridged Local Area Networks.

7.3.2 Use of the secure MAC Service by bridges

Change NOTE 1 as follows:

NOTE 1—The apparent exception to this configuration restriction, which does not permit the creation of security associations to create “secure tunnels” through selected bridges in a Bridged Local Area Network, is the use of a Provider Bridged Network as specified in ~~IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005~~ IEEE Std 802.1Q. However, a Provider Bridged Network appears to Customer Bridges as a single LAN providing full connectivity independent of the operation of Customer Bridge protocols.

Change NOTE 2 as follows:

NOTE 2—Use of this address ensures that the physical topology as perceived by spanning tree protocols aligns with that provided by MAC Security. In Provider Bridged Networks, the Provider Bridge Group Address is used. An exception to the alignment rule occurs with certain types of interface that are supported by Provider Bridge Networks, where a provider operated C-VLAN (see ~~IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005~~ IEEE Std 802.1Q) aware component provides the customer interface.

Change bullet d) as follows:

- d) Configuration of the VLAN Translation Table (~~IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005 only~~)

Change NOTE 3 as follows:

NOTE 3—A Bridge Port is one of the bridge’s points of attachment to an instance of the MAC Internal Sublayer Service (ISS), and is used by the MAC Relay Entity and associated Higher-Layer Entities as specified in IEEE Std 802.1D, and IEEE Std 802.1Q, and ~~IEEE Std 802.1ad~~.

8. MAC Security Protocol (MACsec)

8.1.3 Interoperability requirements

Change the third paragraph as follows:

Where the underlying MAC Service used by MACsec is supported by a Provider Bridged Network (~~IEEE Std 802.1ad~~ IEEE Std 802.1Q), communicating SecYs can be attached to different media operating (locally) at different transmission rates. Interoperability between, for example, 10 Gb/s and 1 Gb/s, and between 1 Gb/s and 100 Mb/s requires interoperability across the speed range. The design of MACsec facilitates interoperability from 1 Mb/s to 100 Gb/s without modification or negotiation of protocol formats and parameters. Operation at higher transmission rates depends on the capabilities of the Cipher Suite. The mandatory default Cipher Suite has been selected (Clause 14) in part because of its ability to perform across this range.

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015

9. Encoding of MACsec protocol data units

9.8 Transmit SA status

Change the NOTE, as follows:

NOTE—~~As specified in this clause, the~~ The IV used by the ~~Default Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128) (14.5) and the~~ GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite (14.6) comprises the SCI (even if the SCI is not transmitted in the SecTAG) and the PN. Subject to proper unique MAC Address allocation procedures, the SCI is a globally unique identifier for a SecY. To satisfy the IV uniqueness requirements of CTR mode of operation, a fresh key is used before PN values are reused.

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015

10. Principle of MAC Security Entity (SecY) operation

10.7.22 Transmit SA status

Insert a further bullet e) directly after the existing bullet d), as follows:

- e) nextPN (10.6, 10.6.5)

IECNORM.COM : Click to view the full PDF of ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/AMD1:2015

11. MAC Security in Systems

11.7 MACsec in Provider Bridged Networks

Change the first paragraph as follows:

Provider Bridges are specified in the IEEE Std 802.1ad amendment to IEEE Std 802.1Q. Provider Bridges (IEEE Std 802.1Q) enable service providers to use VLANs to offer the equivalent of separate LANs to different users. Data for each of the virtual LANs is segregated within the provider's network by using a Service VLAN TAG (S-TAG) that is distinguished, by EtherType, from the Customer VLAN-TAGs (C-TAGs) used within each customer's network. See Figure 11-12.

Change the NOTE as follows:

NOTE—Figure 11-12 is based on Figure 15-1 of ~~IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005~~ IEEE Std 802.1Q.

Change the paragraph describing Figure 11-14 as follows:

Figure 11-14 shows the addition of the service access priority selection function described in 6.9 of ~~IEEE Std 802.1ad~~ IEEE Std 802.1Q to the interface stack of Figure 11-13, together with the use of Link Aggregation to support attachment to the provider's network with two LANs.

Replace Figure 11-14 with the following figure, which changes the prior reference to IEEE Std 802.1ad Clause 6.9 to a reference to IEEE Std 802.1Q Clause 6.9:





Figure 11-14—Provider network with priority selection and aggregation

14. Cipher Suites

14.1 Cipher Suite use

Change footnote 2 in Figure 14-1 as follows:



¹ The SAK to be used on receipt of the frame is identified by the SCI and the AN.

² The SCI is extracted from the SCI field of the SecTAG if present. A value conveyed by key agreement (point-to-point only) is used otherwise.

In the GCM-AES-128 and GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suites (14.5, 14.6), the SCI is always included in the IV parameter whether included in the SecTAG or not (and thus always contributes to the ICV). However the Cipher Suite parameter A includes the SCI if and only if the SCI is included in the SecTAG.

³ The PN is conveyed in the SecTAG

⁴ The validated PN can be used for replay protection.

⁵ All the transmitted octets of the SecTAG are protected, including the optional SCI field if present

⁶ The validated received SecTAG contains bits of the TCI, and optionally the SCI, these can be used for service multiplexing (11.7).

⁷ The length, in octets, of the User Data is conveyed by the User Data parameter, and is protected by Cipher Suite operation.

⁸ The length, in octets, of the Secure Data is conveyed by the MACsec frame, unless it is short, when it is conveyed by the SL parameter in the SecTAG TCI

Figure 14-1—Cipher Suite Protect and Validate operations

14.4 Cipher Suite conformance

Change Table 14-1 as follows:

Table 14-1—MACsec Cipher Suites

Cipher Suite # Identifier	Cipher Suite Name	Services provided		Mandatory/Optional	Defining Clause
		Integrity without confidentiality	Integrity and confidentiality		
00-80-02-00-01-00-00-01 00-80-C2-00-01-00-00-01	GCM-AES-128	Yes	Yes	Mandatory	14.5
00-80-C2-00-01-00-00-02	<u>GCM-AES-256</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Optional</u>	<u>14.6</u>

Delete the NOTE after the table as follows:

NOTE—Currently, Table 14-1 does not include any optional Cipher Suites.

Insert the following NOTE after the paragraph beginning “Table 14-1 assigns a Cipher Suite reference number for use in protocol identification within a MACsec context”:

NOTE—In IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006 (the first edition of this standard) the Cipher Suite Identifier for GCM-AES-128 was incorrectly shown as 00-80-02-00-01-00-00-01 in Table 14-1. Prior to the inclusion of GCM-AES-256, GCM-AES-128 was the only conformant Cipher Suite. IEEE Std 802.1X uses a reserved encoding for the Default Cipher Suite rather than the Cipher Suite Identifier to identify GCM-AES-128.

Change 14.5 as follows:

14.5 Default Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128)

The Default Cipher Suite uses the Galois/Counter Mode of Operation with the AES-128 symmetric block cipher, as specified in this clause by reference to the terms K , IV , A , P , C , T used in section 2.1 of the GCM specification (GCM) as submitted to NIST NIST SP 800-38D.

K is the 128 bit SAK. The 64 most significant bits of the 96-bit IV are the octets of the SCI, encoded as a binary number (9.1). The 32 least significant bits of the 96-bit IV are the octets of the PN, encoded as a binary number (9.1). T is the ICV, and is 128 bits long. When the bit-strings A , P , and C are specified in terms of octet strings, earlier octets compose earlier bits, and more significant bits in each octet are earlier.

NOTE—The bit strings obtained by transforming MAC Address and data octets using these rules do not correspond to IEEE 802.3 “wire order” for frame transmission.

When the Default Cipher Suite is used for Integrity Protection

- A is the Destination MAC Address, Source MAC Address, and the octets of the SecTAG and User Data concatenated in that order.
- P is null.
- The Secure Data is the octets of the User Data, without modification.

When the Default Cipher Suite is used for Confidentiality Protection without a confidentiality offset

- A is the Destination MAC Address, Source MAC Address, and the octets of the SecTAG concatenated in that order.
- P is the octets of the User Data.
- The Secure Data is C .

When the Default Cipher Suite is used for Confidentiality Protection with a confidentiality offset

- A is the Destination MAC Address, Source MAC Address, and the octets of the SecTAG and the first confidentialityOffset (10.7.24) octets of the User Data concatenated in that order.
- P is the remaining octets of the User Data.
- The Secure Data is the first confidentialityOffset octets of the User Data concatenated with C , in that order.

Insert 14.6 as follows:

14.6 GCM-AES-256

GCM-AES-256 uses the Galois/Counter Mode of operation with the AES-256 symmetric block cipher, as specified in this clause by reference to the terms K , IV , A , P , C , T used in NIST SP 800-38D.

K is the 256 bit SAK. The 64 most significant bits of the 96-bit IV are the octets of the SCI, encoded as a binary number (9.1). The 32 least significant bits of the 96-bit IV are the octets of the PN, encoded as a binary number (9.1). T is the ICV, and is 128 bits long. When the bit-strings A , P , and C are specified in terms of octet strings, earlier octets compose earlier bits, and more significant bits in each octet are earlier.

NOTE—The bit strings obtained by transforming MAC Address and data octets using these rules do not correspond to IEEE 802.3 “wire order” for frame transmission.

When the Default Cipher Suite is used for Integrity Protection

- A is the Destination MAC Address, Source MAC Address, and the octets of the SecTAG and User Data concatenated in that order.
- P is null.
- The Secure Data is the octets of the User Data, without modification.

When the Default Cipher Suite is used for Confidentiality Protection without a confidentiality offset

- A is the Destination MAC Address, Source MAC Address, and the octets of the SecTAG concatenated in that order.
- P is the octets of the User Data.
- The Secure Data is C .

When the Default Cipher Suite is used for Confidentiality Protection with a confidentiality offset

- A is the Destination MAC Address, Source MAC Address, and the octets of the SecTAG and the first confidentialityOffset (10.7.24) octets of the User Data concatenated in that order.
- P is the remaining octets of the User Data.
- The Secure Data is the first confidentialityOffset octets of the User Data concatenated with C , in that order.

Annex B

(informative)

Bibliography

Delete bibliographical reference [B2] and the accompanying footnote as follows, renumbering other bibliographical references and updating cross-references as necessary.

[B2] IEEE P802.1af, Draft Standard for Key Agreement for MAC Security.³

Insert the following bibliographical references in alphanumerical order, renumbering other bibliographical references and updating cross-references as necessary:

[Bxx] IETF RFC 5116, An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption, McGrew, D., January 2008.

[Bxx] The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), David A. McGrew and J. Viera. May 31, 2005.⁴

[Bxx] The Security and Performance of the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of Operation. D. McGrew and J. Viera. Proceedings of INDOCRYPT '04, Springer-Verlag, 2004.⁵

³Numbers preceded by P are IEEE authorized standards projects that were not approved by the IEEE-SA Standards Board at the time this publication went to press. (The most recent draft should be used.) For information about obtaining drafts, contact the IEEE.

⁴A prior revision of this document was the normative reference for GCM in IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, but has been superseded by NIST SP 800-38D for that purpose. It does contain additional background information, and can be downloaded from <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf>

⁵Available from the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/193, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193>

Insert new Annex C, as follows:

Annex C

(informative)

MACsec Test Vectors

This annex provides test case examples of the use of MACsec. Each example shows an unprotected frame that could be transmitted as a result of a MAC Service request (with a given set of parameters) and the corresponding MACsec protected frame (with a given set of MACsec SecY parameters). Test cases include the use of integrity protection without confidentiality (authenticated, but unencrypted) and the use of both integrity protection and confidentiality (authenticated and encrypted).

The test cases use a number of different unprotected frame sizes. Two correspond to common sizes of internet packets, 54 octets and 60 octets—two common representations of a TCP/IP SYN packet. A TCP SYN comprises 40 octets plus 14 octets of MAC DA+SA+Ethertype. The frame could be padded to 60 octets to meet minimum Ethernet frame length requirements prior to MACsec processing. The remaining frame sizes represent “corner cases” of the GCM padding algorithm. A 61-octet frame, when encrypted, has a 49-octet payload, which results in the maximum 15 octets of padding for ICV calculation. When integrity protection is provided but confidentiality is not (i.e., when the user data is not encrypted) a 65-octet frame also requires that maximum padding. A 75-octet frame has a 63 octet payload, requiring 1 octet of padding for ICV calculation, as does a 79-octet frame that is integrity protected without confidentiality. The zero-octet padding case is covered by the 60-octet frame, above. MACsec processing is performed above the media-dependent functions of media access control, so all frame sizes given are prior to the addition of the 32-bit CRC or other media dependent fields.

Test cases are provided for both the Default Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128, 14.5) and GCM-AES-256 (14.6). The notation used in this annex is that specified in Clause 14 (Cipher Suites) and NIST SP 800-38D. Fields in the MACsec header are specified in Clause 9. Summaries of the computation and intermediate outputs are provided.

C.1 Integrity protection (54-octet frame)

The MAC Destination Address, MAC Source Address, and MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU, User Data) of a MAC Service data request and a corresponding data indication are shown in Table C-1. These comprise the octets of an unprotected frame when concatenated in the order given (with the addition of any media dependent additional fields such as padding). The User Data shown includes the IP EtherType.

Table C-1—Unprotected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	D6 09 B1 F0 56 63
MAC SA	7A 0D 46 DF 99 8D
User Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 00 01

The MAC Security TAG (SecTAG) comprises the MACsec EtherType, the TCI, the AN, the SL, the PN, and the (optional) SCI. The PN differs for each protected frame transmitted with any given SAK (K) and has been arbitrarily chosen (for this and in other examples) as have the other parameter values. The fields of the protected frame are shown (in the order transmitted) in Table C-2.

Table C-2—Integrity protected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	D6 09 B1 F0 56 63
MAC SA	7A 0D 46 DF 99 8D
MACsec EtherType	88 E5
TCI and AN	22
SL	2A
PN	B2 C2 84 65
SCI	12 15 35 24 C0 89 5E 81
Secure Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 00 01
ICV	Cipher Suite and Key (SAK) dependent (see Table C-3 and Table C-4)

The GCM parameter *A*, the additional data to be authenticated, is formed by concatenating the MAC DA, the MAC SA, the SecTAG, and the User Data. This input is then processed through the authentication-only operation of the GCM module. The SCI and the PN are concatenated (in that order) to form the 96-bit *IV* used by GCM. The computed GCM parameter *T* is the ICV.

C.1.1 GCM-AES-128 (54-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-3 specifies an arbitrary 128-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-128 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-2. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-3—GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	AD7A2BD03EAC835A6F620FDCB506B345
ICV	F0 94 78 A9 B0 90 07 D0 6F 46 E9 B6 A1 DA 25 DD

key size = 128 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 560 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: AD7A2BD03EAC835A6F620FDCB506B345

P:

A: D609B1F056637A0D46DF998D88E5222A
B2C2846512153524C0895E8108000F10
1112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20
2122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F30
313233340001

IV: 12153524C0895E81B2C28465

GCM-AES Authentication

H: 73A23D80121DE2D5A850253FCF43120E

Y[0]: 12153524C0895E81B2C2846500000001

E(K, Y[0]): EB4E051CB548A6B5490F6F11A27CB7D0

X[1]: 6B0BE68D67C6EE03EF7998E399C01CA4

X[2]: 5AABADF6D7806EC0CCCB028441197B22

X[3]: FE072BFE2811A68AD7FDB0687192D293

X[4]: A47252D1A7E09B49FB356E435DBB4CD0

X[5]: 18EBF4C65CE89BF69EFB4981CEE13DB9

GHASH(H, A, C): 1BDA7DB505D8A165264986A703A6920D

C:

T: F09478A9B09007D06F46E9B6A1DA25DD

C.1.2 GCM-AES-256 (54-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-4 specifies an arbitrary 256-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-2. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-4—GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	E3C08A8F06C6E3AD95A70557B23F7548 3CE33021A9C72B7025666204C69C0B72
ICV	2F 0B C5 AF 40 9E 06 D6 09 EA 8B 7D 0F A5 EA 50

key size = 256 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 560 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: E3C08A8F06C6E3AD95A70557B23F7548
3CE33021A9C72B7025666204C69C0B72

P:

A: D609B1F056637A0D46DF998D88E5222A
B2C2846512153524C0895E8108000F10
1112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20
2122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F30
313233340001

IV: 12153524C0895E81B2C28465

GCM-AES Authentication

H: 286D73994EA0BA3CFD1F52BF06A8ACF2

Y[0]: 12153524C0895E81B2C2846500000001

E(K, Y[0]): 714D54FDCFCFEE37D5729CDDAB383A016

X[1]: BA7C26F578254853CF321281A48317CA

X[2]: 2D0DF59AE78E84ED64C3F85068CD9863

X[3]: 702DE0382ABF4D42DD62B8F115124219

X[4]: DAED65979342F0D155BFDFE362132078

X[5]: 9AB4AFD6344654B2CD23977E41AA18B3

GHASH(H, A, C): 5E4691528F50E5AB5EC346A7BC264A46

C:

T: 2F0BC5AF409E06D609EA8B7D0FA5EA50

C.2 Integrity protection (60-octet frame)

The MAC Destination Address, MAC Source Address, and MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU, User Data) of a MAC Service data request and a corresponding data indication are shown in Table C-5. These comprise the octets of an unprotected frame when concatenated in the order given (with the addition of any media dependent additional fields such as padding). The User Data shown includes the IP EtherType.

Table C-5—Unprotected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	E2 01 06 D7 CD 0D
MAC SA	F0 76 1E 8D CD 3D
User Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 00 03

The MAC Security TAG comprises the MACsec EtherType, the TCI, the AN, the SL, the PN. In this example the optional SCI has been omitted. The fields of the protected frame are shown (in the order transmitted) in Table C-6.

Table C-6—Integrity protected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	E2 01 06 D7 CD 0D
MAC SA	F0 76 1E 8D CD 3D
MACsec EtherType	88 E5
TCI and AN	40
SL	00
PN	76 D4 57 ED
Secure Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 00 03
ICV	Cipher Suite and Key (SAK) dependent (see Table C-7 and Table C-8)

C.2.1 GCM-AES-128 (60-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-7 specifies an arbitrary 128-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-128 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-5. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-7—GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	071B113B0CA743FECCCF3D051F737382
ICV	0C 01 7B C7 3B 22 7D FC C9 BA FA 1C 41 AC C3 53

key size = 128 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 544 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 071B113B0CA743FECCCF3D051F737382

P:

A: E20106D7CD0DF0761E8DCD3D88E54000
76D457ED08000F101112131415161718
191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728
292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738
393A0003

IV: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED

GCM-AES Authentication

H: E4E01725D724C1215C7309AD34539257

Y[0]: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED00000001

E(K, Y[0]): FC25539100959B80FE3ABED435E54CAB

X[1]: 8DAD4981E33493018BB8482F69E4478C

X[2]: 5B0BFA3E67A3E080CB60EA3D523C734A

X[3]: 051F8D267A68CF88748E56C5F64EF503

X[4]: 4187F1240DB1887F2A92DDAB8903A0F6

X[5]: C7D64941A90F02FA9FCDECC083B4B276

GHASH(H, A, C): F024285638B7E67C378044C874498FF8

C:

T: 0C017BC73B227DFCC9BAFA1C41ACC353

C.2.2 GCM-AES-256 (60-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-8 specifies an arbitrary 256-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-6. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-8—GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	691D3EE909D7F54167FD1CA0B5D76908 1F2BDE1AEE655FDBAB80BD5295AE6BE7
ICV	35 21 7C 77 4B BC 31 B6 31 66 BC F9 D4 AB ED 07

key size = 256 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 544 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 691D3EE909D7F54167FD1CA0B5D76908
1F2BDE1AEE655FDBAB80BD5295AE6BE7

P:

A: E20106D7CD0DF0761E8DCD3D88E54000
76D457ED08000F101112131415161718
191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728
292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738
393A0003

IV: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED

GCM-AES Authentication

H: 1E693C484AB894B26669BC12E6D5D776

Y[0]: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED00000001

E(K, Y[0]): 87E183649AE3E7DBF725659152C39A22

X[1]: 20107B262134C35B60499E095C532004

X[2]: D7A468F455F09F947884E35A2C80CD7F

X[3]: A82D607070F2E4470ED94C0EECA9FCC1

X[4]: 03C3C8725883EB355963BD53B515C82D

X[5]: 8FF6F0311DDE274FFA936965C0C905B4

GHASH(H, A, C): B2C0FF13D15FD66DC643D96886687725

C:

T: 35217C774BBC31B63166BCF9D4ABED07

C.3 Integrity protection (65-octet frame)

The MAC Destination Address, MAC Source Address, and MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU, User Data) of a MAC Service data request and a corresponding data indication are shown in Table C-9. These comprise the octets of an unprotected frame when concatenated in the order given (with the addition of any media dependent additional fields such as padding). The User Data shown includes the IP EtherType.

Table C-9—Unprotected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	84 C5 D5 13 D2 AA
MAC SA	F6 E5 BB D2 72 77
User Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 00 05

The MAC Security TAG comprises the MACsec EtherType, the TCI, the AN, the SL, the PN, and the (optional) SCI. The fields of the protected frame are shown (in the order transmitted) in Table C-10.

Table C-10—Integrity protected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	84 C5 D5 13 D2 AA
MAC SA	F6 E5 BB D2 72 77
MACsec EtherType	88 E5
TCI and AN	23
SL	00
PN	89 82 D6 12
SCI	7C FD E9 F9 E3 37 24 C6
Secure Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 00 05
ICV	Cipher Suite and Key (SAK) dependent (see Table C-11 and Table C-12)

C.3.1 GCM-AES-128 (65-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-11 specifies an arbitrary 128-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-128 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-10. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-11—GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	013FE00B5F11BE7F866D0CBBC55A7A90
ICV	21 78 67 E5 0C 2D AD 74 C2 8C 3B 50 AB DF 69 5A

key size = 128 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 648 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 013FE00B5F11BE7F866D0CBBC55A7A90

P:

A: 84C5D513D2AAF6E5BBD2727788E52300
8932D6127CFDE9F9E33724C608000F10
1112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20
2122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F30
3132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F00
05

IV: 7CFDE9F9E33724C68932D612

GCM-AES Authentication

H: EB28DCB361EE1110F98CA0C9A07C88F7

Y[0]: 7CFDE9F9E33724C68932D61200000001

E(K, Y[0]): 4EAAF8E4DF948ACAC7F3349C1006A91F

X[1]: 279344E391DB8834EFA68FD3F1BA5CD8

X[2]: DC35B123F4D387BBB076D0822BD60816

X[3]: 8AB3B52963CC15C9C2DB3E4C801CB65A

X[4]: CAB6A261225F42578E6B86ABA9F0DD18

X[5]: 6ABDBB3ECAC0458F116A82AA0DAC563F

X[6]: 8F39EF45985C691E35814202B6BB6EF6

GHASH(H, A, C): 6FD29F01D3B927BE057F0FCCBBD9C045

C:

T: 217867E50C2DAD74C28C3B50ABDF695A

C.3.2 GCM-AES-256 (65-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-12 specifies an arbitrary 256-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-10. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-12—GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	83C093B58DE7FFE1C0DA926AC43FB360 9AC1C80FEE1B624497EF942E2F79A823
ICV	6E E1 60 E8 FA EC A4 B3 6C 86 B2 34 92 0C A9 75

key size = 256 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 648 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 83C093B58DE7FFE1C0DA926AC43FB360
9AC1C80FEE1B624497EF942E2F79A823

P:

A: 84C5D513D2AAF6E5BBD2727788E52300
8932D6127CFDE9F9E33724C608000F10
1112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20
2122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F30
3132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F00
05

IV: 7CFDE9F9E33724C68932D612

GCM-AES Authentication

H: D03D3B51FDF2AACB3A165D7DC362D929

Y[0]: 7CFDE9F9E33724C68932D61200000001

E(K, Y[0]): E97EA8EE4455AE79EC4225CAC340E326

X[1]: 22C28F4DF8D09267EA3E11F019F5932C

X[2]: 3D02CFE5FC6A8A9E65B8FFD63E525083

X[3]: 78466AE4A3490819A08645DDC95B143B

X[4]: 6FE4921A6F0A1D5DD90A100A40206142

X[5]: C880DEC2FF2C44F8AD611692AF6D1069

X[6]: CF4D709A4D020BA876F4371BAA788444

GHASH(H, A, C): 879FC806BEB90ACA80C497FE514C4A53

C:

T: 6EE160E8FAECA4B36C86B234920CA975

C.4 Integrity protection (79-octet frame)

The MAC Destination Address, MAC Source Address, and MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU, User Data) of a MAC Service data request and a corresponding data indication are shown in Table C-13. These comprise the octets of an unprotected frame when concatenated in the order given (with the addition of any media dependent additional fields such as padding). The User Data shown includes the IP EtherType.

Table C-13—Unprotected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	68 F2 E7 76 96 CE
MAC SA	7A E8 E2 CA 4E C5
User Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4A 4B 4C 4D 00 07

The MAC Security TAG comprises the MACsec EtherType, the TCI, the AN, the SL, and the PN. In this example the optional SCI has been omitted. The fields of the protected frame are shown (in the order transmitted) in Table C-14.

Table C-14—Integrity protected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	68 F2 E7 76 96 CE
MAC SA	7A E8 E2 CA 4E C5
MACsec EtherType	88 E5
TCI and AN	41
SL	00
PN	2E 58 49 5C
Secure Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 3F 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4A 4B 4C 4D 00 07
ICV	Cipher Suite and Key (SAK) dependent (see Table C-15 and Table C-16)

C.4.1 GCM-AES-128 (79-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-11 specifies an arbitrary 128-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-128 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-14. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-15—GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	88EE087FD95DA9FBF6725AA9D757B0CD
ICV	07 92 2B 8E BC F1 0B B2 29 75 88 CA 4C 61 45 23

key size = 128 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 696 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 88EE087FD95DA9FBF6725AA9D757B0CD

P:

A: 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E54100
 2E58495C08000F101112131415161718
 191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728
 292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738
 393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748
 494A4B4C4D0007

IV: 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C

GCM-AES Authentication

H: AE19118C3B704FCE42AE0D15D2C15C7A

Y[0]: 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C00000001

E(K,Y[0]): D2521AABC48C06033E112424D4A6DF74

X[1]: CA0CAE2BEE8F19845DCB7FE3C5E713AB

X[2]: 5D3F9C7A3BC869457EA5FDFD404A415F

X[3]: 760E6A2873ACC0515D4901B5AC1C85E4

X[4]: 5A40A8425165E3D1978484F07AFC70D8

X[5]: D9687630FC4436EE582A90A8E4AFC504

X[6]: 311CE361065F86403CDA5DB00798B961

GHASH(H,A,C): D5C03125787D0DB11764ACEE98C79A57

C:

T: 07922B8EBCF10BB2297588CA4C614523

C.4.2 GCM-AES-256 (79-octet frame integrity protection)

Table C-12 specifies an arbitrary 256-bit key (SAK), and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-14. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-16—GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	4C973DBC7364621674F8B5B89E5C1551 1FCED9216490FB1C1A2CAA0FFE0407E5
ICV	00 BD A1 B7 E8 76 08 BC BF 47 0F 12 15 7F 4C 07

key size = 256 bits

P: 0 bits

A: 696 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 4C973DBC7364621674F8B5B89E5C1551
1FCED9216490FB1C1A2CAA0FFE0407E5

P:

A: 68F2E77696CE7AE8E2CA4EC588E54100
2E58495C08000F101112131415161718
191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728
292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738
393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748
494A4B4C4D0007

IV: 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C

GCM-AES Authentication

H: 9A5E559A96459C21E43C0DFF0FA426F3

Y[0]: 7AE8E2CA4EC500012E58495C00000001

E(K, Y[0]): 316F5EDB0829AC9271A6AFF79F3600BF

X[1]: 06A9019B44B76FFEC18978E8B21513E2

X[2]: 89A6401E39EAB6EE5B8159570139F54D

X[3]: 0A5E22BA54F282CE464C334D1AF598EF

X[4]: 4514D8A5C15E15CABC3D2A0E24FC758E

X[5]: 6F98DE3369B88F25AACBF3A993003E78

X[6]: 8183B21C0A932A2D5F598E1B2967564B

GHASH(H, A, C): 31D2FF6CE05FA42ECEE1A0E58A494CB8

C:

T: 00BDA1B7E87608BCBF470F12157F4C07

C.5 Confidentiality protection (54-octet frame)

The MAC Destination Address, MAC Source Address, and MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU, User Data) of a MAC Service data request and a corresponding data indication are shown in Table C-17. These comprise the octets of an unprotected frame when concatenated in the order given (with the addition of any media dependent additional fields such as padding). The User Data shown includes the IP EtherType.

Table C-17—Unprotected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	E2 01 06 D7 CD 0D
MAC SA	F0 76 1E 8D CD 3D
User Data	08 00 0F 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F 30 31 32 33 34 00 04

The MAC Security TAG (SecTAG) comprises the MACsec EtherType, the TCI, the AN, the SL, and the PN. In this example the optional SCI has been omitted. The fields of the protected frame are shown (in the order transmitted) in Table C-18.

Table C-18—Confidentiality protected frame (example)

Field	Value
MAC DA	E2 01 06 D7 CD 0D
MAC SA	F0 76 1E 8D CD 3D
MACsec EtherType	88 E5
TCI and AN	4C
SL	2A
PN	76 D4 57 ED
Secure Data	Cipher Suite and Key (SAK) dependent (see Table C-19 and Table C-20)
ICV	Cipher Suite and Key (SAK) dependent (see Table C-19 and Table C-20)

The GCM parameter P , the data to be encrypted, is the User Data. The additional data A to be authenticated is formed by concatenating the MAC DA, the MAC SA, and the SecTAG. The SCI and the PN are concatenated (in that order) to form the 96-bit IV used by GCM. The computed GCM parameter T is the ICV.

C.5.1 GCM-AES-128 (54-octet frame confidentiality protection)

Table C-19 specifies an arbitrary 128-bit key (SAK), the Secure Data, and the ICV generated by the GCM-AES-128 Cipher Suite when that key is used in conjunction with the frame field data of Table C-18. Details of the computation follow the table.

Table C-19—GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example)

Field	Value
Key (SAK)	071B113B0CA743FECCCF3D051F737382
Secure Data	13 B4 C7 2B 38 9D C5 01 8E 72 A1 71 DD 85 A5 D3 75 22 74 D3 A0 19 FB CA ED 09 A4 25 CD 9B 2E 1C 9B 72 EE E7 C9 DE 7D 52 B3 F3
ICV	D6 A5 28 4F 4A 6D 3F E2 2A 5D 6C 2B 96 04 94 C3

key size = 128 bits

P: 336 bits

A: 160 bits

IV: 96 bits

ICV: 128 bits

K: 071B113B0CA743FECCCF3D051F737382

P: 08000F101112131415161718191A1B1C
1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C
2D2E2F30313233340004

A: E20106D7CD0DF0761E8DCD3D88E54C2A
76D457ED

IV: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED

GCM-AES Encryption

H: E4E01725D724C1215C7309AD34539257

Y[0]: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED00000001

E(K, Y[0]): FC25539100059B80FE3ABED435E54CAB

Y[1]: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED00000002

E(K, Y[1]): 1BB4C83B298FD6159B64B669C49FBECF

C[1]: 13B4C72B389DC5018E72A171DD85A5D3

Y[2]: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED00000003

E(K, Y[2]): 683C6BF3813BD8EEC82F830DE4B10530

C[2]: 752274D3A019FBCAED09A425CD9B2E1C

Y[3]: F0761E8DCD3D000176D457ED00000004

E(K, Y[3]): B65CC1D7F8EC4E66B3F7182C2E358591

C[3]: 9B72EEE7C9DE7D52B3F3

X[1]: A0AE6DFAE25C0AE80E9A1AAC0D5123D3

X[2]: EAEA2A767986B7D5B9E6ED37A3CBC63B

X[3]: 8809F1263C02DC9BD09FDF0F34575BA6

X[4]: A173C5A2C03DE08C025C93945B2E74B7

X[5]: 65D113682551614E556BFAA80AA2FA7A

GHASH(H, A, C): 2A807BDE4AF8A462D467D2FFA3E1D868

C: 13B4C72B389DC5018E72A171DD85A5D3

752274D3A019FBCAED09A425CD9B2E1C

9B72EEE7C9DE7D52B3F3

T: D6A5284F4A6D3FE22A5D6C2B960494C3