INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009

TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2

Published 2013-11-15

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION • МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ПО СТАНДАРТИЗАЦИИ • ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE NORMALISATION
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION • МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ЭЛЕКТРОТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ • COMMISSION ÉLECTROTECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE

Information technology — Personal identification — ISO-compliant driving licence —

Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation

TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2

Technologies de l'information — Identification des personnes — Permis de conduire conforme à l'ISO —

Partie 3: Contrôle d'accès, authentification et validation d'intégrité

RECTIFICATIF TECHNIQUE 2

Technical Corrigendum 1 to ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 17, *Cards and personal identification*.

ICS 35.240.15 **Ref. No. ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009/Cor.2:2013(E)**

Published in Switzerland

Page 34, Annex B

Replace clause B.10.4 with the following:

B.10.4 Example Using Configuration 4

Static document keying material:

K_{doc} = '348D2F25C266CC8068F99391BF0F5CCB87 6B5F5DDB004D0E5C8BCD1D3ACF2FDADA'

Compute Basic Access Keys:

Input: $K_{seed} = H_{SHA-256}(K_{doc})$
K_{seed} = ' 2E3AB26DC47C4BA6724E58514492ABF3 B2B92BD21A40BEBFAF0D7A52D291EA98'

Encryption Key (K_{enc}) computation:

1. Concatenate K_{seed} and c (c = 1):
   D = '2E3AB26DC47C4BA6724E58514492ABF3 00000001'

2. Calculate the hash of D:
   $H_{SHA-256}(D)$ = '0AFD72514422FD43622BB3F1680F6243 5A6F9B8E83C92A299D3B89124D89B611'

3. Form key:
   K_{enc} = '0AFD72514422FD43622BB3F1680F6243 5A6F9B8E83C92A299D3B89124D89B611'

Message Authentication Key (K_{mac}) computation:

4. Concatenate K_{seed} and c (c = 2):
   D = '2E3AB26DC47C4BA6724E58514492ABF3 00000002'

5. Calculate the hash of D:
   $H_{SHA-256}(D)$ = 'F3BC7313E7D34BB3BE0EB07B4DF9DE6A E73A4CA604FE1516AEBFB4140115A5A6'

6. Form key:
   K_{mac} = 'F3BC7313E7D34BB3BE0EB07B4DF9DE6A E73A4CA604FE1516AEBFB4140115A5A6'

Authentication and Establishment of Session Keys:

IS:

1. Request an 8 byte random challenge from the document's SIC:

   Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'84'	'00'	'00'	'08'

Document SIC:

2. Generate random challenge and return it to IS:
RND.ICC = 'E880AAE12EB3A5FB'

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
RND.ICC	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. Generate an 8-byte random challenge and 24-byte random keying material:
RND.IFD = 'B962840EFBFE80C9'
K.IFD = '1D05B3E621AC7BB4786AC1657D0C4C11
58875525EB21659D905674FCAFF94421'

4. Concatenate RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD:
S = 'B962840EFBFE80C9E880AAE12EB3A5FB
1D05B3E621AC7BB4786AC1657D0C4C11
58875525EB21659D905674FCAFF94421'

5. Encrypt S using AES with key K_{enc}:
E_IFD = 'DA020143D3816ACB4EF104FDAAFA30A7
BC49BFE6B616D9D061F728EB063362A1
C435F95DDACBE36C37A09472BBCD464B'

6. Compute CMAC over E_IFD with key K_{mac}:
M_IFD = '4F3B9205ADB2DD20'

7. Construct command data for MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and send command to the document's SIC:
cmd_data = 'DA020143D3816ACB4EF104FDAAFA30A7
BC49BFE6B616D9D061F728EB063362A
1C435F95DDACBE36C37A09472BBCD464B
4F3B9205ADB2DD20'

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'00'	'82'	'00'	'00'	'38'	cmd_data	'38'

Document SIC:

8. Generate 16-byte random keying material:
K.ICC = '56F1510FDCC2B01787E80D2D5E340840
20C93698AF4599C9B9B7D68EB2E958B7'

9. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:
K_{seed} = '4BF4E2E9FD6ECBA3FF82CC4823384451
784E63BD4464FC5429E1A2721D101C96'

10. Derive session keys:
KS_{enc} = '60BDD38EE1B27EEAC7AF9907889F2E04 74C7AF231C71705BB2A84BF87BA825FF'
KS_{mac} = '978E2D4BFC62716966B215A28980ED04 1756A53EBC56AE7CE9F8341167210C33'

11. Initialize send sequence counter:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80C9'

12. Concatenate RND.ICC, RND.IFD and K.ICC; and add padding:
R = 'E880AAE12EB3A5FBB962840EFBFE80C9 56F1510FDCC2B01787E80D2D5E340840 20C93698AF4599C9B9B7D68EB2E958B7'

13. Encrypt R using AES with key K_{enc}:
E_ICC = '2918E899CF1B797F5F869521B1B942B7 8F72C19AA8162C82BA5295733D33C2F7 2BABED4C7687E8D2A58E9C4F109F92A2'

14. Compute CMAC over E_ICC with key K_{mac}:
M_ICC = '2FDBF985C7DA7CCF'

15. Construct response data and send response APDU to the IS:
resp_data = '2918E899CF1B797F5F869521B1B942B7 8F72C19AA8162C82BA5295733D33C2F7 2BABED4C7687E8D2A58E9C4F109F92A2 2FDBF985C7DA7CCF'

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

16. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:
K_{seed} = '4BF4E2E9FD6ECBA3FF82CC4823384451 784E63BD4464FC5429E1A2721D101C96'

17. Derive session keys:
KS_{enc} = '60BDD38EE1B27EEAC7AF9907889F2E04 74C7AF231C71705BB2A84BF87BA825FF'
KS_{mac} = '978E2D4BFC62716966B215A28980ED04 1756A53EBC56AE7CE9F8341167210C33'

18. Initialize send sequence counter:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80C9'

Secure Messaging:

IS:

1. SELECT EF.COM (file identifier = '01 1E'):

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field
'00'	'A4'	'02'	'00'	'02'	'01 1E'

a) Mask class byte and pad command header:
cmd_header = '0CA4020C8000000000000000000000000'

b) Pad data:
p_data = '011E8000000000000000000000000000'

c) Encrypt p_data using AES with KS_{enc}:
enc_data = 'C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51F9BE58'

d) Build DO'87':
DO87 = '871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51
F9BE58'

e) Concatenate cmd_header and DO87:
M = '0CA4020C8000000000000000000000000
871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51
F9BE58'

f) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac}:
- Increment SSC:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CA'
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:
N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CA
0CA4020C8000000000000000000000000
871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51
F9BE58'
- Compute MAC:
CC = 'EC6B4CF08A7206D8'

g) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E08EC6B4CF08A7206D8'

h) Construct command data:
cmd_data = '871101C74A8B66F7EA68098B8B4F1E51
F9BE588E08EC6B4CF08A7206D8'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'A4'	'02'	'0C'	'1D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

2. Set EF.COM as the currently selected file and send affirmative response to IS:

Unprotected response APDU:

SW1	SW2
'90'	'00'

a) Build DO'99':
DO99 = '99029000'

b) Compute CMAC of DO99 with KS_{mac}:
- Increment SSC:
SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CB'
- Concatenate padded SSC and DO99:
N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CB
99029000'
- Compute MAC:
CC = '22CC755FA2A7973B'

c) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E0822CC755FA2A7973B'

d) Construct response data:
resp_data = '990290008E0822CC755FA2A7973B'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. READ BINARY of the first 4 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'04'

a) Mask class byte and pad command header:
cmd_header = '0CB000008000000000000000000000000'

b) Build DO '97':
DO97 = '970104'

c) Concatenate cmd_header and DO97:
M = '0CB000008000000000000000000000000
970104'

d) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac}:
- Increment SSC:
  SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CC'
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:
  N = '0000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CC
  0CB000008000000000000000000000000
  970104'
- Compute MAC:
  CC = '7C564CD2EC22E606'

e) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E087C564CD2EC22E606'

f) Construct command data:
cmd_data = '9701048E087C564CD2EC22E606'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

4. Return 4 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 0:

data = '600D5F01'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

a) Pad data:
p_data = '600D5F0180000000000000000000000'

b) Encrypt p_data using AES with KS_{enc}:
enc_data = 'DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F3455A64AE'

c) Build DO'87':
DO87 = '871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
5A64AE'

d) Build DO'99':
DO99 = '99029000'

e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':
M = '871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
5A64AE99029000'

f) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac}:
- Increment SSC:
  SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CD'
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:
  N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CD
  871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
  5A64AE99029000'
- Compute MAC:
  CC = 'CB87EE6B23392361'

g) Build DO'8E':
DO8E = '8E08CB87EE6B23392361'

h) Construct response data:
resp_data = '871101DBBA6E8C7C837A22FD94F7F345
5A64AE990290008E08CB87EE6B233923
61'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

5. READ BINARY of the remaining 11 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'04'	'0B'

a) Mask class byte and pad command header:
cmd_header = '0CB000048000000000000000000000000'

b) Build DO '97':
DO97 = '97010B'

c) Concatenate cmd_header and DO97:
M = '0CB00004800000000000000000000000
97010B'

d) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac}:
- Increment SSC:
  SSC = '2EB3A5FBFBFE80CE'
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:
  N = '00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CE
  0CB00004800000000000000000000000
  97010B'
- Compute MAC:
  CC = '98EC6D1082ECDF5F'

e) Build DO‘8E’:
DO8E = ‘8E0898EC6D1082ECDF5F’

f) Construct command data:
cmd_data = ‘97010B8E0898EC6D1082ECDF5F’

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
‘0C’	‘B0’	‘00’	‘04’	‘0D’	cmd_data	‘00’

Document SIC:

6. Return 11 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 4:

data = ‘04303130305C04616B6567’

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1 SW2
data	‘90’ ‘00’

a) Pad data:
p_data = ‘04303130305C04616B65678000000000’

b) Encrypt p_data using AES with KS_{enc}:
enc_data = ‘9D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC112EA0D’

c) Build DO‘87’:
DO87 = ‘8711019D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC1
12EA0D’

d) Build DO‘99’:
DO99 = ‘99029000’

e) Concatenate DO‘87’ and DO‘99’:
M = ‘8711019D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC1
12EA0D99029000’

f) Compute CMAC of M with KS_{mac}:
- Increment SSC:
SSC = ‘2EB3A5FBFBFE80CF’
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:
N = ‘00000000000000002EB3A5FBFBFE80CF
8711019D4B6092AEEC6868505D1CFDC1
12EA0D99029000’
- Compute MAC:
CC = ‘7A8EA0EDBEA375DA’

g) Build DO‘8E’:
DO8E = ‘8E087A8EA0EDBEA375DA’