



**INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009**  
**TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1**

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION • МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ ПО СТАНДАРТИЗАЦИИ • ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE NORMALISATION  
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**Information technology — Personal identification —  
ISO-compliant driving licence —**

**Part 3:  
Access control, authentication and integrity validation**

**TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1**

*Technologies de l'information — Identification des personnes — Permis de conduire conforme à l'ISO*  
*Partie 3: Contrôle d'accès, authentification et validation d'intégrité*

*RECTIFICATIF TECHNIQUE 1*

Technical Corrigendum 1 to ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 17, *Cards and personal identification*.

Page 19, 8.2.4.2

Delete the following sentence:

“The SHA-1 hashing algorithm and trailer option 1 shall be used.”

Page 30, 8.6.3

Add the following sentence before the NOTE beginning with “Both BAP and EAP use the commands GET CHALLENGE ...”:

“A SIC that supports EAP shall respond to unauthenticated read attempts of EAP protected data group (including selection of files) with ‘Security status not satisfied’ (0X6982).”

Page 93, C.4.4.5

Add the following sentence before the 5th paragraph beginning with “If the signature verification is successful, access to data groups...” :

“EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command can be used only if Path length constraint of the certificate sent previously with PSO\_VERIFY command is set to 0. If Path length constraint is >0, the card shall return an ISO checking error and take no further action.”

Page 43, Annex B

Replace Annex B with the following:

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## Annex B (normative)

### Basic access protection

#### B.1 Introduction

BAP is a mechanism and protocol to protect identity documents with a SIC against skimming attacks.

This protection is achieved by requiring the establishment of a secure channel using pre-defined key material which should only be revealed by closer physical inspection of the document, before access is granted to information stored in the SIC.

The secure channel protects the integrity and authenticity of authorized communication between an IS and an identity document. If the entropy of the key material is high enough, a certain amount of protection against eavesdropping attacks is also achieved.

NOTE 1 Because the same pre-defined key material is used for all communication sessions with a given document, this protocol does not give forward-secrecy. This means that, if knowledge about the keying material is gained, it can be used to decrypt any past sessions. However, knowledge of a particular session's session keys does not enable the decryption of past or future sessions.

NOTE 2 This protocol is largely based on ICAO's Basic Access Control, which can be viewed as an application of BAP specific to machine-readable travel documents.

#### B.2 Parameters

IA's implementing BAP shall select:

- a) a cryptographic hash function  $h$ ,
- b) a block cipher  $e$  with block length  $n$  (in bits) and key length  $k$  (in bits), and
- c) a cipher-based message authentication code (MAC) algorithm  $m$ .

Valid combinations thereof are listed in B.8.

Referring specifications shall specify the following when referencing BAP:

- a) The source of  $K_{\text{doc}}$ .
- b) The method(s) by which  $K_{\text{doc}}$  is entered into the IS.
- c) The BAP configuration used.

NOTE ISO/IEC 18013-3 uses information printed on the IDL in machine and/or human-readable form as  $K_{\text{doc}}$ . The SAI demarcates the information used. The first byte of the input string indicates which BAP configuration is used. For further details, see 8.3 and 8.5.

#### B.3 Protocol

BAP comprises the following steps:

- a) Document basic access keys are established using the key derivation mechanism described in B.4.

- b) The IS and the SIC mutually authenticate and derive session keys. The authentication and key establishment protocol described in B.5 is used.
- c) After successful authentication, subsequent communication is protected by Secure Messaging as described in B.6. Access shall only be granted as long as secure messaging is active.

#### B.4 Key derivation mechanism

The following key derivation mechanism is used to derive keys from a key seed ( $K_{seed}$ ) for both the establishment of the document basic access keys and the establishment of the session keys for secure messaging.

A 32-bit counter  $c$  is used to allow for deriving multiple keys from a single seed. Depending on whether a key is used for encryption or MAC computation, the following values shall be used:

- $c = 1$  (i.e. '00 00 00 01') for encryption,
- $c = 2$  (i.e. '00 00 00 02') for MAC computation.

The following steps are performed to derive a key  $K$  from the seed  $K_{seed}$  and  $c$  using the selected cryptographic hash function  $h$ :

1. Let  $D$  be the concatenation of  $K_{seed}$  and  $c$  ( $D = K_{seed} || c$ ).
2. Using  $h$ , calculate the hash  $H$  of  $D$  ( $H = h(D)$ ).
3. The  $k$  left-most bits of  $H$  form the key  $K$ .

The document basic access keys  $K_{enc}$  and  $K_{mac}$  are derived using the mechanism described above, with  $c = 1$  and  $2$  respectively. In addition, the most significant 16 bytes of the  $h(K_{doc})$  is used as the value for  $K_{seed}$ .  $h$  is the selected cryptographic hash function defined in the BAP configuration.

$K_{doc}$  should be different for every document and care should be taken to ensure that  $K_{doc}$  is sufficiently random for the intended application.

NOTE The entropy of  $K_{doc}$  is the upper bound on available entropy for the secure messaging keys. For example, if  $K_{doc}$  only provides 30 bits of entropy, the derived keys cannot contain more – even if the key size is larger.

#### B.5 Authentication and key establishment

Authentication and key establishment is provided by a three pass challenge-response protocol according to ISO/IEC 11770-2 key establishment mechanism 6 using the selected block cipher  $e$ . A cryptographic checksum according to the selected MAC algorithm  $m$  is calculated over and appended to the cipher texts. The modes of operation described in B.7 shall be used. Exchanged nonces shall have a size of 64 bits, exchanged keying material shall be  $k$  bits long. Distinguishing identifiers shall not be used.

In more detail, the IS and SIC perform the following steps<sup>1</sup>:

1. The IS requests a challenge RND.ICC by sending the GET CHALLENGE command.
2. The SIC generates and responds with a random nonce RND.ICC.
3. The IS performs the following operations:
  - a) Generate a random nonce RND.IFD and random keying material K.IFD.

<sup>1</sup> The abbreviations IS and SIC are used here are equivalent to IFD and ICC respectively as used in ISO/IEC 7501-1 (ICAO Doc 9303-1).

- b) Generate the concatenation  $S = \text{RND.IFD} \parallel \text{RND.ICC} \parallel \text{K.IFD}$ .
  - c) Compute the cryptogram  $E\_IFD = e[K_{\text{enc}}](S)$ .
  - d) Compute the checksum  $M\_IFD = m[K_{\text{mac}}](E\_IFD)$ .
  - e) Send a MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command using the data  $E\_IFD \parallel M\_IFD$ .
4. The SIC performs the following operations:
- a) Check the checksum  $M\_IFD$  of the cryptogram  $E\_IFD$ .
  - b) Decrypt the cryptogram  $E\_IFD$ .
  - c) Extract  $\text{RND.ICC}$  from  $S$  and check if the IS returned the correct value.
  - d) Generate random keying material  $\text{K.ICC}$ .
  - e) Generate the concatenation  $R = \text{RND.ICC} \parallel \text{RND.IFD} \parallel \text{K.ICC}$ .
  - f) Compute the cryptogram  $E\_ICC = e[K_{\text{enc}}](R)$ .
  - g) Compute the checksum  $M\_ICC = m[K_{\text{mac}}](E\_ICC)$ .
  - h) Send the response using the data  $E\_ICC \parallel M\_ICC$ .
5. The IS performs the following operations:
- a) Check the checksum  $M\_ICC$  of the cryptogram  $E\_ICC$ .
  - b) Decrypt the cryptogram  $E\_ICC$ .
  - c) Extract  $\text{RND.IFD}$  from  $R$  and check if the SIC returned the correct value.

## B.6 Secure messaging

After a successful execution of the authentication protocol, both the IS and the SIC compute session keys  $KS_{\text{enc}}$  and  $KS_{\text{mac}}$  using the key derivation mechanism described in B.4 with  $(\text{K.ICC} \oplus \text{K.IFD})$  as key seed. All further communication shall be protected by secure messaging (SM) as described in ISO/IEC 7816-4 according to the requirements below. The modes of operation described in B.7 shall be used.

### B.6.1 Message structure of SM APDUs

The SM data objects shall be used according to Table B.1 — Usage of SM Data Objects in the following order:

- Command APDU: [DO'87'] [DO'97'] DO'8E'.
- Response APDU: [DO'87'] DO'99' DO'8E'.

All SM data objects shall be encoded in BER-TLV as specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4. The command header shall be included in the MAC calculation, therefore the class byte CLA shall be '0C'.

The actual value of  $L_c$  will be modified to  $L_c'$  after application of secure messaging. In the protected command APDU the *new*  $L_e$  byte shall be set to '00', while the value of the original  $L_e$  byte may be conveyed in the appropriate data object.

Table B.1 — Usage of SM Data Objects

	DO'87'	DO'97'	DO'99'	DO'8E'
<b>Content</b>	Padding-content indicator byte (shall be '01') followed by the cryptogram	Le (1 or 2 bytes)	Processing status (SW1-SW2)	Cryptographic checksum (MAC)
<b>Command APDU</b>	Mandatory if data is sent, otherwise absent.	Mandatory if data is requested, otherwise absent.	Not used.	Mandatory.
<b>Response APDU</b>	Mandatory if data is returned, otherwise absent.	Not used.	Mandatory, only absent when a SM error occurs.	Mandatory if DO'87' and/or DO'99' are present.

Figure B.1 — Computation of a SM command APDUB. shows the transformation of an unprotected command APDU to a protected command APDU in the case that data and Le are available (case 4). If no data is available (case 1 and 2), leave building DO'87' out. If Le is not available (case 1 and 3), leave building DO'97' out.




Figure B.1 — Computation of a SM command APDUB.

Figure B.2 shows the transformation of an unprotected response APDU to a protected response APDU in case data is available. If no data is available, leave building DO'87' out.




Figure B.2 — Computation of a SM response APDU

## B.6.2 SM errors

When the integrated circuit in the document recognizes an SM error while interpreting a command, then the secure messaging session shall be aborted and the status words returned in plain. ISO/IEC 7816-4 defines the following status bytes to indicate SM errors:

- '6987' Expected SM data objects missing
- '6988' SM data objects incorrect

## B.6.3 Other errors

In the application context, other errors (i.e. status words other than '90 00') may occur that are protected under SM. Under these conditions SM shall not be aborted.

## B.7 Modes of operation

### B.7.1 Encryption

During encryption, the selected block cipher shall operate in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode with an initialization vector (IV) of  $n$  '0' bits.

During authentication, the data to be encrypted shall only be padded if it is not a multiple of the block cipher's block length  $n$ . During the computation of SM APDUs, data shall always be padded.

Padding according to ISO/IEC 9797-1 padding method 2 shall be used.

### B.7.2 Message authentication

Cryptographic checksums are calculated using the selected MAC algorithm with an initialization vector (IV) of  $n$  '0' bits. The MAC length shall be 8 bytes.

After a successful authentication, the datagram to be MACed shall be prepended with an 8 byte send sequence counter (SSC). If the block length  $n$  is larger than 64 bits, the SSC shall be prepended by  $n-64$  zero bits to form a full block. The SSC is incremented every time before a MAC is calculated, i.e. if the starting value is  $x$ , in the first command the value of SSC is  $x+1$ . The value of SSC for the first response is then  $x+2$ . The initial value of the SSC is computed by concatenating the four least significant bytes of RND.ICC and RND.IFD, respectively.

$$\text{SSC} = \text{RND.ICC (4 least significant bytes)} \parallel \text{RND.IFD (4 least significant bytes)}$$

### B.8 Basic access protection configurations

When selecting  $h$ ,  $e$ ,  $n$ ,  $k$  and  $m$ , IA's shall pick a valid combination, herein called "configuration", from the choices in this section.

Referring specifications shall either limit the choice of configurations to one, or specify a way to convey the chosen configuration to an IS.

NOTE The criteria for selecting a configuration are typically determined by the application's security, performance and cost requirements.

The following algorithms are used by the configurations:

- SHA-1 and SHA-256 according to ISO/IEC 10118-3;
- TDEA according to ISO/IEC 18033-3 ("Triple DES");
- AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 according to ISO/IEC 18033-3;
- ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3;
- CMAC according to NIST SP 800-38B.

Table B.2 — BAP configuration 1

One-byte identifier	'31'
OID	bap-config-1
Hash Algorithm $h$	SHA-1
Block Cipher $e$	TDEA using keying option 2. The left-most 64 bits of the 128-bit key form K1, while the right-most 64 bits form K2.
Block Length $n$	64 bits
Key Length $k$	128 bits Note that only 112 bits are effectively used by this block cipher as keying material; certain implementations may require adjustment of the remaining parity bits.
MAC Algorithm $m$	ISO/IEC 9797-1 MAC algorithm 3 with block cipher TDEA and padding method 2. TDEA is used with the keying option that $K1=K2=K3$ (reduces to DEA). For MAC calculation, the left-most 64 bits of the 128-bit key form K, while the right-most 64 bits form K'. The resulting MAC algorithm is also known as "Retail MAC".

BAP configuration 1 is equivalent to Basic Access Control (BAC) as described in ICAO Doc 9303 (ISO/IEC 7501-1), Annex A, Appendix 5.

**Table B.3 — BAP configuration 2**

One-byte identifier	'32'
OID	bap-config-2
Hash Algorithm $h$	SHA-1
Block Cipher $e$	AES-128
Block Length $n$	128 bits
Key Length $k$	128 bits
MAC Algorithm $m$	CMAC using AES-128

**Table B.4 — BAP configuration 3**

One-byte identifier	'33'
OID	bap-config-3
Hash Algorithm $h$	SHA-256
Block Cipher $e$	AES-192
Block Length $n$	128 bits
Key Length $k$	192 bits
MAC Algorithm $m$	CMAC using AES-192

Due to the explicit exclusion of AES-192 in Suite B of the United States National Security Agency, BAP configuration 3 is not recommended.

**Table B.5 — BAP configuration 4**

One-byte identifier	'34'
OID	bap-config-4
Hash Algorithm $h$	SHA-256
Block Cipher $e$	AES-256
Block Length $n$	128 bits
Key Length $k$	256 bits
MAC Algorithm $m$	CMAC using AES-256

The following ASN.1 object identifiers are used to refer to the different BAP configurations:

```
bap-config-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) standard(0) driving-licence(18013) part-3(3) security-mechanisms(2) id-sm-
BAP(1) 1
}
```

```
bap-config-2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) standard(0) driving-licence(18013) part-3(3) security-mechanisms(2) id-sm-
BAP(1) 2
}
```

```
bap-config-3 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) standard(0) driving-licence(18013) part-3(3) security-mechanisms(2) id-sm-
BAP(1) 3
}
```

```
bap-config-4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
    iso(1) standard(0) driving-licence(18013) part-3(3) security-mechanisms(2) id-sm-
BAP(1) 4
}
```

## B.9 Card Commands

### B.9.1 GET CHALLENGE

The GET CHALLENGE command receives a (true) random challenge from the card for authentication in the subsequent MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command.

**Table B.6 — Command APDU: GET CHALLENGE**

CLA	As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4
INS	0x84 GET CHALLENGE
P1	0x00 No information given
P2	0x00 (any other values reserved for future use)
Lc field	Absent
Data field	Absent
Le field	0x08

**Table B.7 — Response APDU: GET CHALLENGE**

Data field	8-byte random challenge (RND.ICC)
SW1-SW2	'9000' Normal processing Other Operating system dependent error

## B.9.2 MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE

The MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command is used to submit the host cryptogram to the card and receive the card cryptogram for mutual authentication.

**Table B.8 — Command APDU: MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE**

CLA	As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4
INS	0x82 MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
P1	0x00 reference algorithm implicitly known
P2	0x00 qualifier reference implicitly known
Lc field	Length of subsequent data field.
Data field	Host cryptogram including MAC (E_IFD    M_IFD).
Le field	0x28 (configurations 1 and 2) 0x38 (configurations 3 and 4)

**Table B.9 — Response APDU: MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE**

Data field	Card cryptogram including MAC (E_ICC    M_ICC)
SW1-SW2	'9000' Normal processing '6300' Verification failed. Host cryptogram or MAC verification failed Other Operating system dependent error

## B.10 Worked examples (informative)

This section provides worked examples for all configurations of BAP. Note that not all steps are explicitly shown.

### B.10.1 Example Using Configuration 1

Static document keying material:

$K_{doc} = '31239AB9CB282DAF66231DC5A4DF6BFBAE'$

Computation of basic access keys:

Input:  $K_{seed} = H_{SHA-1}(K_{doc})$   
 $K_{seed} = 'BFE25204D0A589510CD9C397C064CC2DAF5E952F'$

Encryption Key ( $K_{enc}$ ) computation:

- Concatenate  $K_{seed}$  and  $c$  ( $c = 1$ ):  
 $D = 'BFE25204D0A589510CD9C397C064CC2D0000001'$

2. Calculate the hash of D:  
 $H_{\text{SHA-1}}(D) = \text{'AE161CC6AFB5FB766BD20016CAC3F181E77D9428'}$
3. Form key:  
 $K_{\text{enc}} = \text{'AE161CC6AFB5FB766BD20016CAC3F181'}$   
  
 $K_1 = K_3 = \text{'AE161CC6AFB5FB76'}$   
 $K_2 = \text{'6BD20016CAC3F181'}$

Message Authentication Key ( $K_{\text{mac}}$ ) computation:

4. Concatenate  $K_{\text{seed}}$  and  $c$  ( $c = 2$ ):  
 $D = \text{'BFE25204D0A589510CD9C397C064CC2D0000002'}$
5. Calculate the hash of D:  
 $H_{\text{SHA-1}}(D) = \text{'24F522867731552B72533F5D25CC4806777D5953'}$
6. Form key:  
 $K_{\text{mac}} = \text{'24F522867731552B72533F5D25CC4806'}$   
  
 $K = \text{'24F522867731552B'}$   
 $K' = \text{'72533F5D25CC4806'}$

Authentication and Establishment of Session Keys:

IS:

1. Request an 8 byte random challenge from the document's SIC:

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'84'	'00'	'00'	'08'

Document SIC:

2. Generate random challenge and return it to IS:  
 $\text{RND.ICC} = \text{'4608F91988702212'}$

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
RND.ICC	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. Generate an 8-byte random challenge and 16-byte random keying material:  
 $\text{RND.IFD} = \text{'781723860C06C226'}$   
 $\text{K.IFD} = \text{'0B795240CB7049B01C19B33E32804F0B'}$

4. Concatenate RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD:  
 $S = '781723860C06C2264608F919887022120B795240CB7049B01C19B33E32804F0B'$
5. Encrypt  $S$  using TDEA with key  $K_{enc}$ :  
 $E\_IFD = '861D8A36082E38FB1F699FFDFAF7F903ADF74AA79E8459E50080F43ACB096B52'$
6. Compute "Retail MAC" over  $E\_IFD$  with key  $K_{mac}$ :  
 $M\_IFD = '20498D845BE458C3'$
7. Construct command data for MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and send command to the document's SIC:  
 $cmd\_data = '861D8A36082E38FB1F699FFDFAF7F903ADF74AA79E8459E50080F43ACB096B5220498D845BE458C3'$

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'00'	'82'	'00'	'00'	'28'	cmd_data	'28'

Document SIC:

8. Generate 16-byte random keying material:  
 $K.ICC = '0B4F80323EB3191CB04970CB4052790B'$
9. Calculate XOR of  $K.IFD$  and  $K.ICC$ :  
 $K_{seed} = '0036D272F5C350ACAC50C3F572D23600'$
10. Derive session keys:  
 $KS_{enc} = '969EC03B1CBFE9DDD11AB1FED206EBE4'$   
 $KS_{mac} = 'F0CA1E1EB5ADF208816B88DD579CC1F8'$
11. Initialize send sequence counter:  
 $SSC = '887022120C06C226'$
12. Concatenate RND.ICC, RND.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $R = '4608F91988702212781723860C06C2260B4F80323EB3191CB04970CB4052790B'$
13. Encrypt  $R$  using TDEA with key  $K_{enc}$ :  
 $E\_ICC = 'C8F977C50533BE2104E68A844040310A11362AF11EC09D972CE8AD3FDCB9164B'$
14. Compute "Retail MAC" over  $E\_ICC$  with key  $K_{mac}$ :  
 $M\_ICC = '9E8E43F7B5CEDB06'$
15. Construct response data and send response APDU to the IS:  
 $resp\_data = 'C8F977C50533BE2104E68A844040310A11362AF11EC09D972CE8AD3FDCB9164B9E8E43F7B5CEDB06'$

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

16. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $K_{seed} = '0036D272F5C350ACAC50C3F572D23600'$
17. Derive session keys:  
 $KS_{enc} = '969EC03B1CBFE9DDD11AB1FED206EBE4'$   
 $KS_{mac} = 'F0CA1E1EB5ADF208816B88DD579CC1F8'$
18. Initialize send sequence counter:  
 $SSC = '887022120C06C226'$

Secure Messaging:

IS

1. SELECT EF.COM (file identifier = '01 1E'):

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field
'00'	'A4'	'02'	'00'	'02'	'01 1E'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:  
 $cmd\_header = '0CA4020C80000000'$
- b) Pad data:  
 $p\_data = '011E800000000000'$
- c) Encrypt p\_data using TDEA with  $KS_{enc}$ :  
 $enc\_data = '6375432908C044F6'$
- d) Build DO'87':  
 $DO87 = '8709016375432908C044F6'$
- e) Concatenate cmd\_header and DO87:  
 $M = '0CA4020C800000008709016375432908C044F6'$
- f) Compute "Retail MAC" of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
 $SSC = '887022120C06C227'$
  - Concatenate SSC and M:  
 $N = '887022120C06C2270CA4020C800000008709016375432908C044F6'$
  - Compute MAC:  
 $CC = 'BF8B92D635FF24F8'$

- g) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E08BF8B92D635FF24F8'
- h) Construct command data:  
cmd\_data = '8709016375432908C044F68E08BF8B92  
D635FF24F8'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'A4'	'02'	'0C'	'15'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

- 2. Set EF.COM as the currently selected file and send affirmative response to IS:

Unprotected response APDU:

SW1	SW2
'90'	'00'

- a) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- b) Compute "Retail MAC" of DO99 with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '887022120C06C228'
  - Concatenate SSC and DO99:  
N = '887022120C06C22899029000'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = 'FA855A5D4C50A8ED'
- c) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E08FA855A5D4C50A8ED'
- d) Construct response data:  
resp\_data = '990290008E08FA855A5D4C50A8ED'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

- 3. READ BINARY of the first 4 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le

'00'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'04'
------	------	------	------	------

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:  
cmd\_header = '0CB0000080000000'
- b) Build DO '97':  
DO97 = '970104'
- c) Concatenate cmd\_header and DO97:  
M = '0CB0000080000000970104'
- d) Compute "Retail MAC" of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '887022120C06C229'
  - Concatenate SSC and M:  
N = '887022120C06C2290CB0000080000000970104'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = 'ED6705417E96BA55'
- e) Build DO '8E':  
DO8E = '8E08ED6705417E96BA55'
- f) Construct command data:  
cmd\_data = '9701048E08ED6705417E96BA55'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

- 4. Return 4 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 0:

data = '600D5F01'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:  
p\_data = '600D5F0180000000'
- b) Encrypt p\_data using TDEA with  $KS_{enc}$ :  
enc\_data = 'F9435D056E27C52E'
- c) Build DO '87':  
DO87 = '870901F9435D056E27C52E'

- d) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':  
M = '870901F9435D056E27C52E99029000'
- f) Compute "Retail MAC" of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '887022120C06C22A'
  - Concatenate SSC and M:  
N = '887022120C06C22A870901F9435D056E27C52E99029000'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '0C15238078E0A4C9'
- g) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E080C15238078E0A4C9'
- h) Construct response data:  
resp\_data = '870901F9435D056E27C52E990290008E080C15238078E0A4C9'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

- 5. READ BINARY of the remaining 11 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'04'	'0B'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:  
cmd\_header = '0CB0000480000000'
- b) Build DO '97':  
DO97 = '97010B'
- c) Concatenate cmd\_header and DO97:  
M = '0CB000048000000097010B'
- d) Compute "Retail MAC" of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '887022120C06C22B'
  - Concatenate SSC and M:  
N = '887022120C06C22B0CB000048000000097010B'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '40900A27C4C390D6'

- e) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E0840900A27C4C390D6'
- f) Construct command data:  
cmd\_data = '97010B8E0840900A27C4C390D6'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'04'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

- 6. Return 11 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 4:

data = '04303130305C04616B6567'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:  
p\_data = '04303130305C04616B65678000000000'
- b) Encrypt p\_data using TDEA with  $KS_{enc}$ :  
enc\_data = 'B3CD0334417393661AA9B39206EC89CC'
- c) Build DO'87':  
DO87 = '871101B3CD0334417393661AA9B39206EC89CC'
- d) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':  
M = '871101B3CD0334417393661AA9B39206EC89CC99029000'
- f) Compute "Retail MAC" of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '887022120C06C22C'
  - Concatenate SSC and M:  
N = '887022120C06C22C871101B3CD0334417393661AA9B39206EC89CC99029000'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '0747E8CEC180EB48'
- g) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E080747E8CEC180EB48'

- h) Construct response data:  
 resp\_data = '871101B3CD0334417393661AA9B39206  
 EC89CC990290008E080747E8CEC180EB  
 48'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

### B.10.2 Example Using Configuration 2

Static document keying material:

$$K_{\text{doc}} = \text{'3255CA83CC52EC6454DE7AFB1D3DA66F4E'}$$

Compute Basic Access Keys

Input:  $K_{\text{seed}} = H_{\text{SHA-1}}(K_{\text{doc}})$   
 $K_{\text{seed}} = \text{'4D9AE55D18986679B8F39740755E53DF48FE152A'}$

Encryption Key ( $K_{\text{enc}}$ ) computation

- Concatenate  $K_{\text{seed}}$  and  $c$  ( $c = 1$ ):  
 $D = \text{'4D9AE55D18986679B8F39740755E53DF  
 00000001'}$
- Calculate the hash of  $D$ :  
 $H_{\text{SHA-1}}(D) = \text{'F5C60770CF201E80C091A1564D979235  
 18876DD8'}$
- Form key:  
 $K_{\text{enc}} = \text{'F5C60770CF201E80C091A1564D979235'}$

Message Authentication Key ( $K_{\text{mac}}$ ) computation

- Concatenate  $K_{\text{seed}}$  and  $c$  ( $c = 2$ ):  
 $D = \text{'4D9AE55D18986679B8F39740755E53DF  
 00000002'}$
- Calculate the hash of  $D$ :  
 $H_{\text{SHA-1}}(D) = \text{'B6A66D80D698B5B1C6A0AA8C94CCC39D  
 8ACE393A'}$
- Form key:  
 $K_{\text{mac}} = \text{'B6A66D80D698B5B1C6A0AA8C94CCC39D'}$

Authentication and Establishment of Session Keys:

IS

- Request an 8 byte random challenge from the document's SIC:

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'84'	'00'	'00'	'08'

Document SIC:

2. Generate random challenge and return it to IS:  
RND.ICC = 'E72450C17A59DF40'

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
RND.ICC	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. Generate an 8-byte random challenge and 16-byte random keying material:  
RND.IFD = '41C51B949D4FD786'  
K.IFD = '766F9E2B2B503AFBEB420BED8D1A73A8'
4. Concatenate RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD:  
S = '41C51B949D4FD786E72450C17A59DF40  
766F9E2B2B503AFBEB420BED8D1A73A8'
5. Encrypt S using AES with key  $K_{enc}$ :  
E\_IFD = '8335EB0A44172C8124C82F30F6F0E2E2  
192E8881208D50E4EF53744CB460E090'
6. Compute CMAC over E\_IFD with key  $K_{mac}$ :  
M\_IFD = '0D612FFE0699676C'
7. Construct command data for MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and send command to the document's SIC:  
cmd\_data = '8335EB0A44172C8124C82F30F6F0E2E2  
192E8881208D50E4EF53744CB460E090  
0D612FFE0699676C'

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'00'	'82'	'00'	'00'	'28'	cmd_data	'28'

Document SIC:

8. Generate 16-byte random keying material:  
K.ICC = 'C1655F49E136D12B8522B1C99510E71B'
9. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $K_{seed}$  = 'B70AC162CA66EBD06E60BA24180A94B3'

10. Derive session keys:  
 $KS_{enc} = 'AB9497F5819AB69A25A7798789061CF8'$   
 $KS_{mac} = '1FBF06A0DE775C473D64B5E9933290D3'$
11. Initialize send sequence counter:  
 $SSC = '7A59DF409D4FD786'$
12. Concatenate RND.ICC, RND.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $R = 'E72450C17A59DF4041C51B949D4FD786$   
 $C1655F49E136D12B8522B1C99510E71B'$
13. Encrypt R using AES with key  $K_{enc}$ :  
 $E\_ICC = 'D95197A57FB69D9104AD5F9C291FE712$   
 $B1FD32BEC3D711743EFEA62EB975251C''$
14. Compute CMAC over E\_ICC with key  $K_{mac}$ :  
 $M\_ICC = 'BD7D520A3E783182'$
15. Construct response data and send response APDU to the IS:  
 $resp\_data = 'D95197A57FB69D9104AD5F9C291FE712$   
 $B1FD32BEC3D711743EFEA62EB975251C$   
 $BD7D520A3E783182'$

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

16. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $K_{seed} = 'B70AC162CA66EBD06E60BA24180A94B3'$
17. Derive session keys:  
 $KS_{enc} = 'AB9497F5819AB69A25A7798789061CF8'$   
 $KS_{mac} = '1FBF06A0DE775C473D64B5E9933290D3'$
18. Initialize send sequence counter:  
 $SSC = '7A59DF409D4FD786'$

Secure Messaging:

IS:

1. SELECT EF.COM (file identifier = '01 1E');

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field
'00'	'A4'	'02'	'00'	'02'	'01 1E'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:  
 $cmd\_header = '0CA4020C800000000000000000000000'$



- b) Compute CMAC of DO99 with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '7A59DF409D4FD788'
  - Concatenate padded SSC and DO99:  
N = '0000000000000007A59DF409D4FD788  
99029000'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '98AB75F63BE65DD8'
- c) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E0898AB75F63BE65DD8'
- d) Construct response data:  
resp\_data = '990290008E0898AB75F63BE65DD8'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

- 3. READ BINARY of the first 4 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'04'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:  
cmd\_header = '0CB00000800000000000000000000000'
- b) Build DO '97':  
DO97 = '970104'
- c) Concatenate cmd\_header and DO97:  
M = '0CB0000080000000000000000000000000  
970104'
- d) Compute CMAC of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '7A59DF409D4FD789'
  - Concatenate padded SSC and M:  
N = '0000000000000007A59DF409D4FD789  
0CB0000080000000000000000000000000  
970104'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '67BB878136DD4520'
- e) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E0867BB878136DD4520'





Document SIC:

6. Return 11 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 4:

data = '04303130305C04616B6567'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:  
p\_data = '04303130305C04616B65678000000000'
- b) Encrypt p\_data using AES with  $KS_{enc}$ :  
enc\_data = '36B83A1FBAC98D89DDDA2235AD29A8BB'
- c) Build DO'87':  
DO87 = '87110136B83A1FBAC98D89DDDA2235AD29A8BB'
- d) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':  
M = '87110136B83A1FBAC98D89DDDA2235AD29A8BB99029000'
- f) Compute CMAC of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :  
- Increment SSC:  
SSC = '7A59DF409D4FD78C'  
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:  
N = '00000000000000007A59DF409D4FD78C87110136B83A1FBA  
C98D89DDDA2235AD29A8BB99029000'  
- Compute MAC:  
CC = 'FA99B42BF9D1B884'
- g) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E08FA99B42BF9D1B884'
- h) Construct response data:  
resp\_data = '87110136B83A1FBAC98D89DDDA2235AD29A8BB990290008E08FA99B42BF9D1B884'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

**B.10.3 Example Using Configuration 3**

Static document keying material:

$$K_{\text{doc}} = \text{'33B59B332F43A1AC5311DE3C8CE009340F57B53210E3A7C092'}$$

Compute Basic Access Keys:

Input:

$$K_{\text{seed}} = H_{\text{SHA-256}}(K_{\text{doc}})$$

$$K_{\text{seed}} = \text{'D409C6CC7292EA567501E127D2A3FDF28140F1483C053F1AA1F9D10B05B2F5DF'}$$
Encryption Key ( $K_{\text{enc}}$ ) computation:

1. Concatenate  $K_{\text{seed}}$  and  $c$  ( $c = 1$ ):  
 $D = \text{'D409C6CC7292EA567501E127D2A3FDF200000001'}$
2. Calculate the hash of  $D$ :  
 $H_{\text{SHA-256}}(D) = \text{'BB30BD6D81A16BF71D4C96BEAA8714C2895E2B010B97832C7A876CA7C371008B'}$
3. Form key:  
 $K_{\text{enc}} = \text{'BB30BD6D81A16BF71D4C96BEAA8714C2895E2B010B97832C'}$

Message Authentication Key ( $K_{\text{mac}}$ ) computation:

4. Concatenate  $K_{\text{seed}}$  and  $c$  ( $c = 2$ ):  
 $D = \text{'D409C6CC7292EA567501E127D2A3FDF200000002'}$
5. Calculate the hash of  $D$ :  
 $H_{\text{SHA-256}}(D) = \text{'35E8880F471F29430BC3FE3376706DF218465DC8C5635E8E79D264BEB0A7CA0E'}$
6. Form key:  
 $K_{\text{mac}} = \text{'35E8880F471F29430BC3FE3376706DF218465DC8C5635E8E'}$

Authentication and Establishment of Session Keys:

IS:

1. Request an 8 byte random challenge from the document's SIC:

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'84'	'00'	'00'	'08'

Document SIC:

2. Generate random challenge and return it to IS:  
RND.ICC = 'A724E1735E5D5B63'

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
RND.ICC	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. Generate an 8-byte random challenge and 24-byte random keying material:  
RND.IFD = 'DBA0881FC039F4B4'  
K.IFD = '82D950B0EF5C5B36AF3FB362F7431AC1  
A8EC1A4581CAF682'
4. Concatenate RND.IFD, RND.ICC and K.IFD; and add padding:  
S = 'DBA0881FC039F4B4A724E1735E5D5B63  
82D950B0EF5C5B36AF3FB362F7431AC1  
A8EC1A4581CAF682800000000000000000'
5. Encrypt S using AES with key  $K_{enc}$ :  
E\_IFD = '799BEADC2659E2F07668F320D277AD0D  
D18F4714BED4B29D340FB8B3B6515EB0  
69979518B04DD7A1A0AA54FC8204253E'
6. Compute CMAC over E\_IFD with key  $K_{mac}$ :  
M\_IFD = '360A2A7E4912A35D'
7. Construct command data for MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and send command to the document's SIC:  
cmd\_data = '799BEADC2659E2F07668F320D277AD0D  
D18F4714BED4B29D340FB8B3B6515EB0  
69979518B04DD7A1A0AA54FC8204253E  
360A2A7E4912A35D'

Command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'00'	'82'	'00'	'00'	'38'	cmd_data	'38'

Document SIC:

8. Generate 16-byte random keying material:  
K.ICC = '3C2F19D7B42105F25C81B07C78E57BF4  
5818DB906CB9360D'
9. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $K_{seed}$  = 'BEF649675B7D5EC4F3BE031E8FA66135  
F0F4C1D5ED73C08F'
10. Derive session keys:  
 $KS_{enc}$  = '0E6F93A7699C8EB5FE3B0CF30BC1EAF8'

2796411E137058EA'  
 $KS_{mac} = '86D8E8AE5752B1C8268D8566F973BCB6$   
 $E1383A083F65181A'$

11. Initialize send sequence counter:  
 $SSC = '5E5D5B63C039F4B4'$
12. Concatenate RND.ICC, RND.IFD and K.ICC; and add padding:  
 $R = 'A724E1735E5D5B63DBA0881FC039F4B4$   
 $3C2F19D7B42105F25C81B07C78E57BF4$   
 $5818DB906CB9360D8000000000000000'$
13. Encrypt R using AES with key  $K_{enc}$ :  
 $E\_ICC = '0F6DD1745961AD4B490CEA9A9438BAF2$   
 $B346C15373C9762C6D73729DD8042F42$   
 $D38BFBC5C2815377DEC2261A7E7091E4$
14. Compute CMAC over E\_ICC with key  $K_{mac}$ :  
 $M\_ICC = 'F1A924D6231626A2'$
15. Construct response data and send response APDU to the IS:  
 $resp\_data = '0F6DD1745961AD4B490CEA9A9438BAF2$   
 $B346C15373C9762C6D73729DD8042F42$   
 $D38BFBC5C2815377DEC2261A7E7091E4$   
 $F1A924D6231626A2'$

Response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

16. Calculate XOR of K.IFD and K.ICC:  
 $K_{seed} = 'BEF649675B7D5EC4F3BE031E8FA66135$   
 $F0F4C1D5ED73C08F'$
17. Derive session keys:  
 $KS_{enc} = '0E6F93A7699C8EB5FE3B0CF30BC1EAF8$   
 $2796411E137058EA'$   
 $KS_{mac} = '86D8E8AE5752B1C8268D8566F973BCB6$   
 $E1383A083F65181A'$
18. Initialize send sequence counter:  
 $SSC = '5E5D5B63C039F4B4'$



Document SIC:

2. Set EF.COM as the currently selected file and send affirmative response to IS:

Unprotected response APDU:

SW1	SW2
'90'	'00'

- a) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- b) Compute CMAC of DO99 with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '5E5D5B63C039F4B6'
  - Concatenate padded SSC and DO99:  
N = '0000000000000005E5D5B63C039F4B6  
99029000'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '5ACDD04195E4D582'
- c) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E085ACDD04195E4D582'
- d) Construct response data:  
resp\_data = '990290008E085ACDD04195E4D582'

Protected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
resp_data	'90'	'00'

IS:

3. READ BINARY of the first 4 bytes:

Unprotected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Le
'00'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'04'

- a) Mask class byte and pad command header:  
cmd\_header = '0CB00000800000000000000000000000'
- b) Build DO '97':  
DO97 = '970104'
- c) Concatenate cmd\_header and DO97:  
M = '0CB00000800000000000000000000000  
970104'

- d) Compute CMAC of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '5E5D5B63C039F4B7'
  - Concatenate padded SSC and M:  
N = '00000000000000005E5D5B63C039F4B7  
0CB00000800000000000000000000000  
970104'
  - Compute MAC:  
CC = '42A89F1958CB432C'
- e) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E0842A89F1958CB432C'
- f) Construct command data:  
cmd\_data = '9701048E0842A89F1958CB432C'

Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'00'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

- 4. Return 4 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 0:

data = '600D5F01'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:  
p\_data = '600D5F01800000000000000000000000'
- b) Encrypt p\_data using AES with  $KS_{enc}$ :  
enc\_data = 'CE7B3391BE1A2270A0772F99A90606CA'
- c) Build DO'87':  
DO87 = '871101CE7B3391BE1A2270A0772F99A9  
0606CA'
- d) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':  
M = '871101CE7B3391BE1A2270A0772F99A9  
0606CA99029000'
- f) Compute CMAC of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :
  - Increment SSC:  
SSC = '5E5D5B63C039F4B8'
  - Concatenate padded SSC and M:  
N = '00000000000000005E5D5B63C039F4B8'



Protected command APDU:

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Command Data Field	Le
'0C'	'B0'	'00'	'04'	'0D'	cmd_data	'00'

Document SIC:

6. Return 11 bytes of EF.COM starting at offset 4:

data = '04303130305C04616B6567'

Unprotected response APDU:

Response Data Field	SW1	SW2
data	'90'	'00'

- a) Pad data:  
p\_data = '04303130305C04616B65678000000000'
- b) Encrypt p\_data using AES with  $KS_{enc}$ :  
enc\_data = 'D3B264B934AB8E7BDA7DCEEEEDA79AA39'
- c) Build DO'87':  
DO87 = '871101D3B264B934AB8E7BDA7DCEEEEDA79AA39'
- d) Build DO'99':  
DO99 = '99029000'
- e) Concatenate DO'87' and DO'99':  
M = '871101D3B264B934AB8E7BDA7DCEEEEDA79AA3999029000'
- f) Compute CMAC of M with  $KS_{mac}$ :  
- Increment SSC:  
SSC = '5E5D5B63C039F4BA'  
- Concatenate padded SSC and M:  
N = '00000000000000005E5D5B63C039F4BA871101D3B264B934AB8E7BDA7DCEEEEDA79AA3999029000'  
- Compute MAC:  
CC = 'C7F1FA5FD19FA478'
- g) Build DO'8E':  
DO8E = '8E08C7F1FA5FD19FA478'